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THEME AND VARIATIONS IN STATUTORY 
PRECLUSIONS AGAINST SUCCESSIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY 
EPA AND CITIZENS 
PART ONE: 
STATUTORY BARS IN CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS 
Jeffrey G. Miller* 
When Congress enacted our modern environmental statutes' in the 
1970s, it sought to provide effective enforcement.* It adopted several strate- 
gies to achieve that end, one of which was authorizing multiple enforcers 
against violations of the statutes: the Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA"), states, and private  citizen^.^ It reasoned that three potential en- 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. White Plains, N.Y. The author es- 
pecially thanks three students whose help was invaluable in preparing this Article. Lisa 
Jackson, Pace Law School LL.M. '02, who challenged his preconceptions and made him 
reexamine several issues, particularly the "to require compliance" language in the citizen 
suit bars; Sharon Bridglalsingh, Pace Law School LL.M. '02; and Erin Flanagan, Pace Law 
School J.D. '05. The author first presented the concepts elaborated in Parts II.B.2 and 1I.D. I at 
the 2003 Widener Law Review Symposium, "Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysome- 
thing: A Celebration and a Summit," on April 3, 2003, and published the sections as Over- 
looked Issrres in rhe "Diligenr Prosecution" Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 63 
(2003). 
The environmental statutes discussed in this Article are the pollution control statutes, 
including: the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. $3 7401-7671q (2000); the Clean Water 
Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1250-1387 (2000); the Resource Conservation & Recovery 
Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. $5 6901-6992k (2000); the Comprehensive Environmental Re- 
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. $ $  9601-9675 (2000); 
the Federal Insecticide. Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. $5 136-136y 
(2000); the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. $5 2601-2692 (2000); the 
Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. $5 300f to 300j-26 (2000'); the Marine 
Protection, Research. and Sanctuaries Act ("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1401-1445 (2000); 
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRKA"), 42 U.S.C. 
$5 I lOOl-1 1050 (2000). 
William L. Andreen, The Evolrrtion of Water Pollrction Control in the Unired States- 
Srare, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972, Part I ,  22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145 (2003) 
(detailing the failure of and dissatisfaction with earlier water pollution control efforts that 
led to the enactment of modern water pollution control legislation in 1972). Prominent 
among these factors was the failure of government, particularly state governments, to irn- 
plement and enforce earlier legislation. Id. at 194-99. 
Congress directly authorized EPA and citizens to enforce the statutes in specific EPA 
and citizen enforcement provisions. It indirectly authorized states to enforce the statutes by 
authorizing them to implement and enforce state programs in place of the federal program. 
See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (2000). For an example of a state using the citizen 
suit authority, see United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992). In addition, 
by authorizing an interested "person" to bring a citizen suit and defining "person" to include a 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 401 2004 
402 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 28 
vironmental plaintiffs would provide more comprehensive enforcement 
than one. But Congress recognized that empowering three enforcers could 
result in successive enforcement actions against the same violations, pos- 
sibly causing duplication and conflict in. enforcement proceedings and 
remedies. To limit duplication and conflict, it developed a three-element 
(notice, delay, and bar) preclusion device against some successive enforce- 
ment. It placed versions of the device in all of the statutes' citizen suit 
provisions and in many of their EPA enforcement provisions. The device 
generally bars subsequent citizen enforcement if the government "has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting . . . an action . . . to require com- 
p l ian~e ."~  EPA enforcement may be barred by state actions, and either EPA 
or state actions may bar citizen enforcement. 
Many defendants have argued the preclusion device shields them from 
citizen and EPA enforcement actions when a state takes any action, no mat- 
ter how weak or ineffective. Their arguments raise diverse legal issues 
and have resulted in a plethora of judicial decisions interpreting the de- 
vice. Most of the reported decisions concern the preclusive effect of state 
enforcement on citizen  action^.^ Courts interpreting the provisions on 
these issues6 divide into two camps: (1) those interpreting the device in 
accordance with its plain meaning, often favoring successive enforcers, 
and (2) those interpreting it to give deference to prosecutorial discretion, 
often disfavoring successive enforcers. The circuits split on some of the is- 
sues, clearing the way for the Supreme Court to resolve the division.' 
"State," i t  indirectly authorized states to use the federal citizen suit authorities that author- 
ize any "person" to enforce. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. $§ 1365(g) (2000). It adopted other 
strategies for effective enforcement, primarily strict civil liability and severe sanctions and 
remedies in the enforcement provisions. See, e.g., id. $5  1319, 1365. 
CAA $ 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. $ 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). The corresponding language 
in the citizen suit provisions of the other statutes is identical or virtually so. 
This could reflect either the fact that states take more enforcement actions than EPA 
(see infrrr note 68 and accompanying text) or the perception of citizen enforcers that EPA 
enforcement actions are more effective than state actions, or a combination of both. See 
also infru note 8. 
The issues are discussed infru in Part 11. 
' These splits occur most clearly under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g) (2000), which 
will be examined in Part Two. Under (6)(A)(ii) & (iii) of that provision. a state action may 
preclude a citizen suit only if the state acts under "a State law comparable to this subsec- 
tion" or under "such comparable State law." The First and Eighth Circuits have interpreted 
the provision broadly to allow almost any state action to block a citizen suit. See Ark. 
Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that state authority 
need not afford citizens the same right of participation in enforcement as the federal stat- 
ute, as long as it provides some meaningful participation); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the state is not required 
to act under authority that is comparable to the federal enforcement subsection to block a 
citizen suit, as long as it has comparable authority elsewhere in its arsenal of enforcement 
remedies). The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the provision more 
narrowly to allow a citizen suit in the face of state action. See McAbee v. City of Ft. Payne, 
318 F.3d 1248 ( 1  lth Cir. 2003) (holding that state authority must be comparable to federal 
provision in all regards to block citizen suit); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that state authority must provide citizen with same rights of 
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There is obvious potential for procedural duplication and conflict 
from allowing successive enforcement actions. As discussed below, Con- 
gress recognized that disallowing all successive enforcement actions would 
pose a profound danger to achieving compliance with environmental re- 
quirements and therefore opted to limit rather than eliminate the potential. A 
bar on all successive enforcement actions would likely encourage a ra- 
tionally acting violator, when faced with the prospect of zealous enforce- 
ment action, to solicit an immediate action by an enforcer i t  perceives to 
be less zealous, often the state.8 By soliciting and settling that action on 
relatively favorable terms, the violator could invoke the preclusion device 
to avoid more effective action by another enforcer. This is not a hypo- 
thetical chimera; judicial decisions detail examples and commentators report 
i t  to be a common p r a ~ t i c e . ~  In over 125 reported citizen suits, almost all 
of the decisions examined in Part I1 of this Article, citizens filed com- 
plaints after states had taken action that citizen plaintiffs believed to be 
unacceptably weak. 
The desire of some courts to honor the state's prosecutorial discretion 
by interpreting the preclusion device liberally encourages violators to 
seek the protection of state enforcement. The danger here is not merely that 
less effective enforcement nlay oust more effective enforcement; rather, the 
graver danger is that settlements between violators and state enforcers for 
remedies short of compliance may block subsequent enforcement for 
compliance with federal law. That result effectively allows agreements be- 
tween violators and state enforcers, with the support of federal courts, to 
amend and weaken the federal statutes. Of course, much state enforcement 
is strong and effective and does not raise this specter. Fortunately, the 
preclusion device is worded to distinguish between effective and ineffec- 
tive government enf~rcement. '~ But some courts disregard the distinction, to 
the detriment of the statutes and environmental protection. There is a major 
irony in the proclivity of some courts to be zealous guardians of prose- 
cutorial discretion from the perceived ravages of citizen suits; prosecutors 
participation as federal statute to block citizen suit); Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1  1 1  (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that state must act under 
authority comparable to federal enforcement section to block citizen suit, even if state has 
comparable authority elsewhere in its arsenal of enforcement remedies). 
See supra note 5 .  The tendency of violators to seek the protection of state rather than 
EPA enforcement could also reflect the fact that states generally can act faster than EPA. 
Thus it may be possible for the state to commence an action within the time period allowed 
for preclusion, while EPA may not be able to do so. An attorney for the DOJ noted that the 
federal government seldom files preclusive actions after receiving sixty day notices of 
violations from potential citizen enforcers because, among other reasons "it generally takes 
EPA longer than sixty days to develop an enforcement referral." Mark R. Haag, The De- 
partment of Justice's Role in Monitoring Environmental Citizen Suits (1997) (unpublished 
paper on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
See infro notes 388-390 and accompanying text. 
'OThe preclusion device bars citizen suits only when the government has taken action 
"to require compliance," see ittfra Part II.B.2. 
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are not seeking the protection of the courts, but violators are. Indeed, when 
state and federal prosecutors are heard in citizen enforcement cases, they 
support the maintenance of citizen suits." That they do so is clear evidence 
that citizen suits do not interfere with the work of government enforcers 
or with the results they have achieved in earlier enforcement actions.I2 
That violators are the vocal proponents of honoring the prosecutor's dis- 
cretion should be greeted with skepticism, for their self-interest benefits 
from favoring the weakest enforcer. 
This two-part Article examines the preclusion device, its legislative 
history, and the decisions interpreting it. Part One examines the device in 
citizen suit provisions. Part Two, to be published subsequently, will ex- 
amine the device in EPA enforcement provisions. The two parts develop 
a unified interpretation of the device in both sets of enforcement provi- 
sions to resolve the tension between achieving compliance and protecting 
prosecutorial discretion. The Article concludes that Congress meant ex- 
actly what it wrote and enacted: the device solely precludes the succes- 
sive enforcement it actually addresses. Several of the most common can- 
ons of statutory interpretation lead inexorably to this interpretation.I3 But a 
phenomenon not yet observed by the courts or commentators is even more 
suggestive of it. The preclusion device is a theme with many variations. 
While Congress constantly employed the theme of the device throughout 
the statutes, it employed variations of the theme's three elements in the 
different provisions, reflecting the varying roles it intended EPA, the states 
and, to a lesser extent, citizens to play in the implementation and en- 
forcement of each statute.I4 The result is a nuanced pattern of variations, 
suggesting that Congress intended the meanings of the constants in the pro- 
visions to be identical, and the variations in them to have singular meanings. 
The linchpin of the device is the bar element that precludes succes- 
sive action when the government has commenced and is diligently prose- 
cuting an enforcement action. The one issue not resolved by the words 
that Congress used in the device is the meaning of "diligent prosecution." 
The term is not precise, and Congress failed to define it. But the preclu- 
sions bar citizen suits only when the government "is diligently prosecut- 
ing . . . an action . . . to require compliance." Only compliance with the 
statutes can secure the environmental protections that are their very pur- 
poses. The wording of the preclusion device and the purposes of the stat- 
utes, therefore, suggest that diligent prosecution is prosecution that has 
brought or reasonably can be expected to bring about compliance. This is 
also consistent with the test that federal courts apply when they review 
consent decrees under the statutes: determining whether they are consis- 
See infra note 388 and accompanying text. 
'*See infra Parts 1.C-.D. 
j 3  Including the plain meaning, expressio unius, in pari material, and narrow reading 
of exceptions canons. See infra note 32. 
l4 See infra Part I .  
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tent with and carry out the statutes.I5 This strikes a principled balance 
between the divided judicial interpretations of the preclusion, affording 
the government prosecutor deference in how she attains compliance, yet 
barring subsequent suit only if she attains compliance. 
The preclusion device does not stand alone in governing when suc- 
cessive enforcement actions may be brought and pursued. Both general 
statutory provisionsI6 and common law doctrines" may apply as well. The 
degree to which the preclusion device supplants these provisions and doc- 
trines or the extent to which they are interrelated are not explored by this 
Article. l 8  
Introduction ........................................................................................... 407 
I. The Environmental Statutes' Enforcement Provisions and 
Their Preclusions ...................................................................... 412 
A. Impacts of Federalism ......................................................... 412 
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions ................ 414 
........... C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions 416 
.......................... 1. Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions 41 7 
2. Legislative History ............................................................ 420 
D. An Anomaly: CWA 9 309(g) .................................................... 425 
11. Interpreting Preclusions in Citizen Suit Provisions To Implement 
Their Plain Meanings ...................................................................... 426 
A. What Government Entities May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ..... 429 
1. What "Administrator" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ..... 429 
2. What "State" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ................... 430 
a. States, Municipalities, and Indian Tribes ................... 431 
b. States with Unapproved Programs .............................. 434 
B. What Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit? ................ 435 
1. When the Statute Provides that Particular Government 
Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit, May Other Government 
Actions Bar It? ................................................................ 436 
a. Where the Statute Provides that Only Court 
Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit ................................. 436 
b. Where the Statute Provides that Several 
Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit ............. 444 
l5 See infra notes 351-353 and accompanying text. 
l6 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 1738 (2000) (providing, inter alia, "full faith and credit" for state 
judicial decisions in every court in the country). 
" For example, res judicata, issue preclusion, abstention, and mootness. 
Others have begun to do so. See William V. Luneburg, Claim Preclusion as it Affects 
Non-Parties to Clean Air Act Enforcement Actions: The Ghosts of Gwaltney, 10 WIDENER 
L. REV. 113 (2003); and William D. Benton, Application of Res Judicara and Collareral 
Estoppel to EPA Overjling, 16 B.C. ENVTL.  AFF. L. REV. 199 (1988). See also infra note 300 
and accompanying text. 
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Congress placed nearly twenty versions of the preclusion device in 
the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions of the environmental stat- 
utes. Its repeated use of the device signals the importance of the under- 
lying tension Congress intended it to resolve: authorization of multiple 
enforcers to assure full compliance and recognition that successive en- 
forcement could result in conflict and duplication. Congress's repetition 
of the constants in the device establishes that Congress chose it to resolve 
those tensions. Congress's use of variations in the device establishes that 
it resolved the tensions differently in the various enforcement provisions. 
This theme and variations pattern suggests Congress intended the words 
it used in each device to mirror the division of enforcement authority it 
envisioned in that provi~ion. '~ 
Most courts faithfully interpret the device in each provision according 
to its plain meaning, often favoring successive enforcement. Some courts, 
however, ignore the device's plain meaning and interpret it with defer- 
ence to the prosecutorial discretion of the first enforcer, often disfavoring 
successive enforcement. These latter courts not only misinterpret the provi- 
sion, they undermine the integrity of the statutes. They encourage viola- 
tors to invite ineffective actions by the weakest government enforcers, 
anticipating that courts will forever bar later actions by others seeking 
compliance. These courts unwittingly aid violators to enshrine violation, 
rather than compliance, as their norm under the federal statutes. 
A return to the era during which Congress enacted the environmental 
statutes illuminates why Congress authorized multiple enforcers of the 
environmental statutes and the role it intended the preclusion device play 
in the enforcement scheme. Prior to the 1970s, federal environmental legis- 
lation was either non-existent,20 not oriented to environmental protec- 
t i ~ n , ~ '  or lacking effective federal enforcement authority and entirely def- 
erential to state action.22 Instead, the federal government assisted states by 
l9 In CAA 5 113, for instance, Congress established two approaches for EPA adminis- 
trative and civil actions against violators. Where the violation is of a state established re- 
quirement, EPA must first give the State a notice of the violation and wait thirty days be- 
fore proceeding. If the violation is of an EPA established requirement, EPA may proceed 
without the notice and delay. Compare 5 113(a)(l) with 5 113(a)(3). 
20 TSCA, MPRSA, CERCLA, and EPCKRA had not been enacted. 
" At the time FIFRA was focused at protecting pesticide users by assuring the efficacy 
of pesticides rather than protecting the environment from inappropriate pesticide use. 
Although there were nascent federal CWA, CAA and RCRA programs, they largely 
relied on state regulation. Federal enforcement provisions were weak or non-existent. The 
early history of federal water pollution control programs, for instance, is detailed in Andreen, 
supra note 2. For a contemporary account of the shortfalls of pollution control efforts, see 
DAVID ZWICK & MARY BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971). The cumbersome federal 
enforcement mechanisms are described in Murray Stein, The Actual Operation of the Fed- 
eral Water Pollution Control Administration, 3 NAT. RESOURCES L. 47 (1970). 
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partially funding their regulatory programs and conducting research.23 
Cleveland's burning Cuyahoga River, killer smog in southern California, 
and other environmental catastrophes in the late 1960s testified to the 
inadequacy of these measures and coalesced growing public concern about 
environmental degradation. During the first Earth Day in 1970, an estimated 
twenty million people demonstrated across the country to demand envi- 
ronmental protection. During the 1970s, Congress heeded the demand of 
Earth Day and, in a bipartisan effort, enacted comprehensive and effec- 
tive legislation to protect the e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  
Much of the resulting legislation embraced variations of cooperative 
federalism, with EPA establishing standards to protect the environment 
and EPA or states implementing the federal standards. Most of the stat- 
utes offered states the option of implementing the federal statute with an 
EPA-approved state program. But mindful of past experience, Congress pro- 
vided EPA oversight of state implementation. Indeed, Congress granted 
EPA a broad range of enforcement authorities to assure prompt compli- 
ance with federal mandates, regardless of whether EPA or a state imple- 
mented the federal program. Thus, when EPA approves a state program, 
the state may enforce against violations of the state program and EPA 
may enforce against violations of the federal statute, creating the possi- 
bility that both a state and EPA would enforce against the same violating 
acts. To ameliorate the possibility of conflict and duplication from suc- 
cessive enforcement, Congress created a preclusion device in the EPA en- 
forcement provisions, with considerable variations among them, mirror- 
ing the different balances it struck between federal and state authorities 
in different statutes.25 
Congress was not content with creating strong EPA enforcement 
authorities. Not confident that federal and state authorities would fully 
enforce against violations of the statutes, it also authorized citizens to en- 
force through an ingenious new device, the citizen suit provision. The 
device added members of the interested public, acting as private attorneys 
general,26 to the existing federal and state environmental enforcement cad-, 
23 E.g. ,  Act of June 30, 1948, c. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. 
24 The statutes considered in this Article, see supra note 1, were all enacted or entirely 
revamped to their present forms in the 1970s, except CERCLA and EPCKRA, which were 
enacted in 1980. 
25 In TSCA, Congress envisioned no role for state implementation and in 5 16, for in- 
stance, authorized EPA to enforce against violations with no notice to the state. On the 
other hand, Congress envisioned almost exclusive state implementation of the RCRA solid 
waste regulatory program and in 5 4005(c)(2) authorized EPA to enforce against violations 
only in states lacking EPA-approved programs. 
26 The House Report on the CWA alluded to the ''private attorney general" doctrine de- 
veloped in case law. H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 132 (1972), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 753, 821 
(1973) (hereinafter "CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"). See Middlesex Sewerage Authority v. 
Nat'l Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1981). The Court first used the term in New- 
man v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), and has frequently used it in discussing 
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res. To ameliorate the possibility of conflict and duplication from succes- 
sive government and citizen actions, Congress placed different versions 
of the same preclusion device in the citizen suit provisions. It incorpo- 
rates three elements: (1) a notice of violat i~n,~ '  (2) a delay between the 
notice and the commencement of enfor~ement ,~~ and (3) a bar on enforce- 
ment if a government enforcer has already commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting an enforcement action. For each of the above elements, Con- 
gress developed a range of variations. 
The preclusion device was the child of a Congress seeking full com- 
pliance through more and better enforcement. Congress accepted succes- 
sive enforcement against the same violations as a consequence; none of 
its versions of the preclusion device prevented all successive enforcement. 
The preclusion device, as an exception to the robust enforcement authori- 
ties, should be narrowly construed, consistent with the canon that "provi- 
sos and statutory exceptions should be read narrowly" to protect the general 
rule.29 A corollary to the canon is that exceptions to exceptions should be 
construed broadly to protect the general rule. This corollary, in turn, sug- 
gests that limitation on the operation of the preclusion device be inter- 
preted broadly to restrict the preclusions, thus protecting the general author- 
ity for EPA and citizen suits.30 The device in citizen suit provisions, for in- 
stance, limits government actions that may bar citizen suits to govern- 
ment actions for compliance. Following the corollary canon, courts should 
assure that government actions actually seek compliance before allowing 
them to bar citizen suits. 
The Supreme Court has commented that the structure and wording of 
the citizen suit provisions are so similar across the statutes that Congress's 
private enforcement of environmental, antitrust and civil rights statutes. Judge Jerome 
Frank appears to have coined the term iii Assoc. i'ndus. v. ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 
1943). See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (2002). See also 
discussion in Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst., 1992 WL 315188, at *4 
(D. Md.). 
27 For instance, it required citizens to give notice to EPA and the violator in TSCA, 15 
U.S.C. 2619(b)(2)(B) (2000), but to EPA, the violator, and the appropriate state in CWA 
505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000). The difference reflects the greater role 
that Congress established for states in the CWA than in TSCA. 
28For instance, in RCRA § 7002(b)(l) & (2), 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(1) & (2) (2000), 
Congress required citizens to give notice ninety days in advance of filing suit against im- 
minent and substantial endangerments, sixty days in advance of filing against violations of 
non-hazardous waste provisions, and an unspecified time in advance of filing suit against 
violations of hazardous waste provisions. 
29 See WILLIAM N .  ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 324 (1994) 
(citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). See also NORMAN J. SINGER, STAT- 
UTES A N D  STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.8 and 47.1 1,  (6th ed. 2000). This is another 
of the intrinsic canons flowing from the plain meaning canon. 
30''The logical extension of [the principle that exceptions should be construed nar- 
rowly] is that exceptions to the exceptions should be broadly construed." McCune v. Or. 
Senior Sews. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1 1  13 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Estate of Shelfer v. Comm'r 
of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 1045, 1049 11.13 (I lth Cir. 1996); New Castle County v. Hart- 
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1199 n.67 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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use of the same or different terms in a particular provision is significant 
in interpreting it.31 The theme and variations nature of the preclusion de- 
vice suggests even more forcefully that the devices be read in pari mate- 
ria, i.e., "similar statutes should be interpreted ~ i m i l a r l y , " ~ ~  but in a more 
sophisticated manner. The theme and variations nature of the device, with 
some elements and words recurring from one provision to the next and 
others changing, emphasizes suggests the deliberate nature of Congress's 
word choices. The constants in the device should be interpreted in the 
same manner and the differences should be interpreted singularly. The 
words Congress used in a particular provision express its precise intent 
and should be interpreted literally, consistent with the two most common 
canons of construction, the plain meaning rule and expressio unius, i.e., 
"follow the plain meaning of the statutory text: and "expression of one 
thing suggests the exclusion of others."33 When Congress placed the pre- 
clusion device in the EPA or citizen suit provisions, it intended the exact 
bars to successive enforcement it stated in the device, and no others. Con- 
gress's pervasive use of the device in the EPA and citizen enforcement 
provisions also suggests that when Congress intended to preclude succes- 
sive enforcement, it did so in the preclusion device it placed in the enforce- 
ment provision, rather than by implying it from another part of the statute.34 
Congress achieved its goal of greatly increasing compliance by 
strengthened enforcement. Federal enforcement and citizen suits have 
played a large role in the i m p r ~ v e r n e n t . ~ ~  Courts interpreting the preclu- 
sion device in accordance with its plain meaning, often favoring succes- 
sive enforcement, forward the congressional goal. However, compliance 
)' "Congress used identical language in the citizen suit provisions of several other en- 
vironmental statutes that authorize only prospective relief. Moreover. Congress has dem- 
onstrated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how to avoid this prospective im- 
plication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past violations." Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). The Court found 
differences between the wording of citizen suit provisions in different statutes significant 
and differences between the wording of similar provisions in the same statute "[elven more 
on point." Id. at 57 n.2. 
3Z ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 327 (citing Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); 
TWA, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 326 (1989); Communications 
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); and Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations 
Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 51 1 (1987)). See also SINGER, supra note 29, at 5 5  51.01-.08, 
particularly 5 5 1.03. 
33 ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 323 (citing cases where the canons were applied). 
j4 This is particularly relevant in rejecting the contention that the provisions governing 
EPA's approval of state permit programs suggests state enforcement actions bar subsequent 
EPA enforcement actions. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). 
Part Two will address this in detail. 
'=To serve as a successful deterrent, civil penalties must be assessed in an amount 
"high enough to insure that polluters cannot simply absorb the penalty as a cost of doing 
business . . . . Additionally, the probability that a penalty will be imposed must be high enough 
so that polluters will not choose to accept the risk that non-compliance will go unpun- 
ished." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 
491-92 (D.S.C. 1995). 
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is far from universal and enforcement against violators is far from univer- 
Courts interpreting the preclusion device in derogation of its plain 
meaning, often disfavoring successive enforcement, not only ignore con- 
gressional intent, they thwart compliance with federal environmental pro- 
tection requirements. Indeed, they threaten the integrity of the federal stat- 
utes. They encourage violators to invite ineffective actions by weak en- 
forcers, in the expectation that courts will bar subsequent enforcement 
for compliance, thus making violation rather than compliance the norm. 
While some of these courts may be hostile to citizen enforcement, most 
simply interpret the provisions to defer to prosecutorial discretion, blindly 
following an ill-conceived, off-hand comment by the Supreme Court that 
citizen enforcement supplements rather than supplants government en- 
forcement." More importantly, these courts fail to understand that Congress 
severely limited such deference by the wording of its preclusion devices 
and that successive enforcement rarely interferes with the results the 
prosecutor obtained in the initial action." If successive enforcement often 
interfered with prosecutorial discretion, we could expect to hear prosecutors 
complaining. But they are not. Indeed, when. they are heard on this issue, 
prosecutors generally favor citizen suits without qua l i f i~a t ion .~~  Ironi- 
36 David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Lnw in a Triangular Federal Sys- 
tem: Can Three Not Be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United 
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 M D .  L. REV. 1552, 1647-51 (1995). See also 
Victor Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Wa-  
ter Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1997). Study after study by the General Accounting 
Office and EPA's own Inspector General conclude that there is widespread non-compliance 
with the statutes and that EPA and the states do not enforce against many of the violations. 
Hodas at 1603- 17. 
" See infra Part 1II.B. 
'* See infrrr Part 1II.A. 
39 See, e.g. ,  Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
EPA argued that RCRA Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted) open-dumping 
regulations were enforceable by citizens despite EPA approval of state plan); Citizens for a 
Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 11 11, l l 18 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that 
EPA agreed with citizens that only state penalty assessment orders could bar citizen suits 
under CWA Q 309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town 
of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 n.8 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that EPA argued that only states 
with approved CWA permit programs can issue orders that may bar citizen suits); SPIRG 
of N.J.. Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(stating that EPA, New Jersey and New York argued that EPA CWA Q 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 
Q 1319(a) compliance order was not an action in court); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laid- 
law Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 474 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that EPA brief 
"generally supported" citizen enforcer's positions). Similarly, EPA officials have testified 
before congressional committees in support of citizen suits. See, e.g., Pending Clean Water Act 
Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Nat. Res. Of the Horrse Comm. on 
Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 212-13 (1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman, 
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA); The Water Quality Act of 1994, and Issues 
Related to Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before the Subcomm. on 
Water Res. and Env't of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290 
(1994) (statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA). 
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cally, it is the violators who argue for prosecutorial d i s c r e t i ~ n . ~ ~  When 
lawbreakers extol respect for prosecutorial decisions, we should all beware. 
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES' ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS AND 
THEIR PRECLUSIONS 
This Part examines: (1) the enforcement authorities that environmental 
statutes4' grant to citizen enforcers; (2) their preclusions against successive 
enforcement for the same violations; and (3) the legislative history of the 
authorities and their preclusions. But first it describes the diverse feder- 
alism strategies Congress adopted in the different statutes-strategies that 
explain much of the variation in the preclusion devices, particularly in EPA 
enforcement provisions. 
A. Impacts of Federalism 
Federal environmental statutes follow two general federalist strate- 
gies relevant to understanding the preclusion device. The first gives EPA 
authority to implement and enforce the statutory program, with little or 
no role for states.42 Congress usually adopts this approach to regulate activi- 
ties of single or centralized industries, such as registering pesticides as safe 
for sale or determining allowable emissions from motor vehicles. The sec- 
ond strategy provides roles for both EPA and states in implementing and 
enforcing the statutory program.43 Congress usually adopts this approach 
to regulate widespread and decentralized pollution producing sources, such 
40 Industry spokesmen before a House subcommittee hearing on amendments to the 
CWA, including the administrative penalty authority that became CWA Q 309(g), testified 
that EPA had no business enforcing against violations of the CWA in states with approved 
CWA permit programs. A spokesperson for the Chemical Manufacturers' Association 
stated, "CMA urges that the Act be amended to give the states the sole authority to enforce 
state issued NPDES permits." Possible Amendments to  the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and 
Transp., 97th Cong. 966 (1982) (statement of Monte Throdahl, Sr. V.P. of Monsanto Chem. 
Co.). He further stated that "EPA should not be allowed to bring an enforcement action for 
a permit violation occurring in states administering approved programs. States that have 
assumed exclusive responsibility for implementation of NPDES program should be given 
sole enforcement responsibility." Id. at 987. A spokesperson for the American Paper Insti- 
tute testified that EPA penalty actions could result in "undercutting state NPDES agency 
enforcement efforts. There is no useful purpose to be served by EPA initiating a separate 
enforcement action from that already undertaken by a state permitting agency." Id. at 939 
(statement of Peter E. Wrist, V.P. for Forest Products, Mead Corp). Not surprisingly, both 
opposed enactment of CWA Q 309(g), as did all other industry spokespeople testifying. 
41  See supra note 1. 
42TSCA, 15 U.S.C. Q Q  2605 & 2615 (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. Q Q  9604 & 9606 
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. #$ 1412 & 1415 (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. $8 136a & 136v (2000); 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q Q  7521-7554 (2000). 
43 CAA, 42 U.S.C. $8 7401-76714, except for $9 7521-7554 (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
$9 1313, 1313a, 1329, 1341, 1342, & 1344 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q Q  6926, and 6942- 
6949a (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. QQ 136v & 136u (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. $5 300g-1-300g-3 
(2000). 
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as pesticide use or solid waste disposal. Statutes establishing multiple regu- 
latory programs may employ both strategies for different purposes.44 
Statutes following the first strategy give EPA sole regulatory author- 
ity, but provide a variety of accommodations with states. Some give states 
no role,45 and some actually preempt state r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Others, however, 
explicitly allow parallel state programs and authorize EPA to accomplish 
its mission by contracting with states.47 Statutes adopting the second fed- 
eral partnership strategy generally authorize EPA to establish national 
standards and allow states that so desire to assume the primary role in 
implementing them. These statutes establish a default EPA authority to im- 
plement the standards if a state elects not to do so or fails to meet the federal 
requirements. They also typically provide a variety of mechanisms for EPA 
oversight of implementation by states that elect to assume the primary 
role48 and for EPA enforcement regardless of whether states have assumed 
the primary implementation role. Some of the laws mix programs with 
stronger and weaker state roles.49 All but one of the statutes also provide for 
enforcement by citizens acting as private attorneys generaL50 
The CAA, for instance, adopts the first strategy for its program regulating automo- 
bile emissions, 42 U.S.C. QQ: 752 1-7554 (2000), and the second strategy for regulation of 
emissions from other sources, 42 U.S.C. QQ: 7401-743 1 (2000). 
45 See, e.g., MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. $9  1401-1445 (2000), regulating disposal of material 
in international waters, with little role for states. 
46 CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q 7543 (2000), preempts states from'regulating motor vehicle emis- 
sions (other than ORVs), with the exception of California. 
47 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. Q 9604(d) (2000). 
48 The CAA, CWA and Subchapter I11 (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) of RCRA 
follow this model, establishing permit programs that may be administered by EPA or states, 
with EPA as the default administrator. If a state wishes to administer a program, it must 
establish a program that EPA approves as meeting all the requirements of the federal stat- 
ute. EPA may withdraw its approval from the state program if it ceases to meet the federal 
requirements. CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q: 1342(b) & (c) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) & (e) 
(2000); and CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q 7661a(d) & (i) (2000). Under the CAA provision, however, 
EPA may impose sanctions on non-complying states rather than withdrawing its approval 
of their programs. 42 U.S.C. Q 7661a(i) (2000). 
49 RCRA incorporates both types of programs. Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter 
D as enacted) authorizes EPA to establish standards to be met by non-hazardous waste 
landfills, but leaves it to states to administer programs to assure compliance with the stan- 
dards. 42 U.S.C. Q Q  6941-6941a (2000). If the states fail to do so, the statute gives EPA no 
authority to administer the program in their stead but gives it only limited enforcement 
authority to enforce against landfills not meeting the standards. On the other hand, Sub- 
chapter Ill (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) authorizes EPA to establish standards to 
be met by hazardous waste handling facilities, 42 U.S.C. Q 6924 (2000), and contemplates 
that states will administer programs to assure compliance with the standards. 42 U.S.C. Q 6926 
(2000). If the states fail to do so, the statute requires EPA to do so and gives it strong 
authority to enforce against facilities not meeting the standards. 42 U.S.C. Q 6928 (2000). 
FIFRA contains no citizen suit authorization. This anomaly is explained by the dif- 
fering jurisdictions of congressional authorizing committees over the statutes. All of the 
other statutes have in common at least one Senate or House authorizing committee with 
jurisdiction over other environmental statutes (the House Commerce Committee or the 
Senate Environment Committee), but FIFRA's authorizing committee in both chambers is 
the Agriculture Committee. 
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Congress rarely reflected the differences it intended in the federalist 
balances between EPA and states in the range of enforcement authorities 
that it provided EPA and citizen enforcers. Congress often did reflect dif- 
ferences in federalist balances, however, in the preclusions it placed on 
the exercise of those authorities. This was particularly true with regard to 
EPA enforcement authority: Congress generally placed no preclusion on 
EPA enforcement in programs in which EPA was granted authority to 
implement and enforce with little or no role for  state^,^' but placed a wide 
variety of preclusions on EPA enforcement in programs with shared 
authority to implement and enforce between EPA and states. On the other 
hand, Congress placed a more uniform preclusion on citizen suits, re- 
gardless of whether implementation authority is shared between EPA and 
the states.52 Thus, federalism considerations prompted the enactment of 
and many of the variations in the preclusion devices, particularly in the EPA 
enforcement provisions. 
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions 
Congress developed quite different variations for each of the preclu- 
sion device's three elemenkS3 They may or may not require the potential 
enforcer to delay commencement of its enforcement action for periods up 
to ninety days. They may or may not bar the potential enforcer from com- 
mencing particular actions, or any actions, if another enforcer has already 
commenced any action or a particular action. The many possible combi- 
nations of these variations provide Congress a nuanced device, with a wide 
See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. $ 5  2615 & 2647 (2000). 
52  Compare CAA, 42  U.S.C. $ 7413(a)(3) & (4) (2000) (requiring EPA to notify a state 
afrer EPA takes enforcement action in the state) with SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5  300h-2(c)(5) 
(2000) (barring some EPA enforcement actions if the state has taken particular enforcement 
actions). This may be because states had pollution control laws and bureaucracies before Con- 
gress found federal legislation and a federal bureaucracy necessary. Though Congress en- 
acted strong federal environmental legislation in the 1970s because states had failed to 
assure environmental protection and, in particular, had failed to enforce existing environ- 
mental law, Congress maintained a strong state presence in much of the new legislation. 
See Andreen, supra note 2, at 194-99. See, e.g., CWA. 33 U.S.C. $ 1251(b) (2000) ("It is 
the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution."). Resulting tensions be- 
tween state and federal laws and bureaucracies were inevitable, and a rich literature has docu- 
mented those tensions. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regu- 
lation: A P~iblic Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). Federalist tensions in 
environmental enforcement have also been subject to study and commentary. See CLIFFORD 
RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT A N D  
THE STATEIFEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (2003); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based 
Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory 
and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 1 (2000); Hodas, supra note 36; Robert R. Kuehn, 
The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
2373 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrijce? Problems of Federalism in Man- 
dating State lmplementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977). 
53 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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spectrum of effects on successive enforcement against the same viola- 
tions. The broad range of variations that Congress crafted for the device 
underscores its understanding of federalism concerns. The congressional 
judgments can best be given their correct meaning by following the can- 
ons of statutory interpretation and giving the preclusions' different wordings 
different meanings. 
The statutes provide an arsenal of EPA enforcement remedies, ranging 
from simple notices of violation54 to criminal incarceration and fines.5s 
Between are administrative orders to assess penalties,56 require complian~e,~' 
revoke permits,58 stop sales,59 recall products,60 seize goods,6' prohibit 
federal grants or contracts to violating fa~il i t ies;~? and civil judicial ac- 
tions to assess penalties,63 to enjoin compliance,@ to ban new connections 
to sewers,65 and to abate imminent and substantial endangerment~.~~ 
Some provide augmented incarceration and fines for knowing violations 
that place others in peril of life or limb.67 While EPA and states have 
many potential enforcement actions to invoke, they conduct most en- 
forcement by issuing administrative orders. EPA directs about ten percent 
of its enforcement effort, and states direct about five percent or less of 
their enforcement effort toward judicial actions.68 
Congress included the preclusion device in many of the EPA enforce- 
ment provisions, with considerable variations in the three elements of the 
basic notice, delay, and bar provisions, ranging from no preclusion to almost 
s4CAA. 42 U.S.C. 3 7413(a)(I) (2000). 
55 Id. 3 7413(c). 
56 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 13 19(g) (2000). 
57 Id. fj 1319(a)(l) & (3). 
58 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3 6928(a)(3) (2000). 
59 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 3 136k(a) (2000). 
GCAA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 7541(c) (2000). 
61 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. fj 136k(b) (2000). 
6'CWA, 33 U.S.C. 8 1368 (2000). 
63 Id. 3 13 19(d). 
Mid. 3 1319(b). 
65 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1342(h) (2000). 
66 Id. 3 1364. 
67 Id. 3 13 19(c)(3). 
68Between 1977 and 1989. EPA annually referred to the DOJ between 20 and 60 cases 
for criminal prosecution, and between 100 and 350 cases for civil action. It also issued 
between 1000 and 4000 administrative orders annually. EPA, No. 20E-2001. ENFORCE- 
MENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT: FY 1989 15-17, illustrations 1-3 (1990). at http:ll 
w w w . e p a . g o v l C o m p l i a n c e l r e s o u r c e s / r e p o ~  1989accomp-rpt.pdf. 
Between 1985 and 1989, state environmental agencies annually referred between 400 and 
900 cases to their attorneys general for judicial action and issued between 8500 and 12,500 
administrative orders. Id. at 19, illustrations 5-6. Federal and state enforcement maintained 
these rough ratios in later years. In 1994, for instance, EPA referred to the DOJ 220 cases 
for criminal prosecution and 430 cases for civil prosecution, while EPA initiated 3,600 
administrative enforcement actions on its own. At the same time, states took somewhat 
over 11,000 enforcement actions. EPA, No. 300-R-95-004, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLI- 
ANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT: FY 1994 2-2 to 2-3,4-2 to 4-8 (1995), or http:// 
w w w . e p a . g o v l C o m p l i a n c e l r e s o u r c e s l r e p o ~  
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complete preclusion. Where a provision falls on the preclusion spectrum 
is a function of the relative strength of EPA authority in the balance Con- 
gress struck between federal and state implementation of the program 
being enforced. From the strongest to the weakest EPA enforcement provi- 
sions (and the correspondingly strongest to the weakest preclusion devices), 
they: (1) impose no preclusion on EPA enforcement in a statute author- 
izing exclusive federal irnplementati~n;~~ (2) require EPA to notify the 
state after EPA takes enforcement action against a violation of federally 
established standards in the state;70 (3) require EPA to give the state notice 
before EPA takes enforcement action against a violation of state estab- 
lished standards in the state;7' (4) require EPA to give the state notice before 
EPA takes enforcement action against a violation in the state and bar EPA 
action if the states takes "appropriate" enforcement action against the viola- 
ti or^;^* (5) bar EPA from taking some enforcement actions against a vio- 
lation if EPA or the state has taken specific enforcement actions against 
the violation;73 and (6) bar EPA from taking any enforcement action 
against a violation if the state has taken "appropriate" action.74 States have 
similar arsenals of enforcement remedies in their statutes. 
The legislative history of the EPA enforcement provisions empha- 
sizes the relative enforcement roles of EPA and states in particular stat- 
u t e ~ . ~ ~  While this history sheds little direct light on how Congress intended 
the preclusions to be applied, it does make clear that it intended the pre- 
clusions to achieve in the enforcement arena the federalist balances it 
struck in the different statutes.76 
C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions 
All but one of the major statutes provide for citizen e n f ~ r c e m e n t ~ ~  
(CAA S)  304,78 CWA S)  505,79 RCRA S)  7002,80 CERCLA 5 310,8' TSCA 
69TSCA, 15 U.S.C. $5  2615 & 2647 (2000). 
70 CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(3) & (4) (2000) (enforcement against federally developed 
requirements). 
7 1  Id. 5 7413(a)(2) (enforcement against state developed requirements). 
72 SDWA, 42 U.S.C. $ 5  300g-3(a) & 300h-2(a) (2000). 
73 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(g) (2000). 
74 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 5 136w-1 (a) (2000). 
75 For an articulation of the roles of the federal and state governments in enforcement 
in the CAA, see S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 21-22 (1970), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HIS- 
TORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (hereinafter "CAA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY"), at 401, 421-22; and in CWA, see S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73-74 (1971), re- 
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3735-39. 
76 Id. 
77 See supra note 50. 
78 42 U.S.C. 5 7604 (2000). 
79 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000). 
42 U.S.C. 5 6972 (2000). 
Id. 5 9659 (2000). 
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$ 20,82 SDWA 4 1419,8WPRSA 4 105(g),84 and EPKRA $ 326).85 They 
authorize citizens to sue EPA for failing to perform a duty mandated by 
the statute (a statutory mandamus action) and to sue violating members 
of the regulated public. While all three elements of the preclusion apply 
to citizen suits against members of the regulated public, only the first two 
apply to citizen mandamus actions against EPA. All of the statutes authorize 
courts to issue injunctions requiring members of the regulated public to 
comply with statutory requirements and most, but not all, authorize courts to 
assess civil penalties against the violators.86 RCRA authorizes citizen 
suits to abate imminent and substantial endangerments, akin to a statu- 
tory common law of public nuisance action,87 and authorizes citizen en- 
forcement for some violations in which EPA lacks authority to enforce.88 
While the statutes provide a narrower range of remedies to citizens than 
to EPA, the difference results almost entirely from the administrative and 
criminal enforcement mechanisms granted to EPA and not to citizens: 
enforcement mechanisms that, by their very nature, are available only to 
the government. 
1. Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisiorzs 
The citizen suit provisions of the various environmental statutes are 
modeled on CAA 5 304.89 Indeed, the citizen suit provisions in the differ- 
15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000). 
R3 42 U.S.C. 9: 300j-8 (2000). 
84 33 U.S.C. 9 1415(g) (2000). 
8542 U.S.C. 11046 (2000). 
86 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1365(a) (2000). See also MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1415(g)(l) 
'Q (g)(4) (2000). 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3: 6972(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
"RCRA 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000) authorizes citizens to en- 
force against violations of this "act," i.e., all of RCRA. This includes violations of Sub- 
chapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted), encouraging states to establish pro- 
grams to control the disposal of non-hazardous solid waste to meet EPA established stan- 
dards. See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997). EPA lacks such authority 
except in limited circumstances. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 6945(c)(2)(A) (2000). EPA's general 
enforcement authority in 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000), extends only to violations of 
Subchapter 111 (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) of RCRA. 
8942 U.S.C. 7604 (2000). Both the House and Senate Reports on the CWA, for ex- 
ample, acknowledge the provision's origin in the CAA. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2000) is "modeled on the provision enacted in  the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970," 
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745. The section 
"closely follows the concepts utilized i n  section 304 of the Clean Air Act." H. REP. NO. 
92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 753, 820 (1973). In- 
deed, they are so alike that the Senate Report on the CWA's citizen suit provision follows 
the Senate Report on the CAA's citizen suit provision almost paragraph by paragraph and 
word for word. Compare S. REP. NO. 91 - 1 196, at 36-39 (1970), reprinted CAA LEGISLA- 
T I V E  HISTORY, at 401, 436-39 (1974) with S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971), reprinted 
in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1415, 1497-1500 (1973). This is particularly significant 
because the provision in the CAA originated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the 
House bill. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5374,5388. 
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ent statutes are so nearly alike that courts commonly interpret one of them 
by comparing and contrasting its wording with the wordings of others 
and by using legislative history and precedent from the others.90 Section 
304 of the CAA contains the preclusion device with notice, delay, and 
bar elements in forms followed closely by the citizen suit provisions in 
the other statutes. It provides that: 
No action may be commenced. . . 
. . . prior to 60  days after plaintiff has given notice of the viola- 
tion [to EPA, the state and the violator] . . . or 
if [EPA or the state] has commenced and is diligently prosecut- 
ing a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to re- 
quire compliance with the standard, limitation, or order [sought 
to be enforced by the citizen]. . . .9' 
Under the notice and delay elements, citizens must give the government 
the first opportunity to sue in court.92 Under the bar element, citizens may 
not sue if the government has filed an action to require compliance and is 
diligently prosecuting it. If the federal government takes such a preclu- 
sive action in federal court, however, a citizen may intervene as a matter 
of right.93 The citizen suit provisions in the other statutes share these fea- 
90See  Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 615 (treating the CAA and RCRA citizen 
suit provisions alike); Gwaltney of Smithfield. Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 57 (1987) (comparing wording of CWA provisions to citizen suit provisions of 
several other statutes); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1987), 
aff 'd 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (comparing the citizen suit provisions of the CAA and RCRA); 
Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (employing CAA 
citizen suit provision legislative history to interpret CWA citizen suit provision); NRDC v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (employing CAA citizen suit provision 
legislative history to interpret CWA citizen suit provision); Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 
755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990) (interpreting SDWA citizen suit provision); SPIRG of 
N.J.. Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc. 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (D.N.J. 1984), crff'd 
759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1983). United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 
968, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing the wording of citizen suit sections in the CAA, 
CWA, and RCRA). 
" CAA Q 304, 42 U.S.C. 1 7604(b)(l) (2000). 
92 A few variations on the notice and delay provision should be noted. All of the stat- 
utes require that citizens give notice to EPA before suing it  for failure to perform a man- 
datory duty. Although most of the statutes require a sixty-day post-notice delay before a 
citizen may file suit against a violating polluter, RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(2)(A) (2000), 
requires citizens to give EPA a ninety-day post-notice delay before they may file a suit to 
abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. On the other hand, many of the statutes 
do not require a post-notice delay period before citizens may sue for particular violations, 
often associated with hazardous substances, although prior notice must still be given. 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 1 6972(b)(2) (2000). for instance, requires prior notice but no delay 
period for citizens filing complaints alleging violations of Subchapter I11 (as encoded, 
Subchapter C as enacted), regulating the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste. 
See also CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(b) (2000). 
9'See CAA, 42 U.S.C. ji 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). Most of the citizen suit provisions, like 
CAA Q 304, 42 U.S.C. Q 7604 (2000), allow "any person" to intervene. CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
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tures; indeed, the "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting" lan- 
guage in the bar element is identical in  most of them.94 
There are, however, four variations among the bar elements of the 
preclusion device in the citizen suit provisions. First, the citizen suit pro- 
visions of statutes not envisioning a state implementation role do not bar 
citizen suits because of a state action.y5 Second, several of the citizen suit 
provisions bar citizen suits when EPA has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a criminal action.96 Third, some citizen suit provisions bar 
citizen suits if EPA has commenced assessing an administrative penalty9' 
or has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an 
administrative penalty.98 Finally, RCRA bars some citizen suits if EPA or 
states have commenced one of a variety of judicial or administrative re- 
medial actions under either RCRA or CERCLA.99 
CERCLA § 113(h)'0° precludes citizen suits challenging that a 
CERCLA remedial action violates the statute, as long as the remedial action 
"is [yet] to be undertaken." But this precludes an action for judicial re- 
view of final EPA actions, rather than an action for enforcement against 
violations by the regulated public. It is also a postponement of judicial re- 
view rather than a preclusion of it. Thus it is not the sort of preclusion 
addressed in this Article. It does demonstrate, however, that when Con- 
gress intends to include a different sort of preclusion, i t  does so explic- 
itly, not inferentially. 
This examination of preclusions in citizen suit provisions would be 
purely academic if citizens rarely used the provisions. While this Article 
cites more than one hundred twenty-five reported decisions in citizen suit 
cases, reliable statistics on the number of citizen suits filed are hard to 
develop. The first empirical evaluation of the conduct and results of citi- 
Q 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. Q 300j-8(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
Q 6972(b)(l) (2000). EPCKRA 9: 326(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(h)(2) (2000), however, 
qualifies those who may intervene, and TSCA 9: 20(b)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. Q 26 19(b)(l)(B) 
(2000). allows only those parties to intervene who have given notice of citizen suit before 
the government filed suit. 
94 Except as noted in the text below, it is identical in the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)(l)(B) 
(2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. (i 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. (i 300j-8(b)(l)(B) 
(2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 5 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); and EPCKRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(e) 
(2000). 
95See ,  e .g . ,  TSCA, 15 U.S.C. (i 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); EPCKRA, 42 U.S.C. (i I1046(e) 
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1415(g)(2) (2000). 
96See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(l)(B) 
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. (i 1415(g)(l)(D) (2000). See also Endangered Species Act 
("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. 9: 1540(g)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). 
97 See, e .g. ,  MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1415(g)(2)(C) (2000). See also ESA, 16 U.S.C. 
9: 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
98See ,  e .g . ,  TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9: 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); EPCRKA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(e) 
(2000). The CWA includes a bar on EPA and citizen suits for penalties when EPA or a state 
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an administrative penalty 
or has assessed and collected such a penalty. 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g)(6) (2000). 
99 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 6972(b)(2) (2000). 
loo 42 U.S.C. (i 96 13(h) (2000). 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 419 2004 
Harvard Environrnental Law Review 
Zen suits noted that no-one kept comprehensive files of citizen suits, making 
it difficult or impossible to compile complete statistics on them.I0' Based 
primarily on interviews, the study determined that up to 100 citizen suits 
a year were filed in the early 1980s. Congress subsequently amended the 
citizen suit provisions of some of the statutes, requiring that citizen 
plaintiffs serve EPA and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") with copies 
of complaints and proposed settlements, making it easier to compile sta- 
tistics on them. A recent survey of citizen suits based on copies of com- 
plaints on file with the DOJ concluded that citizen suit filings averaged 
less than fifty cases a year from 1987 to 2000.102 That is inherently an 
underestimate, however, for only some of the statutes require citizens to 
furnish copies of complaints to the government.Io3 Indeed, another survey 
reported that citizen suit filings averaged over 100 a year over the same 
period.lO" In any event enough citizen suits are filed to seriously annoy 
the regulated community and to convince the authorizing committee in 
the Senate of their value.lo5 
2. Legislative History 
The legislative history indicates the overriding intent of Congress in 
authorizing citizen suits was to provide for both more frequent and ef- 
fective enforcement and to provide for citizen participation in enforce- 
ment. Congress reasoned that citizen enforcement would both prod the 
government to enforce and enable others to enforce when the government 
failed to do  so. Qualifying that purpose was a desire to assure that citizen 
enforcement did not unduly duplicate, disrupt, or  conflict with govern- 
ment enforcement or harass violators. Because the citizen suit provisions 
are modeled upon CAA 9 304, courts commonly cite the legislative his- 
tory of that section to determine the legislative intent of citizen suits un- 
der subsequently enacted statutes.lo6 Examination of the statutory preclu- 
sions in citizen suits therefore begins with the legislative history of CAA 
ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT UNDER EPA-ADMINI- 
STERED STATUTES, 11- l to 7 (1984). 
'02 Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 156 (2002). 
Io3 Compare CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(c)(3) (2000), and CWA, 33 U.S.C. (i 1365(c)(3) 
(2000) (both requiring such measures), with RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972 (2000), and 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 5 9659 (2000) (not requiring so). 
I M  James R. May. Norv More than Ever: Trends in Environmer~tal Citizen Suits at 30, 
I0 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 24 tbl. 4 (2003). 
' 05  A later Senate Committee Report commented: "Citizen suits are a proven enforce- 
ment tool. They operate as Congress intended to both spur and supplement to government 
actions. They have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gains. In the past 
two years, the number of citizen suits to enforce [CWA] permits has surged so that such 
suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement under this Act." S. REP. NO. 
99-50, at 28 (1985). 
'"See supra notes 89-90. 
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5 304 and proceeds to the legislative histories of citizen suit provisions in 
other statutes. 
This is particularly significant because the provision in the CAA origi- 
nated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the House bill.Io7 The leg- 
islative history of the citizen suit provision, therefore, is largely, but not 
entirely, contained in the evolution of the section in successive drafts of 
the Senate bill, in the Senate debates, Senate Committee Report, and the 
Conference Committee Report. The history does not appear particularly 
contentious, but the CAA was enacted during days when Congress was 
marked by comparative civility. The early 1970s were an era of biparti- 
sanship on environmental legislation, and efforts were made on both sides of 
the aisle to promote such ~p i r i t . ' "~  Both chambers considered the citizen 
suit provision an expansion into the enforcement arena of the opportuni- 
ties for citizen participation that characterized the revitalized environ- 
mental l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ' ~ ~  
The sponsors of the bill and proponents of the citizen suit provision, 
mostly Democrats, justified it as an antidote to previously unambitious 
enforcement by the executive branch and states. "Government initiative in 
seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Author- 
izing citizens to bring suits for violations . . . should motivate govern- 
mental . . . enforcement and abatement  proceeding^.""^ This, of course, 
impugned the environmental bona fides of the administration, which was 
Republican at the time. In an apparent effort to promote bipartisanship,"' 
the sponsors changed their emphasis: "I think it is too much to presume 
that, however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agen- 
cies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations" of all the re- 
quirements of the statute, making citizen suits a default enforcement mecha- 
lo' H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 
5388. 
Io8 Senator Scott, a Republican, heralded the CAA as representing "the highest form of 
non partisan political cooperation." 116 CONG. REC. 33,101 (1970). reprinted in CAA 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. at 223, 349 (1974). 
'@The Senate Report stated the CAA citizen suit provision "would provide citizen 
participation in the enforcement of standards and regulations under this Act." S. REP. NO. 
91-1 196, at 36 (1970). reprinted in CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 436 (1974). 
Senator Muskie, the chief sponsor of the legislation commented, "the bill extended the 
concept of public participation to the enforcement process." 116 CONG. REC. 42,382 (1970). 
Senator Cooper commented, "The committee bill also breaks new ground in extending 
public participation, an essential element throughout the act. to enforcement proceedings." 
116 CONG. REC. 33,l 17 (1970). This is echoed in the House Report on CWA $ 505, in 
which the public participation provisions of the statute are described as being prompted by 
public frustration at feeling excluded from the administrative process in earlier pollution 
control regulation. See CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 753. 821. 
S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 37 (1 970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 
40 1, 436-47 ( 1974). 
" I  Senator Hruska included in  the record a memorandum from his staff that com- 
plained bitterly that "[nlever before in the history of the United States has the Congress 
proceeded on the assumption that the Executive Branch will not carry out the Congres- 
sional mandate." 1 16 CONG. REC. 32,925 (1 970). 
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nism when the government lacks the resources to enforce."* Despite this 
changing emphasis, it is clear throughout the legislative history that a major 
goal of the provision was to encourage government enforcement.Il3 Un- 
der either rationale, the chief purpose of the provision was to provide a 
new enforcement tool, in the hopes of more and better enforcement over- 
all.Il4 Indeed, the Senate Reports for both the CAA and CWA emphasized 
that in bringing such actions "citizens would be performing a public serv- 
ice.)9115 
Opponents of CAA 5 304 were generally restrained. They did speculate 
that plaintiffs would bring vexatious lawsuits against industry to get at- 
torney fee awards and that multiple citizen suits against EPA would dis- 
sipate agency resources and divert its attention from its appointed tasks.Il6 
But they worried more about "burdening the [already overcrowded] courts 
with a large number of  lawsuit^.""^ Reflecting these concerns, the Con- 
ference Committee strengthened the preclusion by extending the delay 
period from thirty to sixty days and adding the bar element, and amended 
the attorney fee provision to allow an award to defendants as well as 
plaintiffs, when appropriate.Ils 
Congress intended citizen suits as a goad to government enforcement. 
The very purpose of the notice requirement was to "prod" or "trigger" 
116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Senator Hart concurred: 
"[The] Government simply is not equipped to take court action against the numerous vio- 
lations of legislation of this type which are likely to occur . . . we will find very likely 
noncompliance which in number or degree are far beyond the capacity of the Government 
to respond to." Id. at 33,104. Senator Hart later noted, "The burden on the Department of 
Justice is so great that the agency cannot respond to it." Id. at 33,105. 
"'That was the case with the original Senate bill, which required only thirty days 
prior notice and had no enforcement bar if the government did commence suit. S. 4358, 
91st Cong. (1970). The Senate Report accompanying this bill stated that "[a]uthorizing. 
citizens to bring suits . . . should motivate governmental agencies . . . to bring enforcement 
and abatement proceedings." S.  REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted in CAA 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 436-37 (1974). The thirty-day notice requirement was in- 
tended to "further encourage and provide for agency enforcement" by giving the government 
agency "an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." Id. at 37, 437. And i t  was the ra- 
tionale for expanding the required notice to sixty days and imposing a bar on citizen suits 
if the government did enforce within that period. "[Tlo further encourage and provide for 
agency enforcement, the Committee has added" the notice and delay requirement. Id. 
Senator Muskie commented that the notice might "trigger" administrative action. 116 
CONG. REC. 32,927 (1 970). Senator Hart commented that the notice would have the "effect 
of prodding" government enforcement. Id. at 33,104. 
""Citizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations and bringing them to 
the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike." 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) 
(statement of Sen. Muskie). "Although the Senate did not advocate these suits as the best 
way to achieve enforcement, it was clear that they should be an effective tool." Id. at 
42,382. 
S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 38 (1 970). reprinted in CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 
438 (1974); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747. 
' I 6  116 CONG. REC. 32,924 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska). 
' I 7  Id. 
' I 8  See legislative history cited strpra in note 113. 
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government enf~rcement ."~ But for some violations, although the provi- 
sions require citizens to give notice, they do not require a delay period 
before citizens may file their  complaint^.'^^ Under those circumstances, 
the citizen suit notice is not likely to prod government enforcement. 
The legislative history also emphasizes that not all government en- 
forcement actions will bar a citizen suit. "[Ilf the citizen believed efforts 
initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to file 
the action . . . [I]f the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, i t  
would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action notwithstanding the 
pending agency action."lZ1 If an agency does commence enforcement ac- 
tions during the delay period, it "must prosecute them in good faith and 
with deliberate speed . . . or the citizen is free to initiate his 
This indicates congressional intent that the preclusions not eliminate all 
successive enforcement by citizens.'23 Finally, at least one citizen suit provi- 
sion authorizes citizens to enforce against violations that the federal gov- 
ernment has no authority to enforce against.lz4 
The legislative history of CWA 3 505 is similar to that of the CAA. 
Indeed, the Senate CWA Report commentary followed the Senate CAA 
Report almost paragraph-by-paragraph and line-by-line.'25 It added, "[ilt 
is the Committee's intent that . . . citizens should be unconstrained to bring 
these actions, and that the courts should not hesitate to consider them."'26 
The legislative history of the CWA provision also anointed a citizen en- 
' I 9  See supra note 1 13. The delay between the citizen's notice and when the citizen can 
file suit should give the government enforcer "an opportunity to act on the alleged viola- 
tion." S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 36 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 
436 (1974). 
I2O See supra notes 27-28. 
I 2 l  S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 
401, 437 (1074). It can be argucd this is not a good mirror of legislative intent because it 
was written before the Conference Committee added the bar element to the preclusion in 
CAA Q 304,42 U.S.C. Q 7604 (2000). But the same language appears in the Senate Report 
on CWA Q 505, see infra note 125, accompanying a Senate bill that included the bar, mak- 
ing it reflective of the Senate's view, with or without the bar. 
Iz2 S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 65 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
401,465 (1974). 
lZ3 Successive enforcement actions are contemplated in several situations: if the gov- 
ernment action was commenced after the citizen suit; if the government action is not being 
diligently prosecuted; and if, under some statutes, the government action is not in court. 
124 RCRA Q 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000), gives citizens authority 
to enforce against violations of any standard, prohibition, or requirement of the statute, 
including standards, prohibitions, and requirements of RCRA Subchapter IV (as encoded, 
Subchapter D as enacted) regulating disposal of non-hazardous solid waste. RCRA Q 3008, 
42 U.S.C. Q 6928 (2000), authorizes EPA to enforce against violations of Subchapter 111 
(as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted), regulating hazardous waste disposal, but only lim- 
ited power to enforce Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted). 42 U.S.C. 
Q 6945(c)(2) (2000). 
lZ5 Compare S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 36-39 (1 970). reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, at 401, 436-39 (1974), with S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971), reprinted in 
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744-47. 
126 S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 78 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3743. 
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forcer as a "private attorney general," believing that the citizen suit pro- 
vision "provides an open door for those who have legitimate interests in 
the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in the admin- 
istrative p roce~ses . " l~~  There is some evidence in the legislative history 
that Congress was aware that the citizen suit provisions were enacted 
against a backdrop of common law preclusions and intended the statutory 
and some common law preclusions to apply in an integrated fashion.'28 
Others have commented that the legislative history of the provisions 
is in conflict, on the one hand expansive, favoring citizen enforcement, 
and on the other hand restrictive, fearing it.I2' But the legislative history 
is more complex. It suggests Congress did not have a single intent in en- 
acting the citizen suit provisions, but that it intended the provisions to 
serve several purposes. One clear purpose was to be a vehicle for citizen 
participation in government, with broader goals of providing transpar- 
ency and openness in government, in turn promoting public ownership of 
and trust in government. Another was to assure compliance with environ- 
mental statutes by encouraging government enforcement and providing 
default enforcers when the government chose not to enforce or lacked the 
resources to do so. Indeed, Congress came to see citizen suits as an effective 
tool in that regard, one performing a substantial role in the total enforce- 
ment effort. It admonished courts to be receptive to citizen suits, recog- 
nizing that citizen enforcers performed a public service. Qualifying these 
purposes was the congressional desire that citizen suits not unduly dupli- 
cate, interfere or conflict with government actions or unduly harass vio- 
lators. 
Congress reconciled any conflict between its desire to promote citi- 
zen enforcement and its desire that citizen suits not unduly duplicate, inter- 
fere, or conflict with government actions in the preclusion device. Courts" 
elevation of the qualification that citizen suits not unduly duplicate, inter- 
fere, or conflict with government actions from its status as a limited con- 
I2'H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 134 (1972). reprinted in 1 CWA LEC~SLATIVE HISTORY, at 
753, 821 (1973). 
Commenting on the citizen suit provision, Rep. Reuss and ten other congressmen 
observed, 
We are confident that the courts would be alert to invoke the doctrine of laches in 
the rare case where a group, despite ample notice and opportunity to prepare and 
participate in adequate administrative proceedings, nevertheless deliberately stayed 
out of those proceedings and immediately endeavored to use the judicial process 
for purposes of delay. The bill need and should not limit the right of all citizens 
and groups to obtain judicial relief, merely in order to deal with this remote 
problem, if it, indeed, exists. 
Id. at 409, 878. 
129 Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Administrative Discretion: When 
Should Government Enforcement Bar a Citizen Suit?, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 
4-6 (1995). 
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gressional afterthought to a dominant intent ignores the very purpose of 
the provisions. 
D. An Anomaly: CWA $309(g) 
Congress added 9 309(g)I3O to the CWA in 1987, authorizing EPA to 
assess administrative penalties against violators of the statute. It was one 
of three amendments intended to strengthen the EPA enforcement provi- 
sion.l3I The authority was a limited one, however. Whereas CWA § 309(d)132 
authorizes courts to assess penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation 
per day with no upper limit on the total penalty, 9 309(g) authorizes EPA 
to assess total penalties of only $25,000 or $125,000, regardless of how 
many violations or days of violations are charged, depending on the for- 
mality of the administrative process EPA uses.133 To prevent duplicative 
penalties for the same violations, Congress included a variation of the pre- 
clusion device, providing that "any violation . . . shall not be the subject 
of a civil penalty action" by EPA or a citizen if 
(i) . . . [EPA] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an 
action under this subsection, 
(ii) . . . a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an 
action under a State law comparable to this subsection, or 
(iii) . . . [EPA or a State] has issued a final order . . . and the 
violator has paid a penalty under this subsection, or such com- 
parable State law . . . 
The preclusion does not apply, however, if a citizen files an enforcement 
action before commencement of "an action under [§ 309(g)17' or serves a 
notice of violation prior to that time and commences a citizen suit less than 
120 days 
The subsection contains a version of the preclusion device found in 
EPA and citizen enforcement provisions throughout the statutes. Many of 
the terms it uses in the bar element are identical to terms used in the other 
provisions, such as "is diligently pro~ecuting."'~~ But the context in which it 
IsO 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g) (2000). 
13'  Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, $5  312-14, 5 309, 101 Stat. 7, 42-46 (1987). 
The amendment also increased the amounts of civil penalties courts may assess and added 
a new and severe criminal sanction for knowing violations placing people in danger of serious 
injury. 
33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000). 
Is3CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) & (g) (2000). 
'"Id. 5 1319(g)(6)(A). EPA may assess penalties using informal proceedings, with a 
cap of $25,000, or using formal APA proceedings, with a cap of $125,000. 
Is5 Id. 5 13 19(g)(6)(B). 
136 Compare CWA, 33 U.S.C. $5  1319(g)(6)(A)(i) & (ii) (2000), with CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
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uses those terms calls for somewhat different interpretation. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that wording in 309(g) that differs from 
wording in the citizen suit sections warrants a different interpretati~n. '~ '  
One important difference is that while the citizen suit sections couple "is 
diligently prosecuting" with "to require compliance," CWA 309(g) does 
not. This difference is not surprising, for the citizen suit provisions authorize 
courts to issue compliance injunctions, while § 309(g) authorizes EPA only 
to assess modest penalties. 
The legislative history of 309(g) emphasizes that EPA is to use the 
administrative penalty authority for minor violations not warranting seri- 
ous enforcement It recounts that Congress built explicit citizen 
participation authorities into the § 309(g) penalty assessment process, in- 
cluding intervention and judicial review, to assure that EPA did not misuse 
the p r o v i ~ i o n . ' ~ ~  Congress's fear of misuse was not that EPA would assess 
excessive penalties, but that it would assess minor penalties for serious 
violations more appropriate for injunctive relief and large penalties.14" 
The legislative history indicated the purpose of the !j 309(g) preclusion was 
to prevent the assessment of duplicative penalties for the same violation, 
with no mention of preserving the government's authority to enforce without 
the hindrance of a simultaneous citizen suit.14' That is in great contrast to 
the purpose of the preclusion in the citizen suit provisions, enunciated in 
their legislative history, to preserve the government's authority to do just 
that.142 The very different purposes served by the preclusion in CWA 
5 309(g) and in the citizen suit sections suggests that they should be inter- 
preted somewhat differently and that interpretations of the § 309(g) preclu- 
sion not be applied uncritically to the preclusions in the citizen suit sections. 
There is considerable literature on citizen suits, with pioneering ef- 
forts dating back to the m i d - 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ ~ ~  Some of the more recent literature 
Authorizing citizens to sue those alleged to "be in violation" in CWA 5 505(a)(l), 
33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1) (2000), suggests violations must be ongoing to support 'a citizen suit, 
while authorizing EPA to assess penalties against a person who "has violated" in CWA 
5 309(g)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(l) (2000) "explicitly targets wholly past violations." 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 ,50  (1987). 
S. REP. NO. 99-50, (1985). 
Id. at 26-27. 
I4O Id. TWO thirds of the Report's discussion of 3 309(g) is devoted to this concern. 
I 4 l  Id. at 28. 
14? See supra Part I.B.2. 
I4'See generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: 
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. 
REV. 833 (1985); Jeffrey G .  Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Law, 
(pts. 1-3), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,309 (1983), 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,062 (1984). 14 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,407 (1984). Treatises on environmental law commonly devote considerable 
attention to citizen suits, e.g. ,  WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS 
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focuses on the statutory bars to citizen suits generally, although much of 
it focuses on the statutory bars in CWA $8  309(g) and 505.14+' None of it 
attempts a unified interpretation of the preclusions in citizen suit provi- 
sions, much less an integrated interpretation of the preclusions in the citi- 
zen suit and EPA enforcement provisions. None of it notices the theme and 
variations nature of the preclusion device, which underlies the unified 
integrated interpretation advocated in this Article. 
A cursory reading of the bar element suggests that it raises a single 
legal question: what is diligent prosecution? A careful reading of the ele- 
ment, however, reveals that it raises five major issues: (1) What govern- 
ment entities may act to bar a citizen suit? (2) What government actions 
may bar a citizen suit? (3) When must the government commence an ac- 
tion to bar a citizen suit? (4) How diligently must the government prose- 
cute an action to bar a citizen suit? (5) What citizen suits may a govern- 
ment action bar? Each of these questions raises subsidiary issues. 
The provisions answer most of these questions directly and explic- 
itly. Indeed, Congress did a remarkably good job drafting the citizen suit 
sections and their preclusion provisions. The provisions specify the gov- 
ernment entities that may act to bar citizen suits, the government actions 
that may bar citizen suits, and that the government must commence one 
of those actions before the citizen commences suit for the government 
action to bar the citizen suit. They don't define "diligently prosecuting," 
but they illuminate its meaning by linking it to compliance. Finally, they 
specify that government actions may bar citizen suits to the extent both 
WASTES A N D  SUBSTANCES (West, 2003 update). There have been at least two treatises on 
citizen suits. MICHAEL AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (3d ed. 1993); JEFFREY 
G. MILLER & ENVTL. L. INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE NFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POL- 
LUTION CONTROL AWS (1987). 
I4"See generally Peter A. Appel, The Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits: The 
Search for Adequate Representation, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 91 (2003); Matthew D. Zinn, 
Policing Environmental Regulatoiy Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 
21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002) (giving a particularly good theoretical analysis of citizen 
suits as an antidote to the capture of government enforcement by regulated industry); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing and Environmental Protec- 
tion, 12 DUKE ENVT'L L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001) (questioning the value of citizen suits); 
Barry S. Neuman & Jeffrey A. Knight, When Are Clean Water Act Citizen Suits Precluded 
by Government Enforcement Actions?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,111 (2000); Derek Dickin- 
son, Note, Is "Diligent Prosecution of an Action in a Court" Required to Preempt Citizen 
Suits Under the Major Federal Environmental Statutes?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545 
(1997); Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency 
Enforcement, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1997, at 20; Heather L. Maples, Reform- 
ing Judicial Interpretation of the Diligent Prosecution Bar: Ensuring an Effective Citizen 
Role in Achieving the Goals of the Clean Water Act, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 195 (1996); Steven 
Russo, States, Citizens, and the Clean Water Act: State Administrative Enforcement and 
the Diligent Prosecution Defense, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 21 1 (1995); Randall S. Schipper, 
Note, Administrative Preclusion of Environmental Citizen Suits, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 163; 
Cindi Ann Solomon, Note, "Lenient" Penalty Is Strong Evidence that a State Enforcement 
Agency's Prosecution Is Nor "Diligent" for Purposes of Section 505 of the Clean Water 
Act, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 58 (1995). See also Snook, supra note 129, at 3; Hodas, supra note 
36, at 1627-32. 
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actions seek compliance with the same requirements. Thus the plain lan- 
guage of the provisions anticipated and answered the issues arising under 
the preclusions, except one, and it gave guidance on that issue. Congress's 
use of the preclusion device with many nuanced variations in both the 
citizen and EPA enforcement provisions strongly reinforces that Congress 
meant the words it used in each variation of it to carry its own particular 
meaning. Most courts interpret the provisions in accordance with their 
plain language, but some depart greatly from it. 
Some violators argue that the possibility of a subsequent citizen suit 
makes it impossible for an agency to settle an enforcement action with a 
violator, unless the settlement precludes citizens from suing.'45 That ar- 
gument is empirically unsound, for violators settle cases daily with fed- 
eral and state enforcers without knowing whether citizen plaintiffs will 
subsequently file suits. The argument presupposes that citizen enforce- 
ment threatens violators as much as government enforcement, which is 
not the case. When citizens take action against a violator, they can seek 
only civil penalties and an injunction. When the government takes action 
against a violator, it too can seek civil penalties and an injunction, but it 
can take many other actions, including inspecting the violator frequently 
and intrusively; revoking or denying permits or making them subject to 
difficult conditions; criminally prosecuting the violator, its officers, and 
employees; and barring the violator from government contracts. To be- 
lieve that violators will not reach administrative and civil settlement with 
the government because of possible action by citizens is naive in light of the 
draconian powers the government has over violators who do not settle. 
The latter argument implies that the resolution of a citizen suit may 
detract from the benefits the government achieved from resolving its own 
enforcement action. This could be true if the resolution of the citizen suit 
displaced the resolution of the government action, but citizen suit resolu- 
tion does not do so. Both the government and citizen suit resolve its ac- 
tion by collecting a penalty, and the penalties remain in the Treasury. 
Thus, if the citizen suit is resolved by the assessment of a penalty, there 
is simply another deposit into the Treasury, which is doubly enriched. If 
the government resolved its action by an order for compliance, there is 
little left for a court to do in a citizen suit other than to enforce the gov- 
ernment's resolution. If the government resolved its action by an order 
for something less than compliance, however, the court in a citizen suit 
must order compliance. This may take from the violator the benefits of 
the resolution of the government's action against it, but it takes no such 
benefits from the government. 
In summary, one court considering the contention concluded: 
- - 
145 See Snook, supra note 129, at 11; Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 144, at 25. 
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To contend that citizen suits undermine agency enforcement 
policy is . . . ultimately misleading. Unquestionably, such suits 
may disturb the course of agency action. But the agency never- 
theless remains free to adhere to its own view of the appropriate 
enforcement policy by continuing to press for an informal resolu- 
tion and devoting its enforcement resources to other matters. 
This should hardly be viewed as some sort of deprivation for the 
agency, since it will usually result from the agency's own de- 
termination that the steps necessary to retain enforcement con- 
trol are not worth the resources required.146 
A. What Government Entities May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? 
The provisions may bar citizen suits if the "Administrator or State" has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting various enforcement actions. 
The first issue is what they mean by the "Administrator" and the "State." 
While the answers appear obvious (Congress meant EPA and each of the 
fifty states) the reasons for the answers may not be. 
1.  What "Administrator" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? 
The provisions may bar citizen suits when the Administrator has com- 
menced and is diligently prosecuting enforcement actions, usually civil 
actions and occasionally criminal actions. The statutes define "Adminis- 
trator" to be the Administrator of EPA.147 But the general law is that the 
Attorney General represents the United States in court.148 Therefore the Ad- 
ministrator does not initiate civil or criminal actions in court, but refers 
actions to the Attorney General, who may file suit on behalf of the United 
States; indeed, the statutes provide so e~plicit1y.l~~ While a particular envi- 
ronmental statute may authorize EPA attorneys to bring an action if the 
Attorney General declines to do so,I5O the author is aware of no instance 
in which they have done so. This practice and the congressional intent that 
the practice effectuates is emphasized by subsequent legislative history. 
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
14' TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9 2602(1) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(d) (2000); MPRSA, 33 
U.S.C. 9 1402(a) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 9 300f(7) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9 6903(1) 
(2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7602(a) (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9 9601(2) (2000); EPCRKA, 
42 U.S.C. 9 11049(1) (2000). 
148 "Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all 
litigation to which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party." 28 U.S.C. 
9 5 19 (2000). 
149TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9 2615(a)(4) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1366 (2000); MPRSA, 33 
U.S.C. 9 1415(d) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 9 300j-9(f) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7605 
(2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9 9622(d)(l)(A) (2000). 
Is0CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1366 (2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1415(d) (2000); SDWA, 42 
U.S.C. 9 300j-9(f) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7605 (2000). 
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The House passed a bill in 1977 to amend the CAA, adding a provision 
that would have granted EPA independent litigation authority. The ac- 
companying House Report detailed a litany of EPA complaints about its 
representation by the DOJ to justify the proposal.Is1 The DOJ quickly ne- 
gotiated and entered into a memorandum of understanding with EPA gov- 
erning their relationship and the Department's accountability for EPA 
case referrals. As a result, Congress dropped the proposal from the 
a r n e n d m e n t ~ . ' ~ ~  ' 
A formal plain meaning interpretation of the citizen suit preclusions 
limits the preclusion to those cases in which the Administrator or EPA 
attorneys commence an action. That reading of the provision, however, 
robs the preclusion of any application to judicial enforcement actions com- 
menced by the federal government under the statutes, for the Attorney 
General and attorneys from the DOJ commence all such actions. Of course, 
statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to all parts of them, not to 
rob them of meaning.'53 Interpreting the provisions to include judicial ac- 
tions brought by the Administrator or  at his request solves this problem. 
While this may not be the rigidly formal reading of the statute, it is con- 
sistent with its plain meaning and with the intent of Congress. To the ex- 
tent that it departs from the literal wording, the departure is justified to 
avoid the absurd result of effectively eliminating its application to federal 
enforcement action in court. Although defendants in EPA enforcement 
actions have raised the issue,Is4 the author is unaware of any citizen suit 
decision in which the issue has been raised. 
2.  What "State " May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? 
The meaning of "State" is not an academic issue, but has arisen in 
several contexts. The apparently straightforward issues are whether mu- 
nicipalities and Indian tribes are "States" whose enforcement actions may 
bar citizen suits. A more complicated issue is whether a state lacking an 
approved program under the statute being enforced is a state whose en- 
forcement actions may bar citizen suits. 
l S 1  H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 332-36 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1411-15. 
l S 2  The Conference Report accompanying the amendments outlines the memorandum 
of understanding, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-564, at 173-76 (1977) reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N., 1502, 1554-57. The memorandum is referenced in CAA § 305(b), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1365(b) (2000). 
15'See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 324 n.13. (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
759, 778 (1988); S. Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,510 n.22 (1986)). 
Is4 Most courts have rejected the contention that the Attorney General cannot initiate 
enforcement actions under the statutes. United States v. REAG 730 F. Supp. 482 (D. Conn. 
1989); See United States v. Zimmer Paper Prods., 733 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Ind. 1989); 
United States v. Packaging Corp. of America, 1982 WL 2123 (W.D. Mich). See also FED. 
R.  CIV. P. 17(a). Contra United States v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 92 
(E.D. Mo. 1980). 
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a. States, Municipalities, and Indian Tribes 
Because municipal agencies often exercise their own enforcement 
authority over pollution control requirements, defendants in citizen suits 
have argued that municipal enforcement actions bar citizen suits to the 
same extent that state enforcement actions bar them. This argument has 
some appeal. Municipalities are creatures of states and states may invest 
them with some of the attributes of state authority. Municipal authorities 
may have a role to play in the enforcement of some of the pollution control 
 statute^.'^^ Successive citizen actions have as much potential to interfere 
with municipal enforcement actions as they have to interfere with state 
actions. 
But both the statutory and plain meanings of "State" and "munici- 
pality" are different. The statutes commonly define "person" to include both 
a "State" and a "rnuni~ipali ty." '~~ They also define "State," however, and 
those definitions do not include "m~nicipal i ty ." '~~ Many of them define 
"m~nicipal i ty ."~~~ These definitions establish that Congress understood that 
states and municipalities were different entities and did not intend its use 
of "State" to include a municipality. The words also have different meanings 
in common usage. A state is "one of the constituent units of a nation having 
a federal government," while a "municipality" is "a primarily urban politi- 
cal unit having corporate status and usual powers of se l f -go~ernment ." '~~ 
Further, states are components of our federalist constitutional system, 
while municipalities are not.160 
The statutes treat states and municipalities differently as a structural 
matter as well, regarding states as regulators in EPA's stead and munici- 
palities as members of the public to be regulated by EPA or states in its 
stead. Under the CWA, for instance, EPA, or states with EPA-approved 
programs. issue permits to industrial and municipal pollution ~ o u r c e s . ' ~ '  
155 In the CWA, for example, municipalities are expected to develop and implement 
programs to regulate discharges by industry into municipal sewage treatment systems. 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8) (2000). 
Is6 See id. 5 1362(5). 
CWA 5 502(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(3) (2000), for instance defines "State" as "a State, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands . . . [and 
other trust territories]." See also SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5 300f(13) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
5 6904(31) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7602(d) (2000). 
IssCWA 5 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(4) (2000), for instance, provides that "'munici- 
pality' means a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, association, or other public body 
created by or pursuant to State law . . . ." See also SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5 300f(10) (2000); 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6903(13) (2000); and CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7602(f) (2000). 
159 WEBSTER'S EVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 855, 557 (1999). 
I W  Thus, a plaintiff state cannot claim a defendant city is a state for purposes of in- 
voking the Court's original jurisdiction for suits between states in Article 111 of the Con- 
stitution. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Court declined to exercise its 
original jurisdiction over suits between states when Illinois sued Milwaukee to abate its 
pollution of Lake Michigan, because Milwaukee is a municipality not a state. 
16' CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000). 
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Although municipalities are expected to establish their own regulatory 
programs governing industrial discharge into sewage treatment systems, 
the requirements for those municipal programs are established in permits 
issued by EPA or states in its stead.162 Nevertheless, some defendants in 
citizen suits enforcing requirements on industrial discharges into munici- 
pal sewage treatment systems have argued that enforcement actions by 
the municipalities barred the citizen suits. Courts have rightly rejected all 
of these arguments on plain meaning grounds, without much a n a 1 y ~ i s . l ~ ~  
Defendants also have argued that actions by Indian tribes enforcing 
environmental statutes have the same preclusive effect as enforcement 
actions taken by states. As a definitional matter, this proposition appears 
dubious, for the statutes do not include "Indian tribe" within their definitions 
of "State."'* Some define "Indian tribe," emphasizing that where the statute 
provides that a "state" enforcement action may bar a citizen suit, it does 
not mean an Indian tribe action may do Other statutes define "mu- 
nicipality" to include an "Indian tribe," with the same r e ~ u 1 t . l ~ ~  Because 
the definition of "State" does not include a municipality, as discussed 
above, it does not include an Indian tribe either. The one court to consider 
the issue, however, held to the contrary under the CWA because CWA 
5 518(e)I6' authorizes EPA to treat Indian tribes meeting specified criteria 
as states for particular purposes,'68 as do provisions in other statutes re- 
garding EPA's treatment of Indian tribes.'69 The court relied heavily on 
correspondence from EPA treating the tribes' action as a state action.170 
Id. Q Q  131 7(b) & 1342(b)(8) (2000). See also EPA, General Pretreatment Regula- 
tions for Existing and New Source of Pollution, 40 CFR Q Q  403.1 & 403.4 (2004). 
163 See, e.g., Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 
1022 (2d Cir. 1993); Ohio PIRG v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 635,638-39 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, 1996 
WL 1670982, at *4-*5. (S.D. Ohio) (not deciding whether a city was a state, but holding 
that a city's action could not bar a citizen suit under CWA Q  309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q  1319(g), 
because the city had no provision for public participation in enforcement); Ill. PIRG, Inc. 
v. PMC Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1993); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. 
Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 1987 WL 44393, at *3 (D.N.J.); N.Y. PIRG, Inc., v. Limco 
Mfg. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). See also City of Heath v. Ashland Oil 
Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 976-77 (S.D. Ohio 1993), and City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & 
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (both examining a similar question under 
CERCLA and precedent under that statute). But see Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. East- 
man Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (dicta). 
See provisions cited supra in notes 156-1 59. 
See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q  7602(r) (2000). 
166CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q  1342(4) (2000). See also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q  6903(13) (2000). 
Because a municipality is a "person" who may be sued under the citizen suit provisions, an 
Indian tribe is also a person who may be sued under them. This definition therefore waives 
whatever immunity a tribe may have to suit by citizens for CWA violations. Atl. States Legal 
Found., Inc. v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 827 F. Supp. 608 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
167 33 U.S.C. Q  1377(e) (2000). 
Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244-45 (N.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
'69 See, e.g. ,  CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7601 (d) (2000). 
Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 2 4 5 4 6  n. 14. 
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The court, however, failed to consider the counterargument, the fact that 
Congress specifically stated that tribes are to be treated as states for some 
purposes, implying that it did not intend that tribes be treated as states 
when it omitted reference to tribes. The treatment of tribes in the statu- 
tory definitions strengthens this argument. The court considered neither 
of these factors, and presumably it would have reached a different con- 
clusion had it done so. The relationship of Indian tribes to states is a 
complicated one, including consideration of the treaties under which 
various tribes were accorded their reservations; as a result, the topic is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
b. States with Unapproved Programs 
A potentially more common issue is whether actions brought by states 
without programs approved by EPA to implement a statute may bar citi- 
zen suits under that statute. For instance, will action by a state without an 
approved permit program under the CWA bar a citizen suit to enforce a 
water pollution permit issued by EPA? Neither the statutory definition 
nor the plain meaning of "state" is limited to a state with an approved 
program, suggesting that enforcement actions by states having or lacking 
EPA-approved programs can bar citizen suits. But the structures of the 
statutes suggest that enforcement actions by states lacking EPA-approved 
programs should not bar citizen suits. The citizen suit provisions of stat- 
utes contemplating federal rather than state implementation provide merely 
that federal actions preclude citizen suits.'" Only statutes contemplating 
implementation by EPA or states with EPA-approved programs provide 
that federal or state actions may preclude citizen suits.'72 The latter stat- 
utes often provide different constraints on EPA enforcement when it has 
approved a state program instead of implementing the program itself.'73 
These differences in constraints on EPA enforcement suggest that the 
preclusion triggered by state enforcement should occur only when a state 
is implementing an approved program. This limitation on the preclusion 
makes policy sense: when a state agrees to assume the laboring oar in im- 
plementing and enforcing a federal program, the state has a stake in the 
federal program. States not implementing an EPA-approved program, how- 
ever, have no such stake. It is understandable that an action by EPA or a 
state with an EPA-approved program may preclude a citizen suit. But why 
I 7 l  See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
172See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
l i 3  See CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(h) (2000) (authorizing EPA to seek a judicial ban on 
new sewer hookups with municipal sewage treatment systems that are not in compliance 
with their CWA permits). The authority is unconstrained in states where EPA is adminis- 
tering the permit program, but in states with approved programs, EPA may use the author- 
ity only if i t  determines that the state has not taken "appropriate" action with regard to the 
permit. Id. 
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would Congress provide that an action by a state may preclude a citizen 
suit when the state is not implementing an approved program, not as- 
suming the laboring oar in the federal program, not having a stake in the 
federal program, and, therefore, lacking a motivation to undercut the fed- 
eral program? 
Allowing actions by unapproved states to preclude citizen suits and 
perhaps EPA enforcement as well appears counter to the structure and policy 
of the statutes, and could do violence to their imp lemen ta t i~n . ' ~~  The one 
time this question was raised in the legislative history of any of the stat- 
utes, it was taken as a given that only actions by states with approved 
programs could preclude further enforcement. Senator John Chaffee, a chief 
sponsor of the CWA amendments of 1987, which added CWA § 309(g), 
commented in the Senate debates that the preclusion in 309(g) "clearly 
applies only in cases where the state in question has been authorized under 
section 402 to implement the relevant permit program."'75 The issue ap- 
Such an interpretation of the citizen suit provisions, of course, would not preclude 
EPA from enforcement unless EPA enforcement provisions contain a similar preclusion, as 
some do. Under CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000), for instance, a state action 
bars both EPA and citizen action. Under some courts' interpretation of that provision, a 
state may, by assessing a small penalty against a violator, bar EPA and citizens from seek- 
ing a court order requiring the violator to comply. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus a state could effectively insulate all 
violators within its boundaries from compliance with federal pollution control requirements 
simply by assessing small penalties against all of them. States with approved programs 
would not be expected to do so because they have a stake in the programs and EPA could 
withdraw its approval of their programs should they commence such activities. See, e .g. ,  
CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(2) (2000). States without approved programs, however, have no 
stake in them and may be motivated to undercut them. If so, EPA has no recourse against 
them. This issue under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g) (2000), will be addressed further in 
Part Two. 
133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1987). He elaborated: 
A single discharge may be a violation of both State and Federal law and a State is 
entitled to enforce its own law. However, only if a State has received authorization 
under section 402 to implement a particular permitting program can it prosecute a 
violation of Federal law. Thus, even if a non-authorized State takes action under 
State law against a person who is responsible for a discharge which also consti- 
tutes a violation of the Federal permit, the State action cannot be addressed to the 
Federal violation, for the State has no authority over the Federal permit limitation 
or condition in question. In such case, the authority to seek civil penalties for 
violation of the Federal law under subsections 309(d) or 31 l(b) or section 505 
would be unaffected by the State action, notwithstanding paragraph 309(g)(6). 
Senator Chaffee's statement ignores the possibility of the State enforcing federal law 
in a citizen suit. The statutes generally define "person" to include a state, see,  e . g . ,  CWA, 
33 U.S.C. 1362(5) (2000), and the citizen suit provisions generally authorize a "person" 
to bring suit, see,  e .g. ,  CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (2000). CWA 505(a), however, author- 
izes a "citizen" to enforce, but it defines "citizens" to be a "person." 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2000). States may bring citizen suits under such statutes. See Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 
503 U.S. at 607 (1992); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Illinois v. Outboard Ma- 
rine Co., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); Massachusetts v. U.S.V.A., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 
1976). But see United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980). States 
cannot bring citizen suits under statutes not defining "person" to include states. Warren 
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pears to have been raised in court only once and then i t  was not consid- 
ered because it was raised for the first time on appeal in an amicus brief.I7'j 
The wording and structures of the statutes and absence of relevant leg- 
islative history suggest that Congress simply did not think about whether 
actions by states, both with and without approved programs, could pre- 
clude citizen suits. They also suggest that, had it done so, i t  would have 
limited preclusions to actions by states with approved programs. But be- 
cause the statutory and plain English meanings of "State" clearly include 
all fifty states, "State" should be interpreted to include all states, regard- 
less of whether they have approved programs. Moreover, Congress clearly 
knows how to limit provisions to states with approved programs when it  
so desires, as it did in the provision authorizing EPA enforcement after 
notice to such states in  the CWA.'" This issue can, and should, be ad- 
dressed in  a simple amendment to the citizen suit provisions, defining 
"State" for the purposes of the provision to mean states with an approved 
program under the particular statute. 
B. What Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit? 
Each of the citizen suit provisions specifies particular government 
actions that will preclude a citizen suit. They range from a simple "civil 
action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance" in 
the CAA'78 to a laundry list of differing federal and state actions in RCRA.'79 
The first issue is whether the provisions should be interpreted to 
limit government actions that may bar a citizen suit to those specified in 
the particular provision. So understood, the question almost answers it- 
self. The most obvious and best interpretation is the plain meaning of the 
County v. North Carc!ina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. i9S I j. 
Senator Chaffee's statement also ignores the possibility of the State's enforcing fed- 
eral law in state court as the supreme law of the land. See Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. 
v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that 
RCRA may be enforced in state court because, under the Supremacy Clause, it is the law 
of the land) (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990)). 
Senator Chaffee's use of "notwithstanding paragraph 309(g)(6)" at the end of the quoted 
language may be unavailing, for even committee reports cannot "trump a textual plain 
meaning" of the statute itself. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 325. 
"Vci tuate ,  949 F.2d at 556 n.3. In a variant to this issue, when citizens of state A 
brought a RCRA citizen suit against a polluter in  state A, the defendant sought to preclude 
the suit based on a pending action against it  by state B. The court noted that the RCRA 
citizen suit provision did not define "State" and proceeded to a disguised prrrens patriae 
analysis concluding that, since state B was not suing on behalf 'of the citizens of state A, 
they were free to proceed. Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 1993 WL 134861 (N.D. 
Ohio), remanded on orher grounds, 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993). The court failed to note, how- 
ever, that RCRA defines "State" generally to include all states. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3 l) (2000). 
The Court's interpretation of the statute is in  derogation of the plain meaning of that 
definition. 
33 U.S.C. 13 19(a)(l) (2000). 
'7842 U.S.C. 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
42 U.S.C. Q §  6972(b)(2)(B) & (C) (2000). 
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clause, augmented by the expressio unius canon of interpretation.Is0 The 
provisions state exactly what Congress intended: the listed government 
actions and only the listed government actions bar citizen suits. This is 
reinforced by the theme and variations nature of the preclusion device. 
The fact that Congress listed different types of actions as potential bars 
to citizen suits in the different provisions reinforces the conclusion that it 
intended the government actions it listed in a particular statute, and no 
others, to bar a citizen suit under that s t a t ~ t e . ' ~ '  As discussed below, most 
courts agree, although there is a significant division among them on the 
interpretation of CWA 9 309(g). 
The second issue is the meaning of the limitation on government ac- 
tions that may bar a citizen suit to government actions that "require com- 
pliance" with the statutory requirements the citizen plaintiff seeks to en- 
force. Again, the plain meaning and expressio unius canons suggest that 
the limitation means exactly what it says. Such an interpretation also serves 
the statutory goal of protecting the environment through full compliance 
with the statute's requirements. Surprisingly, courts have not often focused 
on the meaning and significance of the condition. 
1.  When the Statute Provides that Particular Government Actions 
May Bar a Citizen Suit, May Other Government Actions Bar It? 
To ask the question is to answer it in the negative. The issue arises in 
two contexts: where the provision lists only court actions as precluding 
citizen suits and where the provision lists a variety of government actions 
as precluding citizen suits. 
a.  Where the Statute Provides that Only Court Actions May Bar a 
Citizen Suit 
The plain meaning of such statutory provisions is that only a judicial 
action by the government may bar a citizen suit. A "court" is commonly 
understood to be a judicial, not an administrative tribunal. At the federal 
level, that means an Article I11 court. Neither the environmental statutes 
nor the Administrative Procedure ActIs2 refer to administrative tribunals 
as courts. EPA named its appellate tribunal the Environmental Appeals 
Board, not the Environmental Appeals Court. Nothing in the citizen suit 
provisions or their legislative history indicates Congress intended to de- 
part from this pattern of limiting the meaning of "court" to include only 
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 323 n.1 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) and United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988)). 
I8 l  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 
(1991); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. 491 U.S. 701 (1989); and Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 
490 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1989)). See also discussion, supra note 29. 
5 U.S.C. $ 3  551-559,701-706 (2000). 
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judicial tribunals. To the contrary, Congress underscored its intention that 
"court" mean an Article I11 court in several ways. 
First, in some provisions it authorized citizens to enforce against viola- 
tion of "an order issued by the Administrator," or a state, which could refer 
only to an administrative order.183 TO bar citizen enforcement of an adminis- 
trative compliance order because the government had issued that compli- 
ance order prior to the filing of the citizen's complaint would be circular 
and render meaningless the authorization for the citizen to enforce the 
order. Second, in other provisions it precluded citizen suits when the gov- 
ernment took either judicial or administrative actions. In RCRA, it pre- 
cluded citizen suits because of an action in "court" in one subparagraph 
and because of various administrative actions in two other subparagraphs.lS4 
In the CWA it precluded citizen suits because of an action in "court" in 
5 505 and because of particular administrative penalty actions in § 309(g). 
By referring to both judicial and administrative enforcement actions 
in the same provisions or in different preclusions in the same statute, 
Congress indicated that it knew they were different types of actions, knew 
how to describe each, and meant its references to each as discrete types 
of actions. It indicated the same intent by providing in some statutes that 
only judicial actions could bar a citizen suit, while providing in other stat- 
utes that judicial or administrative actions could bar a citizen suit.Ig5 More- 
over, in some provisions it precluded citizen suits when the government 
has commenced a "civil or criminal action in a Criminal actions, 
of course, are prosecuted only in Article I11 courts, never in administra- 
tive tribunals. 
All but two of the more than thirty courts asked to rule that an ad- 
ministrative tribunal is a "court" for the purposes of the preclusion have 
refused to do ~ 0 . ' ~ '  Although they have come to the same conclusion, they 
have done so for different reasons. The most obvious and best approach 
is that the plain meaning of "court" is an Article I11 court or its state 
equivalent. Almost all courts beyond the Third Circuit have adopted this 
interpretation. The Third Circuit, however, reasoned that an administra- 
tive tribunal might be invested with sufficient quasi-judicial powers to 
make it a court for this purpose. But its departure from the plain meaning 
Is3See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7604(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
Is4  Compare RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000), with id. $5 (b)(2)(B) & (C). 
I s 5  Compare CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). with TSCA, 42 U.S.C. § 2619(b) 
(1 )(B) (2000). 
Is6See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000); and MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 14 15(g)(2)(D) (2000). 
Is7See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co.,  501 F. Supp. 1159 n.161 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), which stands alone among the more than thirty decisions cited in this subsection on 
the issue, except for the bizarre decision in SURCCO v. PRASA, 157 F. Supp. 2d 160 
(D.P.R. 2000). Gardeski is discussed infra in notes 200-203 and accompanying text. The 
decision is no longer good precedent, following a subsequent ruling contra in the Second 
Circuit, Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). Note 198, 
infra, addresses SURCCO. 
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of the statute has not led it to different results, for the Circuit has never 
found that an administrative tribunal has sufficient quasi-judicial powers 
to make it a court. Indeed, following the Third Circuit's analysis, it is 
difficult to imagine how an administrative body could ever be considered 
a court. In any event, the circuit may subsequently have repudiated its 
reasoning in favor of a plain English i n t e r~ re t a t i 0n . l~~  
In Baughman v. Bradford Coal, Inc., the Third Circuit acknowledged 
that "court" usually denotes only judicial tribunals, not administrative 
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. But it commented that "court" could 
be interpreted to incorporate administrative tribunals if "necessary to 
achieve the statutory goals."'89 The court never explained when interpreting 
"court" to include administrative tribunals was necessary to achieve statu- 
tory goals. Instead, it enunciated a two-part test to determine if an ad- 
ministrative tribunal had sufficient quasi-judicial powers to be the func- 
tional equivalent of a court. First, the tribunal must possess the power to 
achieve all of the remedies that EPA could ask a court to exercise under 
the statute at issue, here the CAA. Second, the tribunal's procedures must 
be similar to judicial procedures, including a provision for intervention 
by citizens. It found a state agency's authority deficient in both respects, 
as it lacked authority to enjoin violations and had authority to assess pen- 
alties of only one tenth the amount that federal courts could assess under the 
CAA. While it could grant citizen intervention at its discretion, citizens 
had no intervention by right in its proceedings. 
The Third Circuit revisited the issue in Projjitt v. Comm'rs, Twp. of 
Brisr01'~~ and SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.'" in 
which it held that EPA was not a court when it issued a compliance order 
under CWA $ 309(a). The trial court in Fritzsche based its ruling that EPA 
was not a court on the lack of procedures for citizen intervention in EPA's 
administrative compliance order proceedings. The Third Circuit commented 
that lack of citizen intervention was not the sole criterion for making the 
determination, but rather part of a "dual inquiry." 
The first question to be answered is whether the coercive powers 
that the administrative agency possesses compel compliance with 
effluent limitations (to determine whether the agency has "the 
power to accord relief which is the substantial equivalent to that 
available to the EPA in federal court"). The second inquiry con- 
cerns the procedural similarities the agency proceeding might have 
to a suit in federal court (to determine, among other things, 
188 See infra note 195 and accompanying text discussing SUIT Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars 
USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Is9 Baughman, 592 F.2d at 2 17. 
I9O 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985). 
I9l 759 F.2d 1 13 1 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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whether citizens have a right to intervene in the agency proceed- 
ing).192 
The Third Circuit agreed with the lower court that EPA was not a court for 
several reasons: EPA lacked authority under 8 309(a) to assess penalties;lg3 
EPA's compliance order was not self-enforcing, for EPA had to seek judi- 
cial enforcement if its order was not obeyed; EPA's order issuance proce- 
dures lacked any similarity to judicial procedures; and EPA's procedures 
under § 309(a) did not provide citizens a right of intervention. Indeed, 
EPA had refused the citizen plaintiffs in the case the opportunity to inter- 
vene in its proceedings. Of course, by its very nature an administrative 
agency order is never self-enforcing, for agencies have no powers of 
contempt. If the respondent does not obey an administrative order, the 
agency must seek judicial enforcement. It is therefore difficult to imagine 
how an administrative body could ever be held to be a court under the 
Baughman approach, as elaborated by Fritzsche. 
The Third Circuit later addressed the issue of whether a state ad- 
ministrative agency could be considered a state court for purposes of re- 
moving a case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In Sun Buick, 
Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, I ~ c . , ' ~ ~  the court was clearly uncomfortable applying 
its "functional equivalent" doctrine in that context. Examining its prece- 
dents under the environmental statutes, it commented, "[wle need not 
decide the validity of the dictum in these cases" (emphasis added).Ig5 It con- 
cluded with regard to them "[elven ifwe were still inclined to follow Baugh- 
man's application of the "functional" test for purposes of permitting mainte- 
nance of a private citizen enforcement suit in environmental litigation, 
the removal context is sufficiently distinct to make the cases distinguish- 
able."Ig6 It continued to determine that the state agency involved did not 
have sufficient judicial powers to make it a court for purposes of the re- 
moval statute, much as it had in Baughman, Proffitt v. Bristol, and Fritzsche. 
The court strongly questioned the viability of these precedents but noted 
that it would take an en banc court to jettison them. 
Some district courts have followed Baughman, although none had the 
advantage of considering the effect of Sun Buick on the continued viabil- 
ity of Baughman. All but one found that the administrative agencies whose 
actions were invoked to preclude a citizen suit lacked sufficient quasi- 
192 Fritzsche, 759 F.2d at 1137. 
19' 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a). Frirzsche was decided before Congress gave EPA administra- 
tive penalty assessment authority in CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g) (2000). This 
would not appear to affect the court's holding, because penalty assessment was but one of 
the factors it  considered, and EPA continues to lack penalty assessment authority in CWA 
5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 (1319)(a) (2000), the provision at issue. 
194 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994). 
195 Id. at 1264. 
I W  Id. 
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judicial powers to be the functional equivalents of  court^.'^' Another bi- 
zarre opinion reached the same result but for other reasons.'98 The excep- 
tion was the first decision to consider the issue following Baughman. 
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone C O . ' ~ ~  held that New York's air pollu- 
tion agency was a court. The opinion was based, in part, on a finding that 
the New York agency had substantially more power than the Pennsylva- 
nia agency the Third Circuit had considered in its opinion. But the court 
19' The exception was Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co. ,  501 F. Supp. 1159 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed immediately infra. Other district courts held the agencies at 
issue not to be courts, following a Baughman analysis. See, e.g., Ill. PIRG, Inc. v. PMC 
Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that a municipal sewer agency 
was not a court under the CWA, because it could not enforce its orders except by resort to 
court, it did not give citizens the right to intervene, and it had no power to issue injunc- 
tions); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding an EPA admin- 
istrative order on consent with Air Force no bar to citizen suit because EPA lacked power 
to enjoin violations and the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a) (2000), requires no citizen partici- 
pation in the issuance of compliance orders); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. 
Supp. 1525 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. 
Ind. 1990) (holding that under CWA 5 505, the Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management was not a court, because it lacked power to enforce its penalty assessments); 
PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J.) (holding that New Jer- 
sey Department of Environmental Protection was not a court because it lacked injunctive 
power, power to enforce its orders, public notice of administrative enforcement, and public 
intervention); Wiconisco Creek Watershed v. Kocher Coal Co., 641 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 
1986) (holding that Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection was not a court 
because it lacked the requisite judicial procedures, including citizen intervention); Sierra 
Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 
1988) (holding that, under CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, the Maryland environment agency 
was not a court because it lacked power to enforce its compliance orders); SPIRG of N.J., 
Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.N.J. 1985); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. 
v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1319(a) administrative order was not an action in court); Brewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F. 
Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that Baughman test was assumed to apply under 
CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, but that no factual basis had been established whereby to 
rule on issue); and Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
198 SURCCO V. PRASA, 157 F. S u p p  2d 160, 169 (D.P.R. 2000), held that an EPA 
compliance order under CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a), was the action of a court 
because "EPA by its very nature belongs to that class of typical o r  traditional agencies 
endowed with adjudicative powers." Of course, EPA has adjudicative powers; Congress 
explicitly gave it such powers under CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g) (2000). But the 
court in SURCCO didn't consider whether the powers under which EPA acted were adjudi- 
cative powers, and, if so, whether Congress intended EPA adjudicative actions to bar a citizen 
suit. Indeed, the court did not even identify the authority under which EPA had acted. It 
appeared to act under CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a) (2000), granting EPA authority 
to issue compliance orders. If so, the court failed to note that EPA actions under 5 309(a) 
are accomplished with absolutely no adjudication. Instead the court relied on a First Cir- 
cuit decision under CWA 5 309(g), reasoning that the issue wasn't one of the wording of 
the statute, but whether the government had taken an enforcement action to remedy the 
same violations, making a citizen action duplicative. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991). Because CWA 5 309(g) does not 
limit the preclusion on citizen suits to actions in court, Scituate did not consider the ques- 
tion before the SURCCO court, making the Scituate holding inapposite. The only apposite 
part of the Scituate statement relied upon was that the wording of the statute is not impor- 
tant, a dubious proposition. 
'99501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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essentially made a policy choice motivated by its view of what best served 
the purpose of the CAA, the first part of the Baughman test, which the 
Third Circuit had neglected to explain in its opinion. The Gardeski court 
began by mischaracterizing a fragment of the Senate Report that the pur- 
pose of citizen suits "was only to 'motivate governmental agencies charged 
with responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement pro~eedings." '~~~ 
The Report language, however, contains no "only" and not the slightest hint 
that the Committee's only purpose in authorizing citizen suits was to 
prompt government en f~rcement .~~ '  The court considered the preclusive 
effect of a state consent administrative order imposing an expeditious 
schedule for compliance negotiated shortly after the State agency became 
aware of the violations. The court concluded, not illogically from its 
premise, that "[tlo require an agency to commence any form of proceeding 
would be senseless where the agency has already succeeded in obtaining 
the respondent's agreement to comply with the law in some enforceable 
form."202 Moreover, "[tlo hold that the CAA requires agencies to com- 
mence a court suit in all cases, in order to retain enforcement control, 
would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose as well as Congress's de- 
sire that the states be primarily responsible for enforcing the But 
it went on to hold that although the initial consent order was diligent 
prosecution, the state's subsequent failure to enforce against immediate 
and continued violation of the compliance order was not diligent prose- 
cution. Indeed, the decision contains one of the best analyses of what con- 
stitutes diligent prosecution. 
The opinion appears reasoned in its evenhandedness. But its holding 
that an administrative agency can be a court is based on the false premise 
that the sole congressional purpose of the citizen suit provision was to 
prompt government enforcement. This false premise caused the court to 
disregard the plain meaning of the statute and the complex nature of con- 
gressional intent in authorizing citizen suits. The court's misperception of 
congressional intent was caused by its mischaracterization of the legisla- 
tive history. The court began an unfortunate tradition, followed all the 
way to the Supreme Court, of misstating legislative history to justify dis- 
regard of the wording of the citizen suit  provision^.^^ Any characteriza- 
tion of the legislative history to indicate that Congress had a sole intent 
when enacting the citizen suit provisions is a misunderstanding at best 
2w501 F. Supp at 1159 (emphasis added). The text of the Report was "Government 
initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing 
citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental agencies 
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings." S.  REP. 
No. 91-1 196, at 36-37 (1970). reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 4 3 6 3 7  
(1974). 
See supra the discussion of the legislative history of citizen suits in subsection I.B.2. 
202 Gardeski, 501 F. Supp. at 1166. 
'03 Id. at 1 163. 
2w See infra notes 424-428. 
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and a mischaracterization at worst. Congress had more than one purpose 
in mind when it conceived citizen suits and it had more than one policy 
consideration when it placed limitations on citizen suits.?05 Those pur- 
poses and policies were both complementary and conflicting, requiring 
Congress to craft compromises in the provision and its language. Under 
these circumstances, Congress's intent is more likely to be found in the 
language it used in the statute than in assumptions based on one of its 
multiple goals. 
The Second Circuit was the next court of appeals to consider the is- 
sue. It flatly rejected the Baughman analysis. It found that CWA § 505206 
used "court" "unambiguously and without qualification," therefore making 
it "inappropriate to expand this language to include administrative en- 
forcement actions."207 In addition to its plain English reading of the stat- 
ute, it could find no legislative history indicating that Congress intended 
to include administrative agencies as courts. Finally, it noted that Con- 
gress had barred citizen suits under other statutes because of both judicial 
and administrative enforcement actions, e.g., TSCA, MPRSA, and RCRA.208 
Because the citizen suit provisions in the environmental statutes are 
closely related and Congress clearly knew how to specify that adminis- 
trative enforcement precluded citizen suits under other environmental stat- 
utes, its failure to specify them in CWA § 505 indicated its intent that 
administrative enforcement not preclude citizen suits under that provi- 
~ i o n . ~ ~ ~  All other courts of appeal considering the issue have followed Con- 
sol. Rail, specifically rejecting Baughman for the same reasons the Sec- 
ond Circuit rejected Many district courts in the Second Circuit and 
beyond have followed Consol. Rail and rejected Ba~ghman.~"  Congress 
205 See the discussion of the legislative history of citizen suits, supra at Part I.B.2, par- 
ticularly the last paragraph. 
'06 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365 (2000). 
'07 Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 ,62  (2d Cir. 1985). 
'08 Of course, this applies only to citizen suits against violations of RCRA, not citizen 
suits to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. 
'09 Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 63. The Court itself has interpreted CWA Q: 505, 
33 U.S.C. Q: 1365, in part by comparing it to citizen suit provisions in other environmental 
statutes. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). 
210See Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 
207 F.3d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 2000); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 
2000) (en banc) (holding that language of CWA Q: 505 is "plain and unambiguous"); PMC, 
Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1998); Dague v. City of Bur- 
lington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992) 
(holding that an administrative "Assurance of Discontinuance" was not an action in court 
even though it was filed in court); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
" 'See Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (CWA and RCRA); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry 
Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL 1704240, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (CWA) (reaching the result of 
Consol. Rail and rejecting the result of Baughman, without citing them); Orange Env't, 
Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ill. PIRG, lnc. v. 
PMC Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-76 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that a mu- 
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subsequently amended CWA 5 505(a)?" to cross reference the 5 309(g) bar 
on citizen suits for administratively assessed penalties under specific cir- 
cumstances, reinforcing its intent that "court" in 8 505 does not include 
administrative agencies.?I3 If it had meant "court" in 5 505 to include ad- 
ministrative agencies, it would have had no need to add this cross- 
reference.?14 
The approach of the majority of the circuits is clearly correct. It is 
faithful to the plain wording of the provisions and is faithful to their struc- 
tures. It also made policy sense for Congress to limit the activation of bars 
against citizen suits to government actions in court rather than to admin- 
istrative actions. When Congress developed and enacted the citizen suit pro- 
visions, Congress and the public were skeptical of administrative action 
as lacking transparency and being ineffective.?15 Court actions, however, 
are taken in public and are transparent. Even settlements of EPA's civil 
judicial actions are subject to a public notice and comment procedure.?16 
While administrative agencies frequently issue administrative orders that 
do not require compliance,217 when federal courts find a defendant in viola- 
tion of the statutes, they must order it to comply.218 
nicipal agency is not a court under the CWA); Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 
834 F. Supp. 953, 955-57 (W.D. Ky. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 
1995) (holding that RCRA "court" action in  9: 7002(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9: 6972(b)(l)(B) 
(2000), does not include administrative action because 5 7002(b)(2)(B) & (C) specifically 
provide that administrative actions bar citizen suits); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & 
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (RCRA 5 7002); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. 
Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grollnds, 50 
F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174, 
183-84 (D.N.J. 1992) (CWA 5 505); Proffitt v. Borough of Morrisville, 716 F. Supp. 837, 
841 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1990); Lykins v. Westinghouse, 715 F. 
Supp. 1357, 1358-59 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (CWA 5 505); McCregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, 
Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (N.D. Ohio 1987). aff'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 
1988) (holding, without discussion, that state action in court barred RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(A) 
action); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 61 1 n.2 (D. 
Minn. 1988); Mumford Cove Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 396 (D. 
Conn. 1986) (CWA 5 505); Md. Waste Coalition v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1480- 
81 (D. Md. 1985) (CAA 5 304); and SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. 
Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985). See also PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 
1987 WL 44393, at *3 (D.N.J. 1987) (following Georgia-Pacific and holding that negotia- 
tion about a violation with an administrative agency is not an action in court). 
212 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000). 
*"CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000), begins with a reference to 5 309(g)(6), 33 
U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(6), which, in turn, provides that particular administrative penalty assess- 
ments bar citizen suits. 
? I 4  Of course, it  might have added the cross-reference to countermand Consol. Rail and 
its progeny. But, although the legislative history of 5 309(g), 9 1319(g) (2000), is quite 
detailed, it  makes no mention of such an intent. See supra notes 125-128 and accompany- 
ing text. 
a5 See legislative history cited s~rpra notes 109 & 1 10. 
216 DOJ, Consent ~ u d ~ m e n t s  in kctions to Enjoin Discharges of Pollution, 28 C.F.R. 
6 50.7 (2004). 
"7 See it& cases cited in notes 338 & 349 and accompanying text. 
"8 See infra cases cited in notes 129 & 354 and accompanying text. 
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b. Where the Statute Provides that Several Government Actions May 
Bar a Citizen Suit 
When a statute precludes a citizen suit because the government has 
commenced one of several listed enforcement actions, does the statute 
also preclude it because the government has commenced an unlisted en- 
forcement action? The plain meaning of such a statutory provision is that 
only one of the listed actions by the government may bar a citizen suit. 
The issue arises primarily under RCRA. While RCRA2I9 citizen suits to 
enforce against violations of the statute are barred only by a government 
action in court, RCRA citizen suits to abate an imminent and substantial 
endangerment are barred by seven specified federal and state judicial and 
administrative enforcement and remedial actions under both RCRA and 
CERCLA.220 Thus, state administrative enforcement actions may not bar 
a citizen suit against a violation of RCRA under 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(A) 
(2000), but may bar a citizen suit to abate an endangerment under 42 U.S.C. 
9 6972(a)(l)(B) (2000).221 When defendants have argued that citizen suits 
to abate endangerments were barred by other government enforcement and 
remedial actions under RCRA or CERCLA, courts have followed the Con- 
sol. Rail line of reasoning and have quickly rejected those arguments. For 
instance, in Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc.222 defendants claimed 
that an EPA administrative order under RCRA 8 3008(h)223 requiring de- 
fendants to determine the nature and extent of hazardous waste releases 
from a facility, barred a citizen suit against defendants to abate an immi- 
nent and substantial endangerment caused by the releases. An action un- 
der 42 U.S.C 5 6928(h) (2000) was not on the list of specified actions 
barring citizen suits, although EPA could have used several of the listed 
actions to order the same study. In rejecting the claimed bar, the court 
reasoned that "[wlhen Congress explicitly enumerates exceptions to a 
statutory provision, a court cannot infer additional exceptions without 
evidence of contrary legislative intent."224 It could find no such intent in 
219 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(l)(A) (2000). 
220 Id. at 5 6972(b)(2)(B) & (C). 
22' See N. Cal. River Watch v. Humboldt Petroleum, Inc., 2000 WL 1639524 (N.D. Cal.). 
222 834 F. Supp 953 (W.D. Ky. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
223 42 U.S.C. 9 6928(h) (2000). 
224 Coalition for Health Concern, 834 F. Supp. at 957. 
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the statute or its history.225 Other courts considering the issue under RCRA 
have come to the same conclusion.226 
2. Must the Government Action Require Compliance To Bar a 
Citizen Suit, and When Do Government Actions 
Require Compliance? 
Congress augmented EPA's enforcement authorities and created the 
backstop citizen suit authority to improve compliance with the environ- 
mental statutes. Consistent with this objective, it is provided that for a 
government action to bar a citizen suit, the government action must be 
commenced and diligently prosecuted "to require c~mpliance."~~' The plain 
meaning of the term is to coerce the defendant to cease violating the re- 
quirement being enforced. Non-coercive actions cajoling compliance or 
assessing modest penalties are not actions that require compliance. When 
' 25  Id. The court observed the government actions Congress specified to bar a citizen 
suit seeking abatement of an endangerment all required the government to find that such an 
endangerment existed. It distinguished a RCRA 3008(h) action as requiring no such 
finding. Indeed, it noted that the legislative history of 3008(h) indicated the provision 
was to enable EPA to implement corrective action on RCRA interim status facilities, a 
power that EPA previously had only with regard to permitted facilities and that the provi- 
sion did not alter the statute as to EPA's imminent and substantial endangerment authority. 
226 See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 
1574 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a government action listed as barring RCRA citizen suit 
under 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(l)(B) did not bar suit under 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(l)(A)); Me- 
jdreck V. Lockformer Co., 2002 WL 1838141 (N.D. Ill.) (holding that RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(C), 
42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(2)(C) (2000), preclusion by a state suit under RCRA does not apply to 
a suit brought by a state under a similar state statute); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petro- 
leum Marketing, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that RCRA 
7002(b)(2)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C)(i) (2000), bars citizen suits to abate endan- 
gerlxents if the state brings a citizen suit in court to do the same); Briggs & Stratton Corp. 
v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that state 
action under a state statute that "would not necessarily be in compliance with RCRA" does 
not bar citizen suit); Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners and Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943 
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that state action does not bar citizen suit where section specifies 
that an EPA action bars suit); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 968 F. 
Supp. 423, 430 (E.D. Wisc. 1997); lnterfaith Cmty. Org. v. Allied Signal Inc., 928 F. Supp. 
1339, 1346-48 (D. N.J. 1996); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 41 (D. 
Me. 1994); Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1026-28 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio 1987), 
aff'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that specified federal and state 
actions under CERCLA bar citizen suit under RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9 6972(a) 
(l)(B)); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding 
that remedial funds spent by third parties do not bar citizen suit where section specifies 
that EPA expenditure of remedial funds bars suit); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 
F. Supp. 1531 (D. Pa. 1985). See also Davies v. Nat'l Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 
997 (D. Kan. 1997) (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction to allow state completion of 
investigation and development of plan to remediate releases of hazardous waste, but noting 
that "when Congress has set forth the conditions under which state or administrative actions 
will preclude a federal claim, as it did in [42 U.S.C.] 6972(a)(l)(B), a federal district court 
must be cautious about refusing to exercise jurisdiction when those conditions are not 
present lest it frustrate Congress's scheme for vindicating important federal interests"). 
?"See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
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Congress intended non-coercive actions to bar successive enforcement, it 
did not include the "to require compliance" language in the statute, i.e., 
in CWA 5 309(g).'28 This difference emphasizes the significance of the 
"to require compliance" language in those statutes where it appears and 
highlights the unique nature of 5 309(g), which authorizes only modest 
penalties that are not enough, in many cases, to deter violations. 
The legislative history affirms that Congress deliberately used the term 
"to require compliance." The House and Senate Reports accompanying 
the CAA and CWA citizen suit provisions stated that commencement and 
diligent prosecution of "abatement actions" by the government would pre- 
clude citizen suits.229 Indeed, the Senate CAA bill, containing the proto- 
type citizen suit provision,230 required prior notice by the citizen to "af- 
ford [the government the opportunity] . . . to initiate enforcement pro- 
ceedings . . . to abate such alleged ~ i o l a t i o n . " ~ ~ '  "Abate" is defined as "to 
put an end to."232 The plain meaning of "abate" and "abatement" in the 
legislative history is the cessation of the violation. The Senate Report ac- 
companying this language made it clear that the citizen plaintiff and, ul- 
timately, the court were to make a judgment whether a government action 
met this test: 
[I]f the citizen believed efforts initiated by the agency to be in- 
adequate, the citizen might choose to file the action. In such case, 
the courts would be expected to consider the petition against the 
background of the agency action and could determine that such 
action would be adequate to justify suspension, dismissal, or con- 
solidation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the court 
viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdic- 
tion to consider the citizen action notwithstanding any pending 
agency 
The legislative history equated the adequacy or inadequacy of the govern- 
ment action with its capability of compelling compliance. The Confer- 
ence Committee changed the language of the Senate bill requiring the 
government "to initiate enforcement proceeding . . . to abate such alleged 
228 33 U.S.C. 8 1319(g) (2000). 
229 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1783, at 56 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 
5388 ("If an abatement action is pending . . ."); S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 37 (1972). re- 
printed in I CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 437 (1974) ("if the agency had not initi- 
ated abatement proceedings . . ."); H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1 ,  at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1 
CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 753, 820 (1973) ("If an abatement action is pending and is 
being diligently pursued . . ."); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746 ("if the agency had not initiated abatement proceedings. . ."). 
230 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
231 S. 4358, 91st Cong. 5 304(b) (1970). 
n2 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1 (1999). 
233 S. REP. NO. 91 -1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
401, 437 (1974). 
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violation"234 to the language of the enacted provision requiring the gov- 
ernment to have "commenced and [be] diligently prosecuting . . . action 
. . . to require compliance."235 As discussed above, Congress's reference 
to abating a violation meant compelling compliance with the statute. The 
statute's final language was more elegant than the earlier Senate text from 
which it was derived, but the Senate Report explains both.236 The legislative 
history also demonstrates Congress's intent that the trial court determine 
that a government action is adequate (i.e., whether the government action 
is one capable of and calculated to require compliance) before i t  can bar 
a citizen suit. 
The Supreme Court in Gwaltney of Snzithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, Inc. seized on the present tense in another subsection of CWA 
9 505, as a justification for holding that the section authorized citizen 
suits only to address continuing violations.237 It found additional support 
for its conclusion by noting that the provisions "specifically provide that 
citizen suits are barred only if the Administrator or State has commenced 
an action ' to require compliance.' This language supports the conclusion 
that the precluded citizen suit is also an action for compliance, rather 
than an action solely for civil penalties for past, nonrecurring violations."238 
The Seventh Circuit cited similar language in RCRA 9 7002239 to support 
its holding that an EPA suit to abate violations barred a citizen suit to 
abate the same violations, although directed against different defendants.240 
What government actions "require compliance" and, as a result, may 
preclude a citizen suit? Clearly, an injunction against a continuing viola- 
tion is a coercive act and, therefore, may preclude a citizen suit. The Su- 
preme Court reminds us in laid la^^^' that penalties also may be used to 
coerce compliance. To coerce compliance and deter violations, a penalty 
must recover from a violator more than the economic benefit it has real- 
ized from the violations; in Laidlaw because the penalty agreed upon be- 
'" S. 4358, 91st Cong. § 304(a)(3) (1970). 
235CAA 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). as it  was enacted and is 
worded today. 
236 The Senate Report accompanying the Senate CWA bill contains the same language 
as the Senate Report accompanying the Senate CAA bill. Cornpare S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 
37 (1970), reprinted in I CAA L E G I ~ L A T I V E  HISTORY, at 401, 437 (1974), with S. REP. N O .  
92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744-47. Since the language 
contained in  the Senate CWA bill is the same as the language contained in the CAA Con- 
ference Committee bill, the quoted language from the Senate Report explains both versions 
equally. 
*"See 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). The Court was interpreting the "alleged to be in  viola- 
tion" present tense in  CWA Q: 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
38 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 n.3 (quoting 33 U.S.C. $1365(b)(l)(B)) (emphasis added). 
239 42 U.S.C. 9 6972 (2000). 
240 Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th 
Cir. 1992) ("Notice that this statute refers to an action to 'require compliance with such 
permit [or] regulation'-not an action against the private party's chosen adversary, but an 
action to require compliance" (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000)). 
"' 528 U.S. 167, 185-87 (2000). 
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tween the defendant and the state was insufficient to do so, it did not pre- 
clude a citizen Generally, if a government action is not a traditionally 
recognized coercive device, it probably is not one to require compliance. 
To preclude a citizen suit, a government action must not only be ca- 
pable of requiring compliance, it must be calculated to do so. Although 
the Court in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo reminds us that there may be 
several forms of injunction that can lead to compliance, not all injunc- 
tions will do so.243 The Second Circuit implicitly recognized this in re- 
manding a citizen suit case for the district court to determine whether the 
defendant's settlement of a government enforcement action "caused the 
violations alleged by [plaintiff] to cease and eliminated any realistic 
prospect of their recurrence."244 If so, the citizen suit was to be dismissed, 
if not, it was to go forward. The decision was therefore based on moot- 
ness, but it required the trial court on remand to determine not only whether 
the state's settlement rendered the citizen suit moot, but also whether the 
settlement was complied with and whether it covered all of the types of 
violations alleged by the citizen Other courts have held that admin- 
istrative orders do not bar citizen suits unless they purport to and do, in 
fact, prevent the continuance of violations alleged in the citizen suits.246 
States may use a common enforcement mechanism, such as an adminis- 
trative compliance order, not to coerce compliance, but as a means of ex- 
tending a compliance date. Mere compliance extensions do not coerce com- 
pliance, even though they are contained in compliance orders."' Of 
course, it may not be clear from the face of an order whether the state in- 
tends to compel compliance or merely extend a compliance date. Some 
courts may be hostile to such an inquiry.248 
242 Id. at 186 n.2, citing district court opinion, U.S. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Servs., Inc., 890 
F. Supp. 470,49 1-94,497-98 (D.S.C. 1995). 
243 456 U.S. 305 (1982). The Court held that the district court was not mandated to is- 
sue an injunction requiring the Navy to cease discharging practice bombs into the waters of 
the United States without a CWA permit, but could instead order the Navy to apply for a 
permit. It concluded that the CWA provided several means for a court to assure compli- 
ance. "An injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance." Id. at 314. "Rather 
than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the 
[CWA] permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt 
compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immedi- 
ate cessation." Id. at 320. 
244 Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991). 
245 Id. 
246 See N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 1998 WL 886645, at *3 
(N.D. Cal.); Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1578-79 (N.D. Ga. 
1995); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832,843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
247 Culbertson, 9 13 F. Supp. at 1579. 
248 Indeed, one court suggested that a citizen plaintiff's argument that an administrative 
compliance order was merely a compliance date extension came close to warranting a Rule 
11 sanction. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 
(N.D. Ala. 1988). 
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C. When Must the Government Commence an Action To Bar a Citizen Suit? 
The citizen suit provisions typically provide that no citizen suit may 
be "commenced" if the government "has commenced" and is diligently 
prosecuting an enforcement action. Congress's use of "has commenced" 
raises the related issues of when the government action must be commenced 
to be preclusive and what constitutes commencement of a government 
action. Because the provisions use the term "commenced" describing gov- 
ernment and citizen actions in the same sentence, the word must have the 
same meaning with regard to both. That "commenced" has the same mean- 
ing in both uses is not only consistent with the plain meaning canon of con- 
struction, i t  follows from the canon to "interpret the same or similar terms in 
a statute the same way."249 The fact that Congress used the past tense of 
the same verb in all versions of the preclusion device reinforces this con- 
clusion. 
I .  Must the Governnzent Commence an Action Prior to a Citizen 
Suit To Bar It? 
The uses of the present or future "may be commenced," the past tense 
"has commenced," and the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" in the 
same paragraph suggest that Congress used the different tenses purpose- 
fully and intended the temporal meanings they convey. No citizen suit "may 
be commenced7' if the government "has commenced7' and "is diligently 
prosecuting" an action. Thus the government must have commenced its ac- 
tion before the citizen suit is commenced in order to preclude the citizen 
suit. The Court held in Gwaltney that Congress used differences between 
present and past tenses in citizen suit provisions deliberately and that 
courts should accord significance to those differences.250 This literal in- 
terpretation of "has commenced" is consonant with the Court's notion in 
Gwaltney that the purpose of the notice and delay elements of the preclu- 
sion device is to give the government the first chance to enforce, and al- 
low citizens to enforce when the government fails to do so,25' a notion that is 
consistent with legislative history.252 Most courts have had little trouble in 
holding that a government enforcement action will preclude only subse- 
quently commenced citizen Interpreting "has commenced," based 
249 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 324 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 84 
(1990) and United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 366 (1988)). 
"OGwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57-59 
(1987). The Court concluded that Congress used the present tense "is in violation" in  CWA 
3 505 advisedly, for when it wished to refer to past acts, as it did in RCRA 3 7002, it  knew 
how to do so by using the past tense "has contributed." Id. at 57 n.2. 
15'See Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
"'See discussion of legislative history, Part 1.8.2, supra. 
253Thu~  in Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 215 (D. 
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on its tense, to mean the government action was previously filed implies 
that "is diligently prosecuting," which follows one word later, also should 
be interpreted, based on its tense, to mean a presently pending govern- 
ment prosecution. This present tense meaning of "is diligently prosecut- 
ing" has a significance not fully recognized by the case law, as discussed 
infra in Part 1I.D. 1. 
It follows from this interpretation that once a citizen suit is commenced, 
the subsequent commencement of a government enforcement action does 
not activate the statutory preclusion. That subsequent commencement of 
a government action does not activate the statutory preclusion is consis- 
tent with the general rule that, once jurisdiction is properly invoked, it is 
not ousted by subsequent events, although Congress can provide to the 
contrary.254 It is also supported by the plain meaning and expressio ~inius 
canons of statutory interpretation; by specifying that an action the gov- 
ernment has commenced and is diligently prosecuting may bar a citizen 
Conn. 1985), the court held that the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B), "[oln its face . . . 
does not apply to a case in which the state did not take enforcement action until after the 
citizen suit was filed." Indeed, it found the language of the statute to be "unambiguous." Id. 
at 216. Courts have had no trouble drawing a bright line in this regard. "The fact that DEC 
filed its complaint in state court less than one half hour after plaintiffs filed their complaint 
in this Court does not change the fact that plaintiff's suit was filed first." Long Island 
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. City Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 27 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 
2 4 3 4 4  (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Conn. Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 
1397, 1402-03 (D. Conn. 1987). In Chesapeake Bcry Foundcrtion v. Atnerican Recove? 
Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208 (4th Cir. 1985), the court held that a citizen action was not pre- 
empted by state action commenced three and a half hours later. The court commented that 
"the verb tenses used in subsection [33 U.S.C. 5 13651 (b)(l)(B) and the scheme of the 
statute demonstrate that the bar was not intended to apply unless the government files suit 
first." Id. at 208. It noted further that courts had other mechanisms to avoid duplicative 
litigation. See Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 
(M.D. Ga. 2001); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 
1374 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Pirgim Pub. Interest Lobby v. Dow Chem. Co.. 1996 WL 903838, 
at *6-*7 (W.D. Mich.) (stating that state filed two days later); Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. 
P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst., 1992 WL 315188, at *3 (D. Md.) (holding that state's intent 
to enforce is not enough to bar citizen suit); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 
894 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that state action must be "pending" 
when citizen suit is filed to bar suit); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 
1538-39 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); Mass. 
PIRG, Inc. v. ICI Americas, 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Mass. 199 1) (holding that federal 
and state actions filed after citizen suit didn't bar i t  under the CWA, 42 U.S.C. (I 13 19(g)); 
PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 438, 4 4 4 4 5  (D.N.J. 1991); Chesapeake 
Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987); Brewer v. 
City of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519, 527-28 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that a citizen suit 
was not barred under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, by subsequently filed state enforcement 
action). See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1147 
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding without discussion that an earlier state suit bars CWA and RCRA 
citizen suits). 
'54 Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K. N. Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). See Acme 
Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1 2 4 4 4 8  (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (holding 
after considerable analysis that the issuance of a CERCLA 3 106 administrative order didn't 
divest i t  of jurisdiction over a previously commenced citizen suit for abatement of an im- 
minent and substantial endangerment under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2000)). 
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suit, the provision implies that an action that has not yet commenced or 
has concluded will not bar a citizen Congress did not provide to 
the contrary by using the past tense "has commenced" in the preclusion 
provision, and neither the structure of the statute nor the legislative his- 
tory contain any hint that Congress intended a subsequently filed gov- 
ernment action to oust the court's jurisdiction over a pending citizen suit.256 
Indeed, the preclusion device only bars the citizen from commencing an 
action, not from prosecuting an action once it has properly commenced.257 
Several decisions have held that subsequently filed government actions 
do not bar the filing or continuance of citizen suits, but they do not i l lu-  
minate the issue 
The defendant in  one case acknowledged that a subsequently filed 
government enforcement action did not automatically oust the court from 
jurisdiction to hear a previously filed citizen suit, but made a more subtle 
suggestion based on the Court's description in Gwultney of citizen suits 
as purely secondary.259 The defendant argued that the court should deter- 
mine whether to dismiss a citizen suit by evaluating "on a case-by-case ba- 
sis, whether permitting a properly filed citizen suit to go forward would 
serve the underlying objectives of the Act in light of the subsequently 
filed government action."260 The court commented that the citizen suit at 
issue indeed had served its statutory purpose by prompting diligent gov- 
ernment enforcement and that the continuance of the citizen suit frus- 
trated judicial economy and was needlessly burdensome to the defen- 
dant.*'j' But i t  held that i t  had no statutory authority on which to dismiss 
' 55  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29. 
256See Acrne Printing Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1237. Indeed, the opinion also noted that 
Justice Scalia argued, in his concurrence in Gwaltney, that "commencing" and "maintain- 
ing" an action are different concepts and that Congress used the "commencement" concept 
advisedly in CWA 5 505. Id. at 1247 (citing 484 U.S. at 68). 
'57The Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
1 109, 1 1 13 (D. Colo. 1999). 
' 5 R  See Am. Recovery Co . ,  769 F.2d at 208-09; The Old Titner, 5 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1 109 
(holding that state administrative penalty assessment commenced after filing a CWA citi- 
zen suit complaint does not bar citizen suit under CWA (i 309(g)(6)(ii), 33 U.S.C. 
$ 1319(g)(6)(ii)); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 380; Briggs & Strat- 
ton, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; Glazer, 894 F. Supp. at 1035; NRDC, Inc. v. Loewengart & 
Co., 776 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1991); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 
438 (D.N.J. 1991); Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 951 (D. 
Colo. 1990); Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding 
that entry of a consent decree settling the government's case did not bar continuation of the 
citizen suit when the citizen plaintiffs refused to agree to the decree); Job Plating, 623 F. 
Supp. at 215-16; and Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1132 (D. Md. 
1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that state enforcement action com- 
menced after commencement of CWA citizen suit does not bar citizen suit under the CWA 
(i 505(b), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)). See also Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 235. 
259 Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 609 (D. 
Minn. 1988). 
2W Id. at 614. 
26' Id. at 613. 
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it.2b2 The court did warn, however, that it would deny plaintiff any attor- 
neys fees if plaintiff pursued purely duplicative litigation.263 
2. When Does the Governnzerzt Conzmence an Action? 
While the statutes do not define "commenced," FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing 
a complaint with the court." Courts have readily adopted this definition of 
"commenced" in the citizen suit provision.264 The Senate Report accom- 
panying the CWA citizen suit provision suggests that this is what Congress 
intended: "The time between notice and filing of the action should give 
the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged 
violation."265 When Congress provided in 1987 that penalty assessments 
would bar citizen suits for penalties under the CWA, it exempted from 
the bar citizen suits that had "been filed prior" to the commencement of 
the penalty In a similar vein, EPA's Consolidated Rules of Practice 
provide that administrative penalty proceedings within EPA's jurisdiction 
are commenced when EPA files a complaint with the Regional Hearing 
Clerk.267 Because the statutes do not suggest interpreting "commenced7' 
otherwise, the term should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and EPA's rules for administrative 
procedures. 
One court suggested that for purposes of uniformity, federal rather 
than state law should govern the meaning of "commenced."268 Of course, 
the commencement of federal actions is determined by federal law, pri- 
marily the rules of civil procedure and EPA regulations. To the extent 
that Congress drafted the statutes to preclude citizen suits because of the 
commencement of a state action, however, Congress implicitly accepted 
non-uniformity to the extent that state civil and administrative procedures 
vary in minor ways from their federal counterparts. The provisions authorize 
citizens to enforce against a violation, but not if the government already 
has commenced an action against the same violator. Because the verb "com- 
menced" is used twice in the same sentence, the word should be inter- 
preted similarly in both contexts. Citizen suits cannot be commenced by 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 See Clorox Co. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. 111. 1994). 
S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 80 (1971), reprirlted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (em- 
phasis added). 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(6)(B)(i) & (ii) (2000). 
267 EPA, Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of 
Civil Penalties and the Revocation/Termination or Suspension of Permits, Prehearing Pro- 
cedures, 40 C.F.R. Q 22.13 (2004). 
268 Conn. Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 n.8 (D. 
Conn. 1987). The court also examined the state law governing when suit was commenced 
and found it to the be same as federal law. 
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the statutorily required notice of violation to the governments and the 
violator. Congress intended that notice to enable the governments to pre- 
clude the citizen suit by commencing government enforcement action first, 
but the government could not do so if the citizen suit is commenced by 
the notice.269 If "commencement" has the same meaning both times it is used 
in the same paragraph, it must mean the filing of a complaint by the state 
rather than a preliminary notice or action. Not surprisingly, most courts 
considering the question have held that actions short of filing complaints 
do not constitute commencement of enforcement actions,270 and that the 
actual filing of an administrative complaint or the issuance of an admin- 
istrative order does commence an enforcement action, provided that the 
other requirements of the preclusion bar are met.27' 
269 "The time between notice and filing of the action should give the administrative en- 
forcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 80 
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (discussing CWA 505, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365). 
270See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that writing a letter does not commence an action in court); Dague v. City of Bur- 
lington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on orher grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992) 
(holding that filing of an "Assurance of Discontinuance" in court did not constitute com- 
mencing an action in court under RCRA 7002, 42 U.S.C. 6972); Cmty. Ass'n for Res- 
toration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL 1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wash. 2001) 
(holding that notice of violation does not commence a CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g), 
penalty action); NRDC v. NVF Co., 1998 WL 372299, at "1 I (D. Del. 1998) (holding that 
state and federal monitoring of defendant's activities and discussions with defendant do 
not constitute commencement of an action under CWA 309(g)); Molokai Chamber of 
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1405 (D. Hawaii 1995) (holding 
that notice that the state might commence an administrative penalty assessment did not 
"commence" an action under CWA 309(g): "The commencement of an action for penal- 
ties is not signaled by a letter stating that penalties may be sought under a separate statu- 
tory section, particularly where, as here, the DOH has taken no further steps toward the 
imposition of penalties."). See also Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst., 
1992 WL 315188 (D. Md. 1992) (holding that state's intention to enforce does not consti- 
tute commencement of an action); Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. County Place Waste 
Treatment Co., 734 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that an unsigned letter 
setting up compliance meeting with state does not commence a CWA § 309(g) penalty 
action); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 61 1 n.2 (D. 
Minn. 1988); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 81 7 F. Supp. 1 164, 1 173 
(D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a letter accompanying an inspection report notifying defendant 
that it was in violation and that an enforcement action might be commenced if it did not 
come into compliance did not commence a government enforcement action). Bur see Wil- 
liams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1329 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (apparently 
holding that a state agency can commence an action by informal means, such as entering 
into negotiations or orally telling a violator to submit corrective plans). 
271 See Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (hold- 
ing that issuance of administrative penalty order by consent commenced action for pur- 
poses of CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. 
Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that administrative order on consent commenced 
action for purposes of CWA 9 309(g)); Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (S.D. 
Cal. 1991); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 at *5 (D.N.J.) (hold- 
ing that state oversight of site remediation was not commencement of a CWA § 309(g) pen- 
alty action). 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 453 2004 
454 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 28 
The question of when a citizen suit or a government action is com- 
menced becomes complicated when the citizen first files a complaint al- 
leging a claim not requiring prior notice and later amends the complaint 
to allege a claim requiring prior notice. For instance, a citizen might file 
a public or private nuisance suit to enjoin pollution, an action not requiring 
prior notice, and amend the complaint to add citizen suit claims requiring 
prior notice. Both the policy behind the prior notice requirement and the 
logic of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE lead to the conclusion 
that the action requiring prior notice was commenced with the filing of the 
amended complaint, not the initial complaint. The primary policy behind 
the prior notice, delay, and bar provision is to allow the government to 
assume its enforcement responsibility against the violation unencumbered 
by another's pending enforcement action.272 If filing the initial complaint 
constituted commencement of the amended action, the citizen would not 
have given notice of the violation of the statute and the government 
would not have had the opportunity to enforce against the violation un- 
encumbered by the citizen suit. Only by giving the requisite notice and 
observing the requisite delay period before filing the amended complaint 
is this goal accomplished. The pendency of the initial suit against the defen- 
dant on another matter does not deprive the government of its opportunity 
to enforce against the violation unencumbered by another's enforcement 
action,277 for the government is free to initiate an action once it receives 
notice of the citizen's intent to amend the complaint. Moreover, as noted 
above, under Rule 3,  an action is commenced when filed.274 The cause of 
action against the violation requiring prior notice does not exist until the 
amended complaint is filed, making it difficult to argue it is commenced 
before that time. Finally, "once amended, the initial action is no longer 
before the thereby making it impossible for it to have been com- 
menced earlier. Not surprisingly, most courts considering this issue and 
its variants hold that the action against a violation requiring prior notice, 
272 See supra Part I.C.2. 
273 Of course, there is a spectrum of situations in which the citizen suit case may be- 
come increasingly intrusive on the government's ability to conduct its action against the 
violation requiring prior notice unencumbered by the initial case. If a citizen filed suit 
against a defendant for breach of an employment contract, served notice of its intent to 
amend its complaint to include a citizen suit count for violation of the CWA, and EPA 
brought suit on the CWA violation within the delay period, the citizen would be barred from 
filing the amended complaint and EPA could prosecute its action entirely unencumbered by 
the pending breach of contract case. If the initial case concerned breach of a contract to 
construct the treatment facility that was needed to comply with the CWA, the two cases 
would overlap, but EPA's ability to pursue its action on the violations would be unencum- 
bered. If the initial case was a common law nuisance action for damages caused by the 
violating discharge, the two cases would overlap even more, but EPA's ability to pursue its 
action on the violations would still be unencumbered. 
'74 See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
275 Clorox Co. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
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first alleged in an amended complaint, is commenced when the amended 
complaint is filed.276 
Other courts came to a different conclusion, on the basis that FED- 
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15(c) provides an amended complaint 
relates back to the original complaint if the Rule's requirements are met. 
They did so, however, to preserve citizen suits when a potentially barring 
government action was commenced after the initial citizen suit complaint 
was filed, but before an amended citizen suit complaint was filed.277 The 
Court's use of the "relation back" provision of Rule 15(c) to allow plain- 
tiffs to amend properly filed complaints to add citizen suit counts without 
the otherwise required prior notice is novel. The purpose of the Rule is to 
integrate the operation of statutes of limitation with the amended com- 
plaints, as acknowledged by the court that first adopted this "relation back" 
theory.278 Allowing citizen suit plaintiffs to amend properly filed complaints 
to include previously unnoticed citizen suit counts wrongfully deprives 
the government of the opportunity to receive notice of the newly complained 
of violations and to commence an action on them, unencumbered by a 
citizen suit. If notice is required before commencement of the complaint, 
the initial citizen suit could continue unaffected by any government ac- 
tion on the initially complained of violations. 
The situation may appear more complicated when the original com- 
plaint alleges violation of requirement A,  requiring prior notice, and the 
amended complaint alleges either subsequent violations of requirement A 
or violations of requirement B, both requiring prior notice. These allega- 
tions could reflect either violations of requirement A continuing after the 
complaint is filed or violations of requirement B during discovery. As to 
the added allegations of violations, however, the situation is not different 
from when the original complaint contained no allegation subject to the 
notice, delay, and bar provision. The government did not receive notice 
of these violations before the initial complaint was filed and therefore will 
not have an opportunity to take action against them unencumbered by a 
276 See id. at 122 (stating that initial complaint apparently alleged no violation requir- 
ing prior notice); City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 983-84 (S.D. Ohio 
1993) (stating that initial complaint contained CERCLA claims, and amended complaint 
contained RCRA claims); Zands, 779 F. Supp. at 1254 (stating'that RCRA claims were 
first included in amended complaint); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 627-28 (D. Md. 1987) (stating that notice sent before complaint filed 
suffices for later violations of the same nature cited in the notice); Sierra Club v. Simkins 
Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-1 126 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988). 
17'See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (E.D. Wisc. 1995) 
(using "relation back" theory to sustain citizen suit RCRA counts added in amended com- 
plaint filed after government CERCLA action). See also A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.1. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423,432 (E.D. Wisc. 1997). 
278Acme Printing Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1246 n.6. The Advisory Committee Notes for 
the 1966 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) commented, "Relation back is intimately 
connected with the policy of the statute of limitations." FED. R. CIV. P. 15, Advisory 
Comm. Notes (1960). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. at 627-28 (stating that 
relation back is for purpose of applying the statutes of limitations). 
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citizen suit unless the citizen gives notice before filing the amended com- 
plaint. It is less prejudicial to the government's unencumbered enforce- 
ment ability, however, not to give notice of filing an amended complaint 
if the new violations are of the same requirement as alleged in the initial 
complaint, for which prior notice was given. Because the citizen suit provi- 
sions typically grant authority to sue only for ongoing violations, it is rea- 
sonable for the government to know when it received the citizen's notice 
before the citizen filed her complaint, that the violations were alleged to 
ongoing at the time the complaint was filed and continued thereafter.279 
The pre-complaint notice of violations of particular requirements, there- 
fore, effectively gave the government notice of post-complaint violations 
of the same requirements and the ability to enforce against them unencum- 
bered by a citizen suit. The better practice would be for citizen plaintiffs to 
further alleviate prejudice to the government's unencumbered enforcement 
ability regarding these subsequent violations of the same requirements by 
including allegations of continuing and future violations of the require- 
ment the pre-complaint notice. 
D. How Diligently Must the Government Prosecute an Action in Order 
To Bar a Citizen Suit? 
The statutes do not define the phrase "diligently prosecuting," perhaps 
because prosecution is an activity for which courts have far more experi- 
ence than Congress; the statutes focus instead on how much deference 
should be accorded to prosecutorial choices.280 The phrase raises two inter- 
pretive questions. Must the prosecution be ongoiilg to bar a citizen suit? 
What is diligent prosecution? 
A word of caution is necessary before delving into judicial interpre- 
tation of the phrase. Many of the decisions interpreting it do so in the 
context of CWA 5 309(g). While the preclusions in citizen suit provisions 
apply when the government "is diligently prosecuting . . . to require compli- 
ance," the preclusion in 5 309(g) lacks the second phrase. That is not sur- 
prising, since even the most diligent prosecution of 5 309(g) will yield 
only modest penalties and will not result in a compliance order. That is de- 
cidedly not the case under EPA's other enforcement authorities or under 
the citizen suit provisions. Using them, diligent prosecution can yield 
enormous penalties and injunctions for costly compliance. 
Defendants in CWA citizen suit cases, stymied by limitations on the 
use of preclusion under CWA 5 505 have sought to transform the preclu- 
279 The Court held that allegations of continuing violations are required to establish ju- 
risdiction for a citizen suit under CWA g 505, 33 U.S.C. g 1365 (2000), and similarly worded 
provisions. Gwaltney o f  Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484  U.S. 49  (1987). 
The concurring opinion suggested there would be no continuing injury to support standing 
and defeat mootness without a continuing violation. 
280 See discussion infra in Part II.D.2.b. 
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sion under CWA § 309(g) from a narrow one preventing only duplicative 
penalties for the same violation, to a broad one precluding citizen enforce- 
ment if the government has taken virtually any administrative action. 
Many courts have accepted this reasoning and fail to observe that dis- 
tinction, freely drawing from 5 309(g) "diligently prosecuting" precedent 
when interpreting citizen suit preclusions. Even courts sympathetic to 
citizen suits are swayed by N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town 
of S c i t ~ a t e , ~ ~ '  and its progeny, approaching "diligently prosecuting" issues 
as if they were prosecutorial discretion issues and ignoring the wording 
and intent of the statute. Because the decisions are already a jumble, 
mixing "diligently prosecuting" decisions under 9 309(g) and citizen suit 
provisions as if there were no difference between the two, this Article ex- 
amines decisions interpreting "diligently prosecuting" under both the 
citizen suit provisions and CWA 5 309(g). But it marks 5 309(g) cases in 
the footnotes in bold to indicate how those decisions have influenced the 
state of "diligently prosecuting" law. 
I. Must the Goverrzment Prosecution Be Ongoing To Bar a 
Citizen Suit? 
The environmental statutes bar citizen suits if the government "has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an action "to require compli- 
ance" (emphasis added). As discussed above, almost all courts consider- 
ing the issue have held that Congress's use of the past tense "has com- 
menced" was deliberate, and therefore is significant and should be inter- 
preted in accordance with its plain meaning. "Has commenced," in the 
past tense, is separated by one word from "is . . . prosecuting," in the pre- 
sent tense. The separation of the two verbs by a single word and the jux- 
taposition of their tenses in the same sub-paragraph, suggest the tense 
difference was deliberate and that the government's prosecution must be 
ongoing to bar to a citizen suit. This interpretation is supported by the 
plain meaning and expressio unius canons of interpretation; by specifying 
that continuing prosecutions may be preclusive, the provisions imply that 
concluded prosecutions cannot be.282 "TO require compliance" reinforces 
this conclusion, for it suggests that a preclusive government action is one 
in which compliance is yet to be achieved and hence that a concluded 
government action is not preclusive, for a concluded government action 
should have led to compliance. Modifying "is . . . prosecuting" with "dili- 
gently" adds to the strength of this interpretation. "Diligent7' means "char- 
acterized by steady, earnest, and energetic application and effort."283 Asking 
whether a prosecution is diligent inquires more into the energy put into an 
28' 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). 
282 See ESKRIDGE and discussion, supra note 29, at 323, 327. 
283 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 233 (1 999). 
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ongoing process than into the results or success of a concluded process; 
once the case is concluded, no more energy is put into the prosecution of 
the case. Although energy may be devoted to monitor compliance with an 
injunctive order, that is not "prosecution" of the case. 
The structure of the CWA suggests that Congress intentionally used 
the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" in the citizen suit provision. 
When Congress added 5  309(g) to the CWA in 1987, it barred successive 
EPA and citizen actions for penalties when EPA or a state "is diligently 
prosecuting" a 5  309(g) penalty action and also when one of them "has 
issued" a final penalty order and the violator "has p a i d  a penalty.284 This 
juxtaposition of tenses in a similar context re-emphasizes that Congress 
knows the difference between ongoing and completed actions, that it used 
different verb tenses deliberately, and that it meant the differences to have 
meaning. This re-emphasis is underscored by congressional knowledge of 
the linkage between $ 5  309(g) and 505, for Congress cross-referenced 
each section in the other. When it amended 5  505 to cross reference the 
preclusion in § 309(g), it did not disturb the juxtaposed tenses in 5  505(b), 
indicating its intent to let the meaning of the different tenses stand. 
The legislative history underlines the deliberate nature of the congres- 
sional choice to use the present tense in the preclusion provisions. The 
CAA Conference Committee Report and the House CWA Report both stated 
that a citizen suit is barred if a government "abatement action is pending 
and is being diligently The Senate CAA and CWA Reports 
both contain similar language,286 reinforcing that the legislative intent 
that the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" was to denote current 
prosecution. The Senate Report demonstrated the same approach in stat- 
ing that government agencies must prosecute enforcement actions "in 
good faith and with deliberate speed . . . or the citizen is free-to initiate 
284CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(g)(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). Indeed, Congress in- 
tentionally changed tenses in the subsection to implement its policy objectives. In the ini- 
tial version of the Senate bill, S. 2652, 97th Cong. 9 8 (1982), and the final version of the 
House bill, H.R. 8, 99th Cong. § 24 (1985), it provided EPA with authority to commence a 
penalty proceeding against a person who "is in violation" of the CWA (emphasis added). 
But, in the enacted version, it authorized EPA to assess penalties only against a person who 
"has violated" the statute. 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(g)(l)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The reason 
for the change in tenses was to prevent EPA from assessing paltry penalties against con- 
tinuing violations warranting injunctions or substantial penalties. Congress was aware of 
tense differences and used tenses advisedly. 
285 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1783 at 56 (1970). reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 
5388 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1 CWA LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY, at 753, 820 (1973). 
"[l]f the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to 
consider the citizen action notwithstanding any pending agency action." S. REP. NO. 91- 
1196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 437 (1974) (empha- 
sis added); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746 
(emphasis added). 
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his action."2s7 Again, the question of whether a particular prosecution is dili- 
gent requires the assessment of an ongoing rather than a concluded process. 
Application of the preclusions only when there is an ongoing gov- 
ernment prosecution makes sense as a matter of policy, for the likelihood 
of disruption and conflict from successive prosecution is greatest when 
two enforcement actions for prospective relief are proceeding simultane- 
ously. Once the government's action is concluded, the potential for dis- 
ruption and conflict in judicial proceedings is over. The likelihood that 
resolution of successive citizen suits will disrupt or conflict with the resolu- 
tions of earlier government actions is minimal for several reasons dis- 
cussed above.288 
Not surprisingly, courts routinely have interpreted the citizen suit provi- 
sions in general and their preclusion bar elements in particular to give 
meaning to the tenses Congress used in them.289 Many of them note that 
the Supreme Court in Gwaltney based its decision that CWA $ 505 con- 
ferred no jurisdiction for a citizen suit to enforce against wholly past viola- 
tions on the present tense "alleged to be in violation" in $ 505(a)(l). The 
Court's primary interpretation of the phrase was its plain meaning: 
The most natural reading of "to be in violation7' is a requirement 
that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or in- 
termittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past 
polluter will continue to pollute in the future. Congress could 
have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past 
("to have violated"), but it did not choose this readily available 
option . . . . [Tlhe prospective orientation of that phrase could 
not have escaped Congress's attention . . . . [Clongress has demon- 
strated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how to 
avoid this prospective implication by using language that ex- 
plicitly targets wholly past violations.290 
The Court's admonition to give meaning to the tenses used in 
$ 505(a)'s limitation on citizen enforcement authorityz9' hardly can be 
disregarded in interpreting $ 505(b)'s limitation on that a~thority.?~' Al- 
most all of the many courts considering the "has commenced and is dili- 
gently prosecuting" language have reasoned that Congress's use of the past 
tense "has prosecuted" was deliberate, is significant and should be inter- 
preted in accordance with its plain meaning to hold that only government 
REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 65 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 
401 ,465  (1974). 
See supra text between notes 145 & 146. 
289 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
290 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). 
291 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000). 
292 id.  5 l365(b). 
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actions filed before citizen suits will bar them.293 Similarly, all but one of 
the few courts considering the language have reasoned that Congress's 
use of the present tense "is prosecuting" was deliberate, is significant, and 
should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning to hold that 
only government actions ongoing at the time citizens suits are filed will bar 
them.294 
The district court ruling in laid la^,^^^ is in some ways a schizophrenic 
decision. It allowed a citizen suit to continue in the face of the defen- 
dant's entry into a consent decree with the state assessing a civil penalty 
in excess of $400,000. It is a landmark decision for holding that a state 
action was not diligently prosecuted to bar a citizen suit because the pen- 
alty amount in the state action was not sufficient under the circumstances.296 
But the court rejected the easier, plain meaning approach of holding that 
the state action did not bar the citizen suit because the state action was 
concluded; the state was no longer "prosecuting" its action, diligently or 
not. Indeed, the decision is the only one to holding that Congress's use of 
"prosecuting" does not mean the state action must be continuing to bar a 
citizen suit. The court doubted that Congress intended the meanings of 
the tenses it used, for doing so would allow the citizen suit preclusion 
erected by an ongoing diligently prosecuted government action to dissolve 
once a diligently prosecuted government action was concluded, thus al- 
lowing citizens to evade preclusion simply by waiting until the govern- 
ment's action concluded, a result the court considered senseless.297 The 
court failed to note that its own conclusion also led to a senseless result: 
why would Congress authorize citizens to file suit when the government 
already had commenced an action but was not diligently prosecuting it, 
but later bar the citizens from concluding their action because the gov- 
ernment had concluded its action in a non-diligent and unsatisfactory man- 
ner? The most likely answer to these two questions is that Congress in- 
tended an ongoing government action to bar citizen suits only if the gov- 
ernment is diligently prosecuting the action and for a settled government 
action to bar citizen suits only if the government settled for an injunction 
requiring compliance or a penalty adequate to provide deterrence. 
293 See supra decisions cited in Part 1I.C. I; see supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
294 See Citizens for a Better Env't-Cat. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal. 83 F.3d 1 11 1, 1 11 8 
(9th Cir. 1996); Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 
1996); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423, 429-30 
(E.D. Wisc. 1997); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1034- 
38 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604, RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972); PlRG of N.J., 
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943 (D.N.J. 1991) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)); 
Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986) (in- 
terpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365); Conn. Fund for the Env't v. L & W Indus., Inc., 63 1 F. 
Supp. 1289 (D.Conn. 1986) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C.Q 1365). But see Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995). 
295 890 F. Supp 470 (D.S.C. 1995). 
296 See infra notes 334-335 and accompanying text. 
297 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485. 
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The court admitted that its decision was contrary to the plain meaning 
of the statutory language. It did not examine the legislative history, dis- 
cussed above, that supports the plain meaning of the statutory language.298 
The only justification the court gave for its decision was that it thought 
an opposite result was s e n s e l e ~ s . ~ ~  However, In light of Gwaltney, the oppo- 
site result is supported by the policy reasons examined above. Congress 
was more concerned with avoiding conflict between two ongoing court 
proceedings than with avoiding conflicting resolutions of two enforce- 
ment actions. Successive citizen suits have only a small chance of inter- 
fering with the results the government obtained in a concluded action. 
Moreover, if successive citizen suits interfere with the ability of violators 
to carry out their obligations under concluded government actions, courts 
may apply a variety of common law doctrines to prevent the ~onflict .~"" 
Indeed, the district court in Laidlaw noted that if the statutory bar ceased 
when the government action was concluded, duplicative suits might still 
be avoided under the doctrine of res judicata; but the court could not con- 
sider res judicata in the case, because the defendant had not plead it as a 
defense and both parties agreed it did not apply.30' Congressional aware- 
ness of common law  preclusion^^^' to prevent disruptive successive suits 
could explain why Congress used the present tense "is . . . prosecuting." 
But that would lead to the question, why would Congress intend that citi- 
zen suits be allowed to proceed while the government pursued its action 
without diligence, only to be barred by common law preclusions once the 
government concluded its action in an equally unsatisfactory manner? 
Congress could not have intended that result. In any event, the court's in- 
terpretation was dicta, because the court found the government's prose- 
cution had not been diligent in settling for too small a penalty, and there- 
fore did not preclude a citizen suit.303 
298 See supra notes 285-287, and accompanying text. 
299 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485-86. 
3wSee, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). The rela- 
tionship between statutory and common law preclusions in citizen suits is beyond the scope of 
this Article, although the author intends to address it subsequently. The question of whether 
the statutory preclusions occupy the field and preempt the common law preclusions is a 
complex one, only now beginning to be addressed. See supra note 18. The theme and 
variations in the statutory preclusions have not been recognized by commentators and may 
indicate a congressional intent to occupy the field to a greater extent than recognized by 
them. 
301 Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485 n.7. Indeed, the court asked the parties to brief the is- 
sue, raising two intriguing questions: Why did the court ask the parties to brief the issue when 
the defendant had not plead res judicata as a defense under FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c), and why 
did defendant argue the state order it had gone to considerable trouble to get didn't support 
res judicata? 
30'The Senate CAA and CWA Reports both commented that if courts found government 
enforcement adequate, they could suspend, dismiss or consolidate the citizen suit, evi- 
dently referring to stays, abstention, res judicata, and the other common law preclusions. 
S. REP. NO. 9 1-  1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 401, 437 
(1974); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinred in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746. 
303 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 49 1-98. 
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Few courts have addressed whether the present tense of "is . . . prose- 
cuting" means the preclusion no longer operates once a prosecution ends. 
Perhaps citizen plaintiffs have not made the argument, either because they 
did not think o f  it or because they did not want to raise it, fearing res ju- 
dicata or issue preclusion defenses would follow. 
Assuming that "is diligently prosecuting7' requires an ongoing gov- 
- 
ernment prosecution to bar a citizen suit, what is an "ongoing prosecution"? 
The obvious answer is that an ongoing prosecution is an action commenced 
by filing a complaint and not yet concluded by a dispositive ruling, deci- 
sion on the merits, or court-entered consent decree (or, under some statutes, 
courts' administrative analogues) and not on appeal. The difficult question 
is whether an action that has been concluded by an order is still ongoing 
when the order contains a schedule requiring the defendant to perform 
actions in the future. If the court has issued an injunction or approved a 
- - 
negotiated consent decree requiring compliance in accordance with a 
schedule, it is tempting to say the action is still pending and the citizen is 
barred from suing if the prosecutor is diligently monitoring compliance 
with the order and seeking to enforce it when the defendant fails to do so. 
Indeed, many,304 but not courts considering the matter have so held. 
The minority view, however, has more merit. Monitoring compliance with a 
decree is not action in court. When the prosecutor seeks the court's help 
to enforce the decree, he really is enforcing against a violation of the 
court's order in a contempt proceeding, not against a violation of the stat- 
ute in an enforcement action; that prosecution has been completed.'06 In- 
deed, Congress recognized the distinction by authorizing citizen enforce- 
ment against violations of both the statute and orders enforcing the stat- 
ute.307 The issue becomes considerably murkier when the order is adminis- 
3ar For instance, when a twenty-page consent decree established, in detail, work to be 
performed and standards to be met by the work, the state agency's monitoring of compli- 
ance with the work schedule was held to be continuing and diligent prosecution in City of 
Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1993). See also Cmty. of Cam- 
bridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. 
Md. 2000) (late compliance of consent decree held diligent prosecution under CWA 
p 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 i3iwg)) .  
- 
'05See PIRG of N.J.. Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corn.. 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J.) (holding 
- 
that state participation in committee overseeing implementation of remedial action by 
defendant under a stipulation ending administrative enforcement was not diligent prosecu- 
tion under CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g)); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, Corp. 
615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that post-consent decree administrative surveil- 
lance does not constitute action in court that would bar a citizen suit); Love v. N.Y. Dept. 
of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
'"See Conn. Fund for the Env't v. L & W Indus., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Conn. 
1986) (commenting that modification of a consent decree was not evidence of diligent 
prosecution). 
307 The citizen suit provisions generally authorize suit against violation of the statute or 
an order enforcing the statute. CWA, 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(a)(l)(B) (2000), for instance, author- 
izes suit against violation of a standard or limitation under the statute or "an order issued 
by [EPA or the state] with respect to such a standard or limitation." RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
5 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000), authorizes citizen suits against violation of an "order which has be- 
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trative rather than judicial, and was reached by agreement rather than as a 
result of administrative process. The typical pattern of administrative action 
in  which the issue arises is the issuance of an administrative compliance 
order by consent, followed by several extensions of the compliance date 
at the request of the violator, all without any administrative adjudication. 
As "prosecuting" denotes an ongoing adjudication, this pattern of ad- 
ministrative behavior does not fit it. The authorization of citizens to en- 
force agency orders complicates this issue further.30s 
2.  What Is Diligent Prosecution? 
The determination of whether prosecution is diligent, i.e., whether it 
represents a "steady, earnest and energetic application and effort,"309 is 
largely a factual inquiry, hence one generally not considered on a motion 
to dismiss.310 But the standard is one of federal law.31' As discussed above, 
the use of the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" suggests that a 
prosecution must be ongoing, rather than completed, in order to bar a citizen 
suit. Courts often fail to distinguish between prosecution that is ongoing, 
prosecution that is seeking compliance with an order requiring future action, 
and prosecution that has been completely resolved. As a result, their de- 
cisions are often muddy with regard to whether they are analyzing expe- 
diency of process or effectiveness of results.312 
come effective" under RCRA, which has been held to authorize citizen enforcement of 
administrative and judicial orders. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807. 
815 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988). But see Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 91 3 F. Supp. 1572, 
1582-83 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding, without explanation, that CWA Q 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 
Q 1319(g), bars citizens from enforcing against violations of administrative compliance 
orders). 
O X  See, e .g . ,  CW.4, 33 U.S.C. Q 1305(f) (2000). 
' 0 9  See supra note 283. 
)I0 Bare allegation of a lack of diligent prosecution by the plaintiff will survive a mo- 
tion to dismiss. The defendant, however, usually will develop facts establishing diligent 
prosecution for a determination in either a motion for summary judgment or at trial. See, 
e .g . ,  Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 256 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 
(E.D. Tex. 1995); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 1990 WL 52745, at *I4 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
'I1 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 
470, 486 n.8 (D.S.C. 1995). 
"'A recent decision collecting and summarizing much of the decisional law on what 
is "diligent" prosecution exemplifies this: 
Prosecutions under the CWA and CAA are heavily presumed "diligent." This pre- 
sumption arises from a variety of policy considerations: deference to state (and 
federal) decision-making and enforcement authority, protection of litigants' inter- 
est in the finality of their cases, preservation of the incentives that polluters might 
have to settle charges with state or federal authorities, and recognition of the lim- 
ited and interstitial role that citizen suits occupy in the overall enforcement re- 
gime. Thus citizens mere unhappiness with an enforcement action (or its settle- 
ment terms) does not authorize them to bring a separate lawsuit. 
But neither are prosecutions ipso facto "diligent." Indeed, the same courts that 
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a. In Continuing Prosecutions 
Only one decision has considered in any detail the diligence of an 
ongoing prosecution of a civil This paucity of decisions proba- 
bly reflects the fact that most government enforcement actions are ad- 
ministrative rather than judicial3l4 and that most judicial actions are set- 
tled rather than litigated on the merits. The decision contains only the 
barest outline of two continuing government actions, one of which had been 
pending for two years before the plaintiffs filed their citizen suit. To de- 
termine whether prosecution was diligent, the court examined the docket 
of the government enforcement case. The state had obtained an interlocutory 
order in the action and moved for contempt when the defendants did not 
comply with it. The defendants then filed for bankruptcy, complicating 
the government's action. As reported, it does not appear that the govern- 
ment was moving either swiftly or with unusually glacial speed. In holding 
that the prosecution was diligent, the court commented, "[a] rocket docket 
New York does not have, but the Congress must have been aware that 
state court actions, throughout the nation, are often a slower paced ver- 
sion of justice than that to which federal district courts aspire."315 
Only one other decision considers diligent prosecution in a govern- 
ment action still pending when the citizen suit was filed, but it adds nothing 
to the analysis.316 The real question here is whether the government is mov- 
ing steadily, with reasonable speed, energy, effectiveness and profession- 
profess deference toward state and federal enforcement decisions have neverthe- 
less decided for themselves whether the claims at issue were diligently prosecuted 
The cases speak of various indicia of diligence. These include whether the gov- 
ernment required (or at least sought) compliance with the specific standard, limi- 
tation, or order invoked by the citizen suit; whether the government was monitoring 
the polluter's activities or otherwise enforcing the permits at issue after settlement 
with the polluter and up to the time of the citizen suit; the possibility that the citi- 
zen-alleged violations will continue notwithstanding the polluter's settlement with 
the government; and the severity of any penalties compared to (a) the polluter's 
economic benefits in not complying with the law or (b) the penalties imposed for 
similar violations in the state. 
Citizens Legal Envtl. Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at 
* 12-* 13 (W.D. Mo.) (internal citations omitted). 
While this summary is useful, it does not begin to ask whether there is a difference 
between diligence analyses for ongoing and concluded prosecutions. Moreover, it wrong- 
fully assumes that issues relating to other parts of the preclusion provisions are diligence 
issues. For instance, whether the action or remedy pursued by the government was one 
capable of requiring compliance is a related, but separate issue. 
3'3Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, 917 F. Supp. at251. 
' I 4  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
' I 5  Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, 917 F. Supp. at 256. 
3 1 6  In Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co.,  63 1 F. Supp. 129 1, 1293-94 (D. 
Conn. 1986), the government action was pending in state court when the citizen suit was 
filed and was settled thereafter. The court examined the settlement to make its diligent 
prosecution determination. 
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alism to secure compliance, a question that courts are in  a uniquely expe- 
rienced position to determine. The court's examination of the docket in 
the chief case is an appropriate and objective means of making that de- 
termination. A state court examining the federal decisions concluded that 
they interpreted "is diligently prosecuting7' to mean "the degree to which the 
government remained involved in the case after commencing the action 
rather than its motives or resolution of all the problems at a particular 
site."3" 
b. In Completed Prosecutions and Continuing Enforcement of Orders 
Most decisions considering the diligence of prosecutions do so in the 
context of completed prosecutions or the continuing enforcement of or- 
ders. They rarely examine the energy and effort the prosecutors put into such 
actions, but instead examine the results that the prosecutors achieved. Per- 
haps these courts are cognizant that the diligent prosecution bar does not 
apply to concluded prosecutions and are anticipating the argument that a 
common law or other statutory bar to a citizen suit may apply, holding that 
Congress's intent was that no bar applies to a settled prosecution that does 
not assure compliance with the statute being enforced. 
Many courts err by applying deference to the prosecutors' decisions 
in guises not suggested by the wording of the preclusion provisions: by 
requiring the plaintiff adequately to plead lack of diligent prosecution in 
his complaint;318 placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove that government 
action is not diligent;319 proclaiming the burden to be a heavy one;320 
giving great deference to prosecutorial decisions;321 creating a presump- 
tion of diligence;322 noting that compromise is expected in settling 
37 State v. Indiana Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. App. 1992) (interpreting 
"does not diligently pursue" in the state's citizen suit provision, IND. CODE 5 C13-6-1-1). 
Hasee ,  e.g., City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 981-82 (S.D. Ohio 
1993). 
'I9 See, e.g., Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cam- 
bridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (D. Md. 2000) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)); 
Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1334 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (inter- 
preting CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 487 (D.S.C. 1995); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington 
Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, 183 (D. Conn. 199 1 ); Contract Plating Co., 63 1 F. Supp. at 
1293. Contra, Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1988). 
"Osee, e.g. ,  Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp.at 487. 
' I '  See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 
1324 (7th Cir. 1992); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 
552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 
247 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 
554; Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (E.D. Ark. 1993); 
Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. at 1324; Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 487; Orange Env't, Inc. v. 
County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[Tlhe'standard for evaluat- 
ing the diligence of the state in enforcing its action is a low one which requires due defer- 
ence to the state's plan of attack . . ."); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 777 F. Supp. at 185. 
'"See, e.g., Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 554; 
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cases;323 and reiterating that citizen enforcement is secondary to government 
enforcement.324 Indeed, one court commented that the presumption of 
diligence was so  strong that it "will only rarely be a significant factor" in 
citizen suit decisions.325 Even courts that find government prosecution not 
to have been diligent often begin their analysis with such homilies.326 On 
none of the other issues discussed in this Article do the courts express 
nearly as much deference to government enforcers as they do on the dili- 
gence of the government's prosecution. While some degree of deference 
is due to prosecutorial decisions, blind deference ignores the fact that 
Congress authorized citizen suits precisely because government enforcers 
were not always diligenP2' and Congress intended courts to hear citizen 
suits where government enforcement was not "adequately" prosecuted to 
require c ~ m p l i a n c e . ~ ' ~  As one court observed, "[c]omplete deference to 
agency enforcement strategy, adopted and implemented internally and be- 
yond public control, requires a degree of faith in bureaucratic energy and 
effectiveness that would be alien to common experience."329 By specifying 
that prosecution must be diligent to bar a citizen suit, Congress invited citi- 
zens to question the energy and effort of government enforcement, and 
directed courts to do so as well. 
It should be noted that it is not federal and state prosecutors who are 
arguing in these cases that they should be accorded great deference in 
their enforcement choices or that citizen suits make it difficult for the gov- 
ernment to enforce effectively or to reach settlements with violators. Rather, 
it is the violators who are seeking to wrap themselves in the flags of the 
enforcers. Indeed, it is the violators whom the government allowed to escape 
without timely compliance or payment of a penalty that removed the 
economic advantages from the violations. Of course, it is in the violators' 
Contract Plating, 63 1 F. Supp. at 1293 (finding a presumption of diligence "absent persua- 
sive evidence that the state has engaged in a pattern of conduct in its prosecution of the 
defendant that could be considered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad faith."). 
3Z3See, e.g., Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 
1994) ("It would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find failure to diligently prosecute 
simply because . . . a compromise was reached."); Supporters to Oppose Pollution, 973 
F.2d at 1322 (stating that the notice and delay provision requires "a would-be champion to 
try negotiation before litigation," an odd comment, since the notice and delay provision does 
not require the citizen to negotiate, only to let the government have the first chance to sue). 
3 ' 9 e e ,  e.g. ,  Supporters to Oppose Pollution, 973 F.2d at 1324. 
32S Contract Plating. 631 F. Supp. at 1293. 
See, e.g., Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1578-79 (N.D. Ga. 
1995); Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 486-87. 
327 Congressional skepticism of the diligence of government enforcement is not confined 
to the environmental arena. Similar concerns prompted it to enact a citizen suit provision 
as part of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 1003 
(1979) (now codiJied at 49 U.S.C. §Q: 60101-60128 (2000)). For an example of a citizen 
suit augmenting the lackluster federal enforcement of this statute, see Williams Pipe Line 
Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551 (D. Minn. 1987). 
328 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
329 Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (1980). 
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self-interest to argue that the most lenient enforcer should prevail, and i t  
is instructive that industry favors enforcement by states.330 
The facts in Laidlaw suggest why violators favor enforcement by 
states. The defendant had long been in violation of its permit, particularly 
for discharges of mercury. After six years, the state began an administra- 
tive enforcement a~ t ion .~"  Once the citizen plaintiffs served notice of 
their intention to sue, the defendant asked the state to file a court action in- 
stead of proceeding with its administrative action, for the purpose of bar- 
ring the citizen suit. When the state said that it had no interest in doing 
so, the defendant offered the state the largest penalty i t  had ever collected 
for an environmental violation, drafted a complaint and a consent decree, 
walked them through the state offices to obtain the required signatures, 
filed the documents on the sixtieth day after the citizen notice and paid 
the filing fee.332 The state had only filed two judicial actions against vio- 
lators of the CWA, both at the request of the violators, presumably for the 
same reason.333 The consent decree did not require the defendant to com- 
ply with its CWA permit and assessed a civil penalty that, although large 
for the state, was con'siderably less than the economic benefit the defen- 
dant had enjoyed from its n o n - c ~ m p l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  The defendant engineered 
the state court action for no reason other than to bar the citizen suit, appar- 
ently assuming correctly that the state would deal with i t  more leniently 
than the federal court would in a citizen suit. This pattern is not new, but 
was begun in the 1980s in deliberate efforts to thwart citizen suits.335 If 
330 Industry spokesmen before a House subcommittee hearing on amendments to the 
CWA, including the administrative penalty authority that became CWA 5 309(g), testified 
that EPA had no business enforcing against violations of the CWA in states with approved 
CWA permit programs. A spokesperson for the Chemical Manufacturers' Association 
stated, "CMA urges that the Act be amended to give the states the sole authority to enforce 
state issued NPDES perniits." Possible A~nendtnenrs to the Federal !firer Pollrtiiot~ Contrul 
Act: Hearings Before the Subcorntn. on Woter Res. of the Hortse Cotntn. on Pub. Works and 
Transp., 97th Cong. 966 (1982) (statement of Monte Throdahl, Sr. V.P. of Monsanto Chem. 
Co.). He further stated that "EPA should not be allowed to bring an enforcement action for 
a permit violation occurring in states administering approved programs. States that have 
assumed exclusive responsibility for implementation of NPDES program should be given 
sole enforcement responsibility." Id. at 987. A spokesperson for the American Paper Insti- 
tute testified that EPA penalty actions could result in "undercutting state NPDES agency 
enforcement efforts. There is no useful purpose to be served by EPA initiating a separate 
enforcement action from that already undertaken by a state permitting agency." Id. at 939 
(statement of Peter E. Wrist, V.P. for Forest Products, Mead Corp.). Not surprisingly, both 
opposed enactment of CWA 5 309(g), as did all other industry spokespeople testifying. 
33' See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 475-76. 
332 Id. at 478. 
333 Id. 
Id. at 479-82. 
335 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 
(D.S.C. 1995), in which the recipient of a citizen suit notice letter solicited a lawsuit from 
the state, drafted the complaint and consent decree, walked the papers through the state 
agency, filed the complaint and consent decree, and paid the filing fee, all in an effort to 
bar the citizen suit. See also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping 
Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990). for much the same story. In Conn. Fund for the 
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such violator-invited enforcement ever results in appropriate enforce- 
ment, it is only by accident. If diligence is measured by the state's "steady, 
earnest, energetic application and effort,"336 there is not diligent prosecution 
here, where the state expended no effort at all. 
Of the courts examining the diligence of government enforcement, a 
scant majority have found it to be diligent, primarily in reliance on the pre- 
sumptions discussed above.337 Others have found it not to be diligent, based 
in whole or in part on a variety of factors, including: the government actions 
were nothing other than compliance extensions;338 the settlement did not 
require compliance;339 the penalty was not sufficient to deter or recover the 
ecommic benefit of n o n - c ~ m p l i a n c e ; ~ ~ ~  the state was merely "monitoring the 
~ i tua t i on" ;~~ '  procedural irregularities were suspect;342 and the government 
Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986), a defendant was able to 
avoid a citizen suit for injunctive relief by payment of a $3,500 penalty to the state. See 
also Hodas, supra note 36, at 1647-5 1 .  
336 See supra note 283. 
337 See Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Grdup, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 
1992); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 
1991); Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dressel Contracting, 138 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1998); Hudson 
Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1015-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Ark. 1993); City of 
Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 97 1 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's 
Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, (D. Conn. 1991); Conn. Fund for the 
Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986); Gardeski v. Colonial 
Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that original consent 
order was diligent, but subsequent enforcement of the order was not); Cmty. of Cambridge 
Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 
2000); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997). 
338 See Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Dague v. 
City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991); Culbertson v. Coats American, 
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995). 
339 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 
(D.S.C. 1995); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. 
Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990). 
340 See City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d at 522-23; Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Coch- 
ran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 2001) (holding $5,000 penalty for continu- 
ing violation insufficient to block citizen suit under CWA 9 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g), 
saying that "such leniency hardly qualifies as 'diligent prosecution"'); Frilling v. Village of 
Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that $50,000 penalty was not justified 
as adequate, but ruling on other grounds); Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp at 470 (holding $100,000 
penalty not enough to recover economic benefit); Universal Tool, 735 F. Supp. at 1404 
(holding "lenient" penalty of $10,000 insufficient for hundreds of violations). 
341 See N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n. v. N.Y. City Dept. of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 
162, 168 (S.D N.Y. 1991) ("It is inconsistent . . . for DOS to argue that we should credit 
DEC's diligence while DOS obviously did not feel compelled to comply with DEC's al- 
leged demands."); N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 1998 WL 886645, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal.). 
342 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 470 (Although defendant's actions did not amount to 
collusion, they did weigh against diligent prosecution.). See also Pirgim Pub. Interest 
Lobby v. Dow Chem. Co., 1996 WL 903838 (W.D. Mich.); Universal Tool, 735 F. Supp. at 
1416 (stating that defendant walked the consent decree through the state's offices in a day 
for signature, a "highly unusual" procedure, indicating the state's "willingness to bend its 
procedures on [defendant's] behalf."). 
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procedures did not allow intervention by interested  citizen^.'^' Courts often 
reach diametrically opposite conclusions based on virtually the same facts. 
For instance, courts consider protracted sagas of administrative enforce- 
ment to be diligent or not, based more on the degrees of deference they 
are willing to give to enforcement agencies than on the speed with which 
the agencies m o ~ e d . ' ~  Where one court has characterized state enforce- 
ment actions as acts of "a pen pal, not . . . a prose~utor,"'~~ another char- 
acterized similarly paced state enforcement as "reasoned cooperative ef- 
f o r t ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Indeed, different panels of the same court of appeals have had 
starkly different views on the same state actions. One panel called the 
enforcement "inadequate," calling ten years an "inordinately long period 
of administrative enforcement" and saying that the state had "extended and 
waived . . . compliance deadlines of three, possibly four, of its sweet-heart 
consent orders."347 The other panel felt that the state had merely extended 
deadlines "in response to practical difficulties," making clear attempts to 
"remedy the problem."348 In addition, some courts have not been troubled 
by trivial penalties having no deterrent value.349 
Courts that preclude citizen suits out of deference to state prosecu- 
tion simply are ignoring whether the state is diligently prosecuting or has 
343 See generally Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 821; Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 470; Gardeski 
v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
)M Contrast Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 
1995) (CWA, 5 309(g)) (holding that state's actions were mere "extensions of compliance 
deadlines"); N.Z Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 162 (CWA, 5 309(g)) (hold- 
ing that five years of successive state administrative orders yielding few results was not 
diligent prosecution); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (No diligent prosecution where violations continued after state ordered defendant to 
cease violation and state took no steps to enforce its order); and Gardeski, 501 F. Supp. at 
1159 (two years of ineffective follow-up to consent order not diligent prosecution); with 
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Ark. 1993); (CWA, 
5 309(g)) (stating that a series of consent administrative orders extending date of compli- 
ance and assessing small civil penalties were diligent prosecution), and Jones v. City of 
Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410,413-14 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 224 F.3d at 518 (same). 
3JS N.  Z Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 168. 
346Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 842 F. Supp. at 1149. See also Conn. Fund for the Env't v. 
Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986). 
347 City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d at 522. 
348 City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d at 414. 
349 See Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 842 F. Supp. at 1142-43, aff'd 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(assessing $1,000, with additional $500 penalties in  each of three amendments extending 
the compliance date, waiving $50,000 and $120,000 due in stipulated penalties for viola- 
tions of consent orders); Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City 
of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (D. Md. 2000) (CWA, 5 309(g)) (assessing $1,500, 
noting that although the penalty amount was "minimal," "economic benefit analysis . . . has 
limited relevance when applied to the municipality"); Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at 
1292-94 (assessing $3,500 for 71 admitted violations and no injunction to comply). With 
regard to the contention in Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmfy. Dev. Group that significant 
penalties are inappropriate against cities, see Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd. v. 
New York City, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (assessing a $5.75 million penalty against 
the City for an interbasin transfer of waste from one river to a more pristine river without a 
CWA permit). 
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diligently prosecuted an action to achieve compliance. If the diligent prose- 
cution bar applies to concluded prosecutions, the question is not how 
much deference courts should give to enforcement agencies, but whether 
the enforcement agencies diligently prosecuted the concluded action to 
seek compliance. When the state enforcement agency has issued an order 
that does not require compliance, has assessed a penalty that is insufficient 
to deter continuing violations, or has engaged in a series of actions to 
enforce an order that have not resulted in compliance over a protracted 
period of time, it cannot be said that the state diligently sought compli- 
ance. If the prosecutor pursues a case to a decision on the merits, a judge 
or jury will make the ultimate decision. All that can be asked of the prose- 
cutor in that case is that she present her case to the decision-maker with 
diligence, i.e., moving steadily, with reasonable speed, energy, effective- 
ness and professionalism to secure compliance. Even if she prosecutes the 
case with diligence, the third party decision makers may not require strict 
compliance.350 But if the prosecutor settles the case, she is the decision- 
maker. Her actions in negotiating and agreeing to the settlement are then 
capable of a more exacting diligence analysis. If she agrees to a settle- 
ment that does not achieve compliance or agrees to a penalty that is too 
small to deter violations, her agreement hardly can be an action diligently 
pursuing compliance. Thus when a prosecution is ongoing, the prosecutor's 
pleadings and discovery actions reveal whether she is diligently prosecuting 
to require compliance, thereby ending the violations of which the citizen 
complains. But when the prosecution ends in a settlement, we can and 
should look to the prosecutor's action agreeing to the terms of the settlement 
to determine if she prosecuted the case diligently to require compliance. 
This evaluation of the government's settlement is an exercise with 
which federal court judges are familiar in another guise: reviewing con- 
sent decrees to determine whether to enter them. In that exercise courts look 
both at the negotiation process and to the results of the process. As to the 
process, they ask whether the negotiation was arm's length and fair.35' As 
to the results, they ask if they are reasonable and fair.352 In the case of a 
350 AS Judge Easterbrook commented in Supporters ro Oppose Pollurion, Inc. v. Heritage 
Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992), when the prosecution ends in a judgment after 
a trial on the merits, a citizen suit is 
appropriate only when the agency loses its suit and the private litigant insists that 
the agency had not tried hard enough. RCRA permits a follow-on private suit if 
the public suit was not prosecuted diligently. But if the agency prevails in all re- 
spects, that is the end; § 6972(b)(l)(B) does not authorize a collateral attack on 
the agency's strategy or tactics. 
35'See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 51 (6th Cir. 1982; United States v. 
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. 
Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 85-86 (D. Alaska 1977). See also infra cases cited in 
. - 
notes 352 & 353. 
352 See Sierra Club v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 470 2004 
Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions 
decree resolving a statutory enforcement action, they ask whether the 
decree "adequately protects the public interest and is in accord with the 
dictates of C~ngress ."~" The diligence review accords considerable defer- 
ence to the prosecutor in how her settlement achieves compliance, much as 
an appeals court accords considerable deference to how a trial court's in- 
junction requires compliance in cases enforcing against statutory viola- 
tions. But just as the trial court may not issue an injunction for less than 
compl i an~e , ' ~~  so too the prosecutor may not settle for less than compli- 
a n ~ e . ~ ~ ~  
Some courts have asked whether a diligent prosecution review of the 
government's settlement is an unpermitted collateral attack on the underly- 
ing ~e t t l ement ;~ '~  it is not.357 A diligent prosecution review of the govern- 
ment's settlement in a citizen suit does not threaten to overturn the settle- 
ment, since the court's findings regarding the settlement do not affect the 
settlement. The only question is whether a citizen suit may go forward. If 
the settlement did not require compliance with the statute in a reasonable 
time and manner or payment of a penalty sufficient to deter continuing vio- 
lations, the prosecutor did not enter into an agreement for compliance and a 
court should not have entered it under the established standard of review. 
The citizen then should be free to undertake an action seelung compliance. 
Courts often include in the diligent prosecution analysis the question 
of whether the settlement was a collusive one, presuming the government 
would not take part in such a settlement. Although collusive settlements 
do not represent diligent prosecution and therefore should not bar citizen 
suits, non-collusive settlements are not necessarily diligently prosecuted. 
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 11 17, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sfotts, 679 
F.2d at 552-54; United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 61 (5th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1994); Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola 
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Kerchikan, 430 F. Supp. at 84-85. For a 
more recent decision reviewing and applying these standards, see United States v. District 
of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1996). 
353 Gorsuch, 718 F.2d at 1 1  17 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also United States v. City of Mi- 
ami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 167 F. 
Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (N.D. Ind. 2001); Coca-Cola, 673 F. Supp. at 1556; United States v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 960 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ga. 1996); United States v. Seymour 
Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (C.D. Ind. 1982); Kerchikan, 430 F. Supp. at 86. 
354 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1 982). 
355 See generally Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, Judicial Review and rhe Limits of Prose- 
cutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (2001), (arguing that while separation of 
powers doctrine generally limits judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, this does not 
apply when Congress establishes a statutory standard governing prosecutorial conduct). In 
the citizen suit provision, Congress established a standard for when government action 
precludes citizen suits and courts should apply the congressional standard. 
356Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dressel Contracting, 138 F.3d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1998) at 
356, and Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). 
jS7 A collateral attack on an EPA enforcement action would take the form of an action 
seeking judicial review of a final agency administrative action, using the arbitrary, capri- 
cious, and abuse of discretion standard of review from the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. Q 706 (2000). Such an action would seek to set aside or remand the agency action. 
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While none of the settlements discussed in the decisions appear collusive, 
several of them do not appear to have been at arm's length, an inquiry courts 
make when reviewing a consent decree. Although the lack of an arm's- 
length negotiation may be insufficient to decide the government action 
was not diligently prosecuted (after all, the violator might find it in his inter- 
ests to capitulate fully at any time), it should prompt a heightened inquiry 
into the settlement's fairness, reasonableness, faithfulness to the public 
interest, and faithfulness to the statute. 
Here the analysis turns to whether the prosecutor was diligent in enter- 
ing the particular settlement, and this question is an inquiry into what the 
prosecutor was willing to settle for, rather than a collateral attack on the set- 
tlement. The inquiry is whether the results were fair, reasonable, and faithful 
to the public interest and to the statute being enforced.358 This inquiry is 
paramount in settlements of actions enforcing statutes. If the results were 
insufficient, the settlement still stands and the state still gets what it thought 
sufficient, but the citizen is free to seek results more faithful to the statute 
being enforced. 
Courts at times also include in the diligent prosecution analysis the 
question of whether the underlying proceeding afforded citizens full rights 
of p a r t i ~ i p a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Such participation turns on the details of procedural 
law, however, and not the energy of the prosecutor and, therefore, is not 
part of diligence. Moreover, while CWA 3 309(g) requires citizen partici- 
pation for the government action to bar a citizen suit, the citizen suit pre- 
clusions do But the question is pertinent in another respect. Citizen 
358 See supra note 352 and accompanying text. 
359See, e.g., Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 840-42 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
The court correctly noted that to have EPA approve a state program for issuing permits under 
the CWA, EPA regulations require the state to have procedures for citizen participation in 
enforcement, one option for which is intervention in state enforcement actions. The other 
option is a set of three specific measures, including agreement by the state not to oppose 
the permissive intervention by citizens as  authorized by state law. The second option, how- 
ever, does not require that the state authorize permissive intervention. EPA, State Water 
Program Requirements for Enforcement, 40 CFR 3 123.27(d) (2004). But see NRDC v. 
EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that EPA told the court that it interpreted the 
regulation to require state permission to intervene). In any event, neither the CWA nor 
EPA's regulations provide that states must authorize intervention by citizens before state 
actions may bar citizen suits. And if a state's law does not conform to 40 CFR 5 123.27(d), 
the CWA provides a remedy to citizens; an action for withdrawal of EPA's approval of the 
state program. 42 U.S.C. 3 1342(c) (2000); see Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, 556 F.2d 
1282 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a citizen suit against EPA to require it to withdraw approval 
of a state program, and suggesting that the proper procedure was for the citizens to petition 
EPA to withdraw approval and seek judicial review of EPA's action if it refused to do so). 
In a converse situation, the court in United States v. Encycleflexas, Inc., 1999 WL 
33446875 (S.D. Tex.), held that citizens had no right to intervene in an EPA enforcement 
action under the CWA and RCRA to oppose a proposed consent decree, because they did 
not establish that EPA failed to diligently prosecute the case. The decision was wrong, 
however, because the citizen suit sections bar citizen suits if EPA is diligently prosecuting 
an action, but provide for citizen intervention in the same diligently pursued actions that 
bar their suits. 
3M The citizen suit provisions authorize citizens to intervene in EPA enforcement actions 
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participation in enforcement encourages transparency, assuring that the 
government conducts its enforcement business in an arms-length man- 
ner.361 If there has been no citizen participation in the underlying govern- 
ment action or settlement negotiations, or if the government has refused 
such participation or the government's procedures do not accord citizen 
full rights of participation, the settlement has not been or could not have 
been held up to public scrutiny to assure that it is fair, just, and faithful to 
the public interest and to the statute being enforced. This lack of earlier 
public scrutiny suggests that courts should give heightened scrutiny to 
settlements entered into without public participation. 
E. What Citizen Suits May a Government Action Bar? 
The major issue here is whether a government action bars a citizen 
suit only for the common violations that the two actions seek to abate. For 
the government action to bar a citizen suit, the government action must 
seek "to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order" (em- 
phasis added).362 "[Tlhe standard, limitation, or order" to which this sec- 
tion refers is the standard, limitation or order the citizen alleges is violated, 
for it is the only prior use of the three nouns in the section.363 On its face, 
a government action bars citizen suits only for violations they seek to en- 
force in common. This interpretation is supported by the plain meaning 
and expressio unius canons of statutory construction;364 by specifying that 
the government action precludes a citizen suit only for the violations of 
the standard, limitation or order that they both allege and seek to abate, the 
in court. See, e .g. ,  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). They do not authorize citizens 
to intervene in state actions. Indeed, "under general principles of federalism and state sov- 
ereignty, Congress likely would have no authority directly to provide citizens the right to 
intervene in state-court enforcement actions." Friecds of the Earth, lac. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 487 n.10 (D.S.C. 1995). But Congress could provide 
that only state actions in which citizens can intervene may preclude a citizen suit under 
federal law. Indeed, it has done so in the CWA: administrative penalty assessments by EPA 
under CWA 309(g) or by a state under a state provision "comparable" to that subsection 
may bar a citizen suit for penalties. 33 U.S.C. 8 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2000). Because 309(g)(4) 
requires public notice of proposed penalty assessments and authorizes citizen intervention 
in EPA assessment proceedings, state provisions must also require public notice and authorize 
citizen intervention to be "comparable" to 309(g). 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(4) (2000). See, e .g. ,  
NRDC v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
Absent a specific requirement for a state to provide for citizen intervention before 
state actions may bar citizen suits, it is difficult to understand how such a requirement can 
be justified on the basis of diligent prosecution. It has nothing to do with the energy and 
effectiveness of the state in prosecuting the suit. It does, of course, have a good deal to do 
with the transparency of the state's process, which is an important goal of citizen partici- 
pation. The lack of such process may well justify giving special scrutiny to a state settle- 
ment, but the lack of intervention alone cannot signify a lack of diligent prosecution, ex- 
cept under CWA § 309(g). 
See supra note 109. 
362 CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
363 42 U.S.C.$ 7604(a)(l) (2000). 
3M See ESKRIDGE supra note 29, at 323. 
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provision implies that the government action does not preclude a citizen 
suit against other violations. That result is consistent with the policy of 
the provision; the notice and the delay period were intended to enable the 
government to have an opportunity to enforce against the violations of the 
standard, limitation or order alleged by the citizen, unencumbered by a citi- 
zen suit. Where the government has enforced against some, but not all of 
such violations alleged by the citizen, it has foregone its opportunity to 
foreclose the citizen from enforcing against the violations the government 
chose to ignore. Most, but not all courts considering the issue have so 
held.365 
A similar issue arises when the defendant in a citizen suit under one 
statute argues that a government action under another statute bars the citizen 
suit. Such government actions generally are not brought to require com- 
pliance with the same standards the citizen is enforcing against and should 
not bar the citizen although there are decisions to the contrary.367 
Another variant is whether a citizen suit may go forward when both the 
365 See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL 
1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wash. 2001); Berry v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 
1150, 1155-58 (D. Kan. 2000); Citizens Legal Envt'l Action Network v. Premium Std. 
Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 836 (holding that 
citizen suits are "barred only if the State commences a civil action to require compliance 
with the same standard . . . referenced in the plaintiff's 60-day notice.") (emphasis in 
original); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, 1996 
WL 1670982, at *5-*6 (S.D. Ohio) (holding that state air pollution enforcement action is 
not a bar to CWA citizen suit); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 
1029, 1036-37 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 
1140, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (finding opposite in the specific case but assuming that each 
violation not charged by state would be subject to enforcement); Hudson River Fisher- 
men's Assn. v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); PIRG 
of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 at *4 (D.N.J.) (holding that defendant 
must establish state action for "identical claims" a citizen suit alleges); Md. Waste Coali- 
tion v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1484 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that CAA Q 304, 42 
U.S.C. Q 7604, bars a citizen suit where a previously filed government enforcement action 
seeks compliance "with the same standards at the same emission sources," although the 
two actions were based on violations on different dates); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Con- 
servation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Contrn Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that administra- 
tive order requiring future action covered prospective violations under CWA Q 309(g), 33 
U.S.C. Q 1319(g)); Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291, 
1293-94 (D. Conn. 1986). 
See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1373- 
74 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 
F. Supp. 1448, 1451-52 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that EPA CERCLA action does not bar a 
RCRA citizens suit); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33 (D. Me. 1994) (hold- 
ing that state suit to enforce its hazardous waste law does not bar CWA citizen suit); Hud- 
son River Fishermen's Ass'n, 686 F. Supp at 105 1-53 (holding that federal enforcement of 
Refuse Act consent decree requiring proper operation and closure of landfill did not re- 
quire compliance with CWA prohibition of addition of leachate through point source to 
navigable water without a permit). 
367 See generally United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1 188 (8th Cir. 1994); Hudson River- 
keeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sierra 
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994). 
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citizen suit and the government action seek to enforce the same requirement, 
but the actions allege violations of the requirement at different times. Courts 
generally hold that the citizen suit may proceed on continuing violations 
not enforced against by the government action,368 although that does not 
follow from the statutory language that speaks of the statutory requirements 
violated, rather than the occasions on which they were violated.36g 
To determine which violations a government enforcement action bars 
from a subsequent citizen suit, a comparison of the citizen suit sixty-day 
notice and complaint with the complaint in the government action is re- 
q ~ i r e d . ~ ~ O  Of course, as discussed above,37' where the government's action 
has concluded, there is no continuing government prosecution to bar a citi- 
zen suit. Courts that disregard this aspect of the bar must determine the 
scope of the bar by considering the violations dealt with by the consent de- 
cree. This determination is complicated when the government has settled 
its action and the violations cited in its complaint are not the same as the 
violations cited in the consent agreement or order.372 Where the consent 
decree orders compliance with requirements or penalizes violations not 
alleged in the government's complaint, the general doctrine that the claims 
adjudicated in a consent decree rather than the allegations of the under- 
lying complaint define the extent of the adjudication presents few prob- 
l e m ~ . ~ ~ ~  But when the consent order contains a release that goes well be- 
yond the violations cited in the complaint, without redressing the addi- 
tional violations, the doctrine could bar suits against violations never en- 
forced against, contrary to the plain meaning and policy of the provision. 
Under these circumstances, most courts have limited the citizen suit bar 
to the violations cited in the government's complaint, although on differ- 
ent theories. Some courts hold that no enforcement action had been 
commenced against violations not cited in the complaint and that a gen- 
368 See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel- Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. 
Md. 1987); Md. Waste Coalition, 616 F. Supp. at 1474; Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. at 1186. 
See also Love, 529 F. Supp. at 832. But see Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Ko- 
dak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (reading Gwaltney to bar citizen suits for penal- 
ties the "government elected to forego."). The Kodak court clearly misread Gwaltney, 
which held only that citizens could not sue for wholly past violations. The Gwalrney court, 
in turn, used an ill-conceived example of the government foregoing penalties in exchange 
for the violator installing controls beyond those required by the statute, see infra text ac- 
companying notes 432-438. 
369 For example, no citizen may commence suit if the government "has commenced 
and is diligently prosecuting a civil action . . . to require compliance with the standard, 
lirnirarions, or order." CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). 
370 See Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at 1293. 
371 See infra Part 1I.D. 1 .  
372 Of course, as discussed in Part 1I.D. I, if a government action has been settled in a 
consent decree, it is no longer being prosecuted and, under a plain reading of the provisions, 
no longer bars a citizen suit. 
373 See City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1993); PlRG of 
N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 W L  66178 at *4 (D.N.J.); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. 
Georgia-Pacific, Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1432 (D.N.J. 1985). 
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era1 release in the consent order cannot bar an action that was never 
commenced.374 Others hold that violations cited in the complaint and within 
the terms of a general release in the consent decree, but not redressed in 
the consent order, were not subject to an action to require compliance and 
therefore are not barred from citizens A few courts have applied 
the bar broadly with little regard to whether the government action sought to 
or did require compliance with particular  violation^.^'^ This minority hold- 
ing is not true to the wording3" and congressional intent that the bars 
apply only where government actions seek compliance. Clearly, orders that 
do not require compliance with requirements or penalize violations thereof, 
but instead release them from enforcement, do not seek compliance. 
A few courts interpret the consent order as a contract, seeking the 
answer to what is barred within the four corners of the document or the 
intent of the parties.378 Others more properly hold that, although consent 
374 Where a government consent decree recited that it resolved "all matters arising out 
of facts alleged or which could have been alleged:' the court held that a successive citizen 
suit could continue against violations not asserted in the government's complaint, for the 
government had not "commenced" an action for violations not mentioned in its complaint. 
Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Where 
a government consent decree contained a general release, the court in Citizens Legal Envtl. 
Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000), limited 
the citizen suit bar to violations addressed in the complaint, holding that the state simply 
had not enforced against other violations. 
375 In the reverse situation, where the state complaint addressed violations of six 
effluent limitations on different pollutants, but the consent order only addressed two, the 
court in Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 837, held that the bar applied only to violations of the two 
limitations, for the inclusion of the other four in the complaint was a "mere formality" and 
the state action "as a practical . . . matter" was not brought to require compliance with 
them. The court reached this conclusion, in part, because the complaint and the consent 
order were filed simultaneously. Id. 
376 See Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (D. Or. 
1995), rev'd 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that limiting the bar to violations en- 
forced in the government action would "impede the goal of the statute and go against case 
law and policy which denies duplicative litigation, and supports agency discretion"); Sierra 
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1481-83 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that 
RCRA 5 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(h), order to study contamination and develop reme- 
diation plan bars CWA citizen suit for unpermitted discharge); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F. 
Supp. 914, 918 (D. Or. 1993) ("[Clitizens suits are not appropriate simply because the 
plaintiff has more claims than were resolved by a prior government enforcement action."); 
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1993) 
(holding that a consent order with a release for "all violations occurring up to and includ- 
ing the date of this Order" barred a citizen suit for those violations even though they were 
not addressed in the order). 
377 See, e.g. ,  CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7603(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
378 See Berry v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Kan. 2000) (hold- 
ing that, where an order provided a release for all violations known to EPA, and later re- 
cited what violations were known to EPA, the bar was limited to the violations recited). 
See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Scherer, 7 F.3d 191, 196 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that "the 
instrument must be construed as it is written," quoting U.S. v. Amour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 
682 (1971)). Sinclair Oil Corp. was followed by Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. 
Vulcan Materials Co.,  964 F. Supp. 1448, 1451-52 (D. Colo. 1997), in holding that a re- 
lease in a consent decree for claims raised in a complaint alleging RCRA and CERCLA 
reporting violations did not bar a citizen suit for EPCRKA reporting violations. See also 
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orders might preclude suits if interpreted as contracts, this is the wrong in- 
quiry; they are not contracts. Although consent decrees have contractual 
aspects, they ultimately are court orders.379 While the contractual aspects of 
a consent decree may bind the contracting government enforcer not to 
enforce further against the violator, whether the decree also bars citizens 
from enforcing further against the violator depends on whether the govern- 
ment has diligently prosecuted against the violations the citizen seeks to 
enforce.380 None of these decisions examined in any depth the nature of 
consent decrees and the entering court's duty in reviewing them prior to 
entry. The well-established doctrine regarding such nature and duty, how- 
ever, strongly supports the conclusion that consent decrees should not be 
interpreted solely as contracts, at least at the federal 
The issue recurs in specific contexts under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 5 6972 
(2000), authorizes actions to enforce the RCRA regulatory program and also 
to abate imminent and substantial endangerments arising from solid and 
hazardous waste. Defendants often seek to bar citizen suits to abate endan- 
germents because the government has taken an action against violations 
of the RCRA regulatory program. Although 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(l)(B) 
(2000) bars citizen suits against violations of the RCRA regulatory pro- 
gram if the government has already commenced an action against such vio- 
lations, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(2)(B) & (C) (2000) do not bar citizen suits to 
abate endangerments because of such actions.382 
RCRA 5 7002(b)(2)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C. $6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2000), bars 
a citizen suit to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment if EPA 
has ordered or obtained a court order requiring responsible parties to reme- 
diate a contaminated site and they are proceeding to do so. But RCRA 
5 7002(b)(2)(B) adds that the prohibition is effective "only as to the 
Georgia-Pacijc, 615 F. Supp. at 1432 (interpreting the scope of the consent decree's cov- 
erage on the basis of the decree itself, EPA's complaint, and an internal EPA memorandum). 
379 Sinclair Oil Corp., 7 F.3d at 193. 
380Citizens Legal Envrl. Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 
220464, at * 13 (W.D. Mo.), considered the effect of a very broad release in a consent de- 
cree on violations not addressed in the complaint. It held that while the release (extending 
to violations arising "out of facts known to the State . . . at the time of execution of this 
Consent Judgment") might preclude the state from enforcement against violations not ad- 
dressed in the complaint as a matter of contract law, it was not diligent prosecution against 
those violations to preclude citizen suits, indeed it was not prosecution of them at all. 
38' Consent decrees are generally held to be by nature both contracts and judicial orders. 
Courts review them to determine if they were: negotiated at arms' length; are fair, reason- 
able and equitable; do not violate law or public policy; and, in suits enforcing a statute, were 
consistent with the goals of Congress. See Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp. 
1555, 1557 (M.D. Ha. 1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 
1067, 1080 (C.D.N.Y. 1982); and United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. 
Alaska 1977). States, however, apply state law for entry of consent decrees in state courts, 
and state law may be different than federal law. In Indiana, for instance, courts enter consent 
decrees absent fraud or lack of consent. State v. Indiana Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 
186 (Ind. App. 1992). 
382See N. Cal. River Watch v. Humboldt Petroleum, Inc., 2000 WL 1639524, at. *I 
(N.D. Cal.). See supra Part 1I.B. l .b. 
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scope and duration" of the order. Attempts by defendants to apply the 
Q 7002(b)(2)(B)(iv) bar broadly have been unsuccessful; rather, courts have 
applied the bar in accordance with its plain meaning.383 "[Tlhe 'scope and 
duration' clause manifests Congress's desire to permit citizen suits to be 
brought to remedy imminent and substantial dangers which are not being 
addressed by existing" government actions.384 A citizen suit may be be- 
yond the scope and duration of a CERCLA order if the citizen suit con- 
cerns contamination (1) of a different area, (2) by a different pollutant, or 
(3) relating back to claims made before the order.38s Of course, citizen suits 
within the scope and duration of an EPA remedial order are barred.386 
F: Conclusions from Examination of the Preclusion Bar 
Defendants have raised five legal issues and a dozen sub-issues to 
challenge citizen suits on the basis of the government action bar. Part I1 
has examined all of these issues and has concluded that Congress antici- 
pated and addressed them all, except for one: the meaning of "diligently 
prosecuting." The plain meaning of the provisions answers the other is- 
sues, usually in favor of citizen plaintiffs. The theme and variations na- 
ture of the preclusion device Congress used in the different provisions of 
the statutes underscores the application of plain meaning. Congress de- 
liberately varied the three elements of the device to express its intent on 
how it applies in a particular provision. To ignore its words is to ignore 
its intent. Most courts have interpreted the provisions on all these other 
issues in accordance with their plain meaning. But some courts have not, 
favoring a misguided deference to prosecutorial discretion to adherence 
383 See Organic Chem. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 755, 
764 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (EPA administrative order to remediate contaminated groundwater 
does not bar citizen suit to remediate contaminated soil); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E. I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423, 430 (E.D. Wisc. 1997) (EPA order under CERCLA 
to remediate surface does not bar citizen suit for groundwater remediation); Acme Printing 
Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (E.D. Wisc. 1995); Meny v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 1988 WL 
120739, at *I 1 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied, 198 WL 83518 (E.D. Pa.) (EPA 
CERCLA order to clean up drinking water supply does not bar citizen suit for surface re- 
mediation) (citing specific legislative history); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. 
Supp. 153 1, 1539 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that EPA order addressing surface contamina- 
tion does not bar citizen suit addressing drinking water contamination). 
384Acme Printing Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1245 (bar applies when dangers addressed by 
citizen suit are within scope of EPA order, even though defendants in citizen suit are not 
parties to whom EPA order was issued). See also A-C Reorg. Trust, 968 F. Supp. at 431 
(administrative order for surface contamination remediation does not bar citizen suit for 
subsurface contamination remediation; administrative order for arsenic remediation does 
not bar citizen suit for remediation of other hazardous wastes); Coburn, 1988 WL 120739, 
at * 12 (administrative order for groundwater remediation does not bar citizen suit for sur- 
face remediation). 
3ss See A-C Reorg. Trust, 968 F. Supp. at 430. 
386 See Keystone Coke Co. v. Pasquale, 1998 WL 341927, at *2 (E.D. Pa.). 
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to the statutes enacted by Congress. Their interpretations do violence to 
the wording and history of the provisions and should be disregarded. 
Although the meaning of diligent prosecution is not as clear as the 
meaning of the other questioned words in the provisions, i t  is modified by 
the congressional declaration that a government action must be one for 
compliance to bar a citizen suit. Despite Congress's clear direction, the 
courts have fractured when determining whether the government is dili- 
gently prosecuting an action, with a scant majority asking if the govern- 
ment action was aimed at and effective in securing compliance, and a 
large minority seeking only to defer to prosecutorial discretion regardless 
of whether the government sought or obtained compliance. 
The relative agreement of courts on the other issues and fundamental 
disagreement on the "diligently prosecuting" issue is not surprising. The 
diligent prosecution issue is the least susceptible to resolution on a plain 
meaning basis, as it requires looking a few words ahead in the provision 
to the "compliance7' language. It is also an issue on which prosecutorial 
discretion is Courts mainly concerned with deference to prose- 
cutorial discretion thus find it easier to favor previous government action 
on the "diligently prosecuting" issue rather than the other issues. Of course, 
prosecutorial discretion is not really an issue here because citizen plain- 
tiffs are not seeking judicial review of government action or non-action. 
Indeed, the attacks on citizen suits as interfering with prosecutorial dis- 
cretion are not being raised by prosecutors, but by violators. Part I11 ex- 
amines why some courts are so motivated by deference to prosecutorial 
discretion that they blatantly disregard the words of the statute. 
A. Plain Meaning Versus Deference to Prosecutorial Decisions 
Much of the litigation over these issues arises not from lack of con- 
gressional clarity, but from the desire of defendants to reach results at odds 
with congressional language and intent. Judges ignoring the plain mean- 
ing of the provisions do so from a desire to protect the government's .(usu- 
ally the state's) prosecutorial functions and discretion from interference 
by successive citizen suits. Significantly, prosecutors do not urge courts 
to defer to their discretion or contend that successive citizen suits inter- 
fere with the exercise of their discretion. Indeed, when the prosecutors 
387 Choice of remedy and agreement to a negotiated settlement are important aspects of 
the prosecutorial discretion involved in the "diligently prosecuting" issue. Just as important 
to prosecutorial discretion is the decision not to initiate an enforcement action. The clear lan- 
guage of the citizen suit provisions authorizing citizen suits in the absence of government 
action, however, has forestalled most courts from deference to government decisions not to 
enforce. 
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are involved in these disputes, they normally argue in favor of citizen en- 
f o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~ ~  That violators are the vocal champions of the prosecutor's 
prerogatives38y is more than ironic; it poses the question of why violators 
champion government prosecutors over citizen enforcers. The apparent an- 
swer is that they expect the government, particularly the state, to be a 
more lenient enforcer than citizens. Indeed, attorneys representing vio- 
lators candidly admit as much.3y0 
An examination of the arguments that citizen suits interfere and conflict 
with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion suggests that they are over- 
blown. Prosecutorial discretion revolves primarily around three decisions: 
what violations to prosecute; what enforcement mechanism to use; and what 
remedies and sanctions to seek or settle on. These are largely prioritiza- 
tion and resource allocation decisions, for agencies do not have enough 
resources to enforce against all violations or to pursue to trial all of the vio- 
lations they prosecute. Citizen enforcers, of course, augment limited gov- 
ernment enforcement resources, providing more enforcement than if the 
government enforcers were left to their own devices. This function of citi- 
zen suits enhances overall enforcement rather than interfering with gov- 
ernment enforcement. 
Violators argue that when a citizen gives notice to the agency that it 
intends to enforce against a particular violation, the agency is forced to 
spend its resources enforcing against that violation, regardless of whether 
it is a high or low priority for the a g e n ~ y . ~ "  But the filing of a citizen suit 
notice does not require the agency to enforce against that violation. If the 
violation is a low priority for the agency, it can and should spend its re- 
'ansee,  e.g., Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
EPA argued that RCRA Subtitle IV open dumping regulations were enforceable by citizens 
despite EPA approval of state plan); Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of 
Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1 1  1, 11 18 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that EPA agreed with citizens that only 
state penalty assessment orders could bar citizen suits under CWA 9 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(g)); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 
n.8 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that EPA argued that only states with approved CWA permit 
programs can issue orders that may bar citizen suits); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge 
& Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that EPA, New Jersey and 
New York argued that EPA CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a) compliance order was not 
an action in court); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. 470, 474 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that EPA brief "generally supported citizen en- 
forcer's positions). Similarly, EPA officials have testified before congressional committees 
in support of citizen suits. See, e.g., Pending Clean Water Act Legislation: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Env't and Nut. Res. Of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisher- 
ies, 103d Cong. 212-13 (1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator 
for Enforcement, EPA); The Water Qualiry Act of 1994, and Issues Related to Clean Water 
Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before rhe Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't 
of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290 (1994) (statement of 
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA). 
389 See supra note 330. 
390 See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 144, at 25 ("From the viewpoint of the sources, 
agency enforcement is often preferable to citizen suit enforcement."). 
2 9 1  See Snook, supra note 129, at 1, 10. 
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sources on higher priority violations and allow, as Congress intended, citi- 
zens to augment agency resources by enforcing against violations the 
agency otherwise would not address. If the violation is a high priority for 
the agency, it  can and should proceed with its enforcement, but if it does, 
its own priorities, not the citizen suit, dictate the agency's use of its re- 
s o u r c e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Violators also argue that the notice of a citizen suit forces the agency 
to use judicial rather than administrative enforcement mechanisms, need- 
lessly wasting its resources.393 If the agency's goal is to bar a citizen suit, 
under some statutes it must commence and diligently prosecute a civil ac- 
tion. But if its goal is compliance, i t  may proceed with whatever remedy 
it believes is appropriate to achieve that objective. The citizen suit does not 
stop the agency from proceeding with an administrative order, either be- 
fore or after a citizen files suit in court. Indeed, if the agency frames an 
administrative compliance order with an appropriate remedy, the court is 
likely to adopt it or give its terms considerable weight. Of course, if the 
agency order does not require compliance, the court should disregard it, 
for the court must order c~mpliance.~" If the court assesses a penalty in a 
citizen suit, that does not preclude the agency from assessing a penalty. 
Many of the issues regarding the statutory preclusions identified and 
discussed above are straightforward, answered by the wording and structure 
of the statutes, and engender little controversy in judicial interpretations. 
An action brought by the DOJ on behalf of EPA may bar a citizen suit. Mu- 
nicipalities are not states for the purpose of state enforcement actions that 
may bar citizen suits. When the statutory preclusions identify particular 
government actions as barring citizen suits, they are the only government 
actions for which the preclusions bar citizen suits. EPA and citizens 
commence enforcement actions by filing complaints. 
Two of the issues appear straightforward but are often either overlooked 
or ignored: ( 1 )  are preclusive government actions limited to actions seeking 
compliance, and (2) are preclusive government actions limited to ongoing 
government actions? The plain meaning and expressio unius canons of 
interpretation, reinforced by the theme and variations nature of the preclu- 
sions make it  clear that preclusive government actions are limited to on- 
going actions seeking compliance. Because there is little case law on these 
issues, citizen plaintiffs may be unaware of their importance. Courts that are 
unfriendly to citizen suits are content to ignore them. 
39' Indeed, after EPA receives notice of a citizen suit, it rarely requests that the DOJ 
file an action because it does not reorder its enforcement priorities as a result of such a 
notice and generally supports citizen enforcement. Haag, supra note 8. 
393 See Snook, supra note 129, at 1, 7; Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1572. 
394 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that, when a trial 
court finds that defendants violate environmental statutes, the court must require compli- 
ance, although it has considerable discretion how to achieve that end). 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 481 2004 
482 Harvard E~zviror~merztal Law Review [Vol. 28 
Other issues have engendered controversy in judicial interpretation. 
What is diligent enforcement? Will a government action against some viola- 
tions bar a citizen suit on other violations? On these issues judicial inter- 
pretations vary widely. It is not unusual for courts to conclude that the gov- 
ernment has or has not diligently prosecuted an action on virtually the 
same facts. Courts that find diligent prosecution often frame their analy- 
ses in terms of deference to prosecutorial discretion. At times this may be 
a disguise for hostility to the notion of citizen enforcement or for advancing 
states' rights, as most of the purportedly barring actions are state actions. 
Courts have held th'at many government actions have been diligently 
prosecuted, and therefore bar citizen suits, even though the actions had been 
concluded or did not require c ~ m p l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~ h e n  courts hold that such 
actions bar citizen suits, they entirely ignore the fact that Congress lim- 
ited the bar against citizen suits to actions that the government "is dili- 
gently prosecuting . . . to require compliance." Acknowledging these two 
limitations would hamper these courts in reaching their desired level of 
deference to prosecutorial discretion. These decisions ground their hold- 
ings on the Court's comments in Gwaltney's holding that citizen suits 
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement.396 Underlying 
the attitudes of these courts and of the Court in Gwaltney is the deep- 
rooted deference courts routinely give to the prosecutorial discretion of 
the executive branch, finding it difficult to reconcile the citizens' author- 
ity to seek judicial remedies for a violation with the prosecutor's discre- 
tion not to enforce against the violator or violation or to use administrative 
rather than judicial enforcement remedies.397 
. Judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion arises from the doctrine 
that actions committed to agency discretion are not subject to judicial re- 
view, for there is no law to apply in such re vie^."^ Of course, citizen 
suits do not ask courts for judicial review of agency actions or to overturn 
them. Citizen suits merely ask courts to find that the agency's actions are 
not adequate to bar citizen suits. And there is law to apply to whether the 
government actions are adequate to bar citizen suits; the law enunciated 
in the citizen suit preclusions (particularly that the actions are for com- 
pliance), augmented by the standards of review the courts have developed 
to determine whether to enter consent decrees enforcing federal statutes. 
The doctrine that actions committed to agency discretion are not subject 
to judicial review gathers particular strength when applied to decisions on 
295 See supra discussion and cases cited in Part II.D.2.b. 
396 Virtually every post-Gwaltney preclusion decision cited in this Part One begins its 
analysis with a citation to Gwalrney, although that decision did not consider the preclusion 
provision in the citizen suit sections. Other commentators have noted this. See Maples, 
supra note 144, at 204-05; Dickinson, supra note 144. at 1554; and Snook, supra note 
129, at 6. 
397 See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 
556 (1st Cir. 1991). See also supra discussion Part II.D.2.b and decisions cited there. 
39R Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 4 10 (1 97 1). 
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whether andlor how to prosecute. The Court in Heckler v. Char~ey '~~ re- 
counted that i t  had "recognized on several occasions over many years that an 
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 
criminal processes, is a decision generally committed to an agency's ab- 
solute discretion." There the Court considered a challenge to the decision 
of the Federal Food and Drug Administration not to enforce against an 
alleged violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic The Court 
began with the presumption of the Administrative Procedure Act that 
final agency actions are subject to judicial review.401 But i t  noted the ex- 
ception to this presumption when "agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law,"402 and held that "an agency's decision not to take en- 
forcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review" un- 
der that exception.403 It found agency decisions not to enforce particularly 
unsuitable for judicial review. 
The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an 
agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated bal- 
ancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its ex- 
pertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a viola- 
tion has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent 
on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to suc- 
ceed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested 
best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the 
agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An 
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of 
the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better 
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables in- 
volved in the proper ordering of its p r i~ r i t i e s .~~"  
The Court cautioned that agency decisions not to enforce were not al- 
ways immune from judicial review. "[Tlhe decision is only presumptively 
unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive 
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its 
enforcement p o ~ e r s . " " ~ ~  
"470 U.S. 82 I ,  83 1 (1985). 
4w 5 U.S.C. $5  501-706 (2000). The complaint was filed by convicts on death row seeking 
to require the FDA to prevent states from lethal injection by drugs that had not been ap- 
proved for that purpose by the FDA. 
4u' 5 U.S.C. $ 702 (2000). 
"oz 5 U.S.C. $ 701(a)(2) (2000). 
403 470 U.S. at 832. But see Justice Marshall's concurrence for a spirited disagreement 
with the Court's presumption of non-reviewability of decisions not to enforce. Id. at 840- 
55. 
4ar Id. at 83 1-32. 
405 Id. at 832-33. 
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The justification for enforcement discretion enunciated by the Court 
. 
in Chaney applies with equal force to enforcement under the pollution con- 
trol statutes. Environmental agencies, like the Federal Food and Drug Ad- 
ministration cannot address all violations because their resources are lim- 
ited, and they must therefore order enforcement priorities in accordance 
with their overall policies. 
Plaintiffs in some citizen suits have challenged EPA's enforcement dis- 
cretion directly, seeking judicial orders to require EPA to exercise an al- 
legedly mandatory duty to bring enforcement actions against violators."06 
Every court of appeals considering such a suit has held that EPA's en- 
forcement decisions are discretionary, not mandatory, and that, following 
Chaney, EPA decisions not to enforce are immune from judicial review.407 
Of course, citizen suits against violators do not seek judicial review 
of the government's enforcement decisions. They do not seek orders re- 
quiring EPA to enforce or requiring i t  to use enforcement resources in a 
manner contrary to its considered judgment. Citizen suits seek only to 
enforce against the violator. Rather than demanding that EPA expend its 
resources on particular violators, on particular violations, or in a particular 
way, citizen enforcers take on the task, enabling EPA to use its resources 
as it chooses. Thus the traditional reasons for judicial deference to prose- 
cutorial decisions not to enforce, articulated in Chaney, are inapplicable 
to citizen suits against violators. Violators may argue that citizen suits in- 
trude on agency decisions to favor violators by not enforcing against them or 
by enforcing against them too leniently. If so, that is an intrusion Con- 
gress specifically intended when enacting the citizen suit provisions. 
B. The Pernicious Effect of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation, Inc. 
The tradition of judicial deference to prosecutorial decisions is 
strong enough to cause some courts to react negatively when citizens in- 
directly question the government's enforcement decisions by seeking ju- 
dicial remedies for a violation that the government decided not to enforce 
against, chose to pursue with an administrative remedy, or settled on terms 
less favorable to the environment than deemed appropriate by the citi- 
z e n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Some of the Court's dicta in Gwaltney, for example, that citizen 
'%See,  e.g.,  K .  W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988). 
407See, e .g . ,  id. at 279; DuBois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 9 4 7 4 8  (8th Cir. 1987); 
Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 955 (3d Cir. 1987); City of 
Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 137 1,  1374 (5th Cir. 198 1); State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 
559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977); and Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 
1977). See also SHELDON M. NOVCIK, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 5 9.4 
(West 2003). 
Even courts that allow citizen suits to proceed in the face of a government action 
often begin their analysis with professions of deference to prosecutorial discretion. See 
supra note 326. 
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suits supplement rather than supplant government enforcement, encour- 
aged this negative reaction toward citizen suits.409 The holding in Gwalt- 
ney, however, stands for the narrow legal proposition that CWA 5 505 and 
citizen suit provisions worded like i t  authorize suit only for violations 
that are continuing or are reasonably certain to The Court's pri- 
mary reason for this holding was the plain English reading of the statute, 
authorizing citizens to sue those who were alleged "to be in violation" of the 
~ta tu te .~"  By using the present tense, the Court reasoned, Congress in- 
tended to authorize citizen suits for continuing violations and to preclude 
citizen suits for wholly past  violation^.^'^ This plain meaning interpreta- 
tion of the provisions, including their verbal tenses, of course, underlies 
many of the interpretations of the citizen suit preclusion device suggested 
in this Article. 
The Court bolstered its primary argument in Gwaltney with the ob- 
servation that the purpose of requiring prior notice to the violator was to 
allow it to avoid citizen suits by coming into ~ompliance.~" If citizens 
could sue for wholly past violations, prior notice would be meaningless, 
since the violator could not avoid suit by coming into compliance. While 
this argument appears logical, it  ignores reality. When a citizen alleges both 
present and past violations, the notice serves exactly the purpose pro- 
posed by the Court. Even when a citizen alleges only past violations, the 
violator benefits from the notice in several ways. For instance, i t  may try 
to avoid suit by convincing the citizen enforcer that the violator acted in 
good faith, that the violations were not serious and caused no harm, that 
the violator is in the process of complying, and that a citizen suit will 
serve no purpose. If the violator fails to persuade the citizen not to sue, 
the violator also may commence settlement negotiations to bring about a 
quick resolution, sparing itself and the courts the burden of prolonged 
litigation. And it should be remembered that prior notice to the violator is 
not required for some violations.414 The Court's secondary argument also 
ignores legislative intent. The legislative history amply demonstrates that 
the purpose of the prior notice provision is to allow the government an 
opportunity to exercise its enforcement authority, not to allow the violator 
to avoid suit by quick ~ompl iance .~ '~  If the Court had stopped with its sec- 
ondary argument, although that analysis was flawed, its plain meaning 
primary analysis would have been persuasive and sufficient. Its holding 
409See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,  6 0  
(1987). 
410 Id. at 52. 
4 1 1  33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(I) (2000). 
412 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S.  at 56-59. 
413 Id. at 59-60. 
414 See supra note 92. 
415 See supra notes 1 10-1 13, 1 16 and accompanying text. 
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would have somewhat narrowed the scope of citizen enforcement, but it 
would not have cast a pall over citizen suits in other contexts.416 
Not content with its primary and secondary arguments, however, the 
Court developed a questionable tertiary argument that has had broad nega- 
tive impact on citizen suits. The crux of this argument is that citizen suits 
are of subordinate importance in the enforcement scheme; they are meant 
only "to supplement rather than to supplant governmental a~ t ion ."~"  Thus 
the citizen suit provisions should be interpreted not to change "the nature 
of the citizen's role from interstitial to potentially intrusive."418 The wording 
of the Court's peroration is puzzling. "To supplement" means "to add 
"To supplant" means "to take the place of."420 Of course, citizen suits add 
to government enforcement when citizens act in the absence of government 
enforcement or when they act to strengthen weak government enforce- 
ment. Citizen suits do not replace government enforcement unless citizen 
suits bar subsequent government action and nothing in the statutes or case 
law suggests they do.4" The citizen suit provisions do not change the role 
of citizen enforcers from "interstitial" to "intrusive," the provisions give 
citizens a role in enforcement where they had none before.422 If it is intru- 
sive for citizens to second-guess government decisions not to enforce, 
that is exactly what Congress intended by enacting the provisions. By speci- 
fying in the provision that the government could bar a citizen suit against 
particular violations by commencing and diligently prosecuting a com- 
pliance action, Congress made it clear that the government could not bar 
a citizen suit by taking no action against the violations. 
The Court's statement that allowing citizens to enforce against wholly 
past violations will supplant rather than supplement government enforce- 
4 1 6  Because violations generally must be ongoing or likely to recur to justify the issu- 
ance of an injunction, the primary effect of the ruling was on suits maintainable for civil 
penalties. 
4'7 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. 
4 1 8  Id. at 61. 
4 1 9  WEBSTER'S EVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 884 (1 999). 
420 Id. 
43 Indeed, the scant case law on the issue suggests that citizen suits do not bar gov- 
ernment enforcement. See People v. Acme Fill Corp. 1997 WL 685254, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
1997) (holding that settlement of citizen suit has no res judicara effect of subsequent state 
enforcement action). 
422 Prior to the enactment of citizen suit authorities, citizens attempted to bring qui ram 
actions to enforce against violations of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 407 (2000), a prede- 
cessor of the CWA. All such attempts were rejected. See Jacklovich v. Interlake, Inc., 458 
F.2d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1972); Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 
90 (2d Cir. 1972); Gerbing v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971); 
Mitchell v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D.S.C. 1971); Lavagnino v. 
Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323, 325 (D. Colo. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman 
Soc'y of America v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Enquist v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347, 349 (D. Neb. 1971); U.S. ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest 
Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 
848, 850 (D. Wisc. 1971); and Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446, 447 (W.D. 
Wash. 1970). See also Bucy, supra note 102, at 44 (article on qui ram actions). 
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ment is simply a non sequitur. Citizen suits do not supplant government 
actions any more for enforcement against past violations than they do for 
enforcement against present violations. If the Court's tertiary argument is 
puzzling, the support for its argument is more so: a misreading and mischar- 
acterization of legislative history, an illogical deduction from the mischar- 
acterized legislative history, and an illogical 
The Court quoted the Senate Report accompanying the enactment of 
the CWA in support of its conclusion that citizen suits were of a subordi- 
nate nature. "The Senate Report noted, that '[tlhe Committee intends the 
great volume of enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,' and 
that citizen suits are proper only 'if the Federal, State, and local agencies 
fail to exercise their enforcement resp~nsibilities." '~~~ The quoted language 
appears in a discussion of EPA's enforcement authority in CWA 5 309425 
not in a discussion of the CWA's citizen suit provision in 9 505.426 Read 
in its entirety, the meaning of the Senate Report language is quite differ- 
ent than the meaning the Court gives it: 
The Committee . . . notes that the [enforcement] authority of the 
Federal Government should be used judiciously by the Admin- 
istrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal action because of 
their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee in- 
tends the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the 
State. It is clear that the Administrator is not to establish an en- 
forcement bureaucracy but rather to reserve his authority for the 
cases of paramount interest. 
It should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local agencies 
fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, the public is pro- 
vided the right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the 
citizen suit provisions of section 505.427 
The Report language focuses on EPA enforcement, not citizen enforce- 
ment. It suggests an expectation that federal enforcement will be restrained, 
but that citizen enforcement will be available if government enforcement 
is too restrained. It conveys no notion that citizen enforcement is subor- 
dinate to government enforcement. Indeed, it contains neither the language 
nor the implication that citizen suits are "proper only" under the stated 
circumstances the Court asserts. 
423 See infra discussion accompanying notes 432-440. 
424Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
425 33 U.S.C. 9 1319 (2000). 
42633 U.S.C. 5 1365; S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668,3730. 
427 Id. 
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Based entirely on its out of context quote from the Senate Report, 
the Court concluded that "[plermitting citizen suits for wholly past vio- 
lations of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for 
the citizen If citizen suits are supplementary, their supplementary 
nature does not suggest that they are more appropriate againstcontinuing 
violations than against wholly past violations, and the Court suggests no 
such reason. 
If the Court's concern, as it later hints, is that citizen suits can inter- 
fere with the government's enforcement action, surely the potential for 
such interference is greater for enforcement against continuing violations 
than for enforcement against wholly past violations. Ideally, the govern- 
ment will place a priority on abatement of continuing violations, making 
the potential for citizen interference more likely in such cases. More im- 
portantly, where both suits are for wholly past violations, both enforcers 
will be seeking only penalties. If the citizens are successful in recovering 
penalties after the government has already done so, the additional penal- 
ties do not interfere with government's action. Indeed, the Treasury is dou- 
bly enriched.429 And the violators will not be inappropriately penalized, 
for the statutes direct courts to assess penalties considering several fac- 
tors, including "such . . . matters as justice may require."430 Surely, the 
amount of penalties already paid for a violation is such a matter.431 But 
where continuing violations are at issue, both enforcers will be seeking 
abatement injunctions and penalties. There is more potential for citizens 
to interfere with the government's action for injunctive relief than for penal- 
ties. 
The example the Court develops to illustrate its concerns and con- 
clusion is equally illogical. It posits a situation in which a violator agrees 
with EPA to install unusually expensive and advanced control equipment 
that not only will bring the violator into compliance but will result in its 
achieving pollution control well beyond that required by law. In return 
for undertaking pollution control beyond that required by law, EPA limits 
its enforcement action to an administrative compliance order, agreeing not to 
seek penalties. The Court concluded that "[ilf citizens could file suit, months 
428 Gwalmey, 484 U.S. at 60. 
429 The Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. 5 3302(c)(l) (2000), requires that pen- 
alties assessed in citizen suit cases be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Friends of the Earth 
v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9152, at *7 n.3 ("The penalties 
imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the treasury and not be recovered 
by the citizen bringing the suit."). See also H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted 
in 1 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 753, 820 (1973). 
430See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000). Although this penalty factor is found 
in the EPA enforcement section, the citizen suit section authorizes courts in citizen suits to 
assess penalties under it. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000). 
43'See PIRG of N.J.,  Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 153841  (D.N.J. 1993), 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995), in which plaintiffs argued the 
court should take into account penalties the defendant paid to the government when as- 
sessing penalties in the citizen suit. 
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or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator 
chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in 
the public interest would be curtailed considerably."432 There are at least 
six problems with the Court's deductions from this hypothetical. 
First, by enacting the citizen suit provision, Congress curtailed the 
agency's ability to assure a violator that it would not be enforced against.433 
The question is whether it curtailed it sufficiently to allow citizen en- 
forcement in the situation posited by the Court. 
Second, the Court's hypothetical is a red herring: none of the more than 
125 decisions cited in Part One involve a situation similar to the one posited 
by the 
Third, if the defendant achieved more than the required pollution re- 
duction by spending more than required for mere compliance, it in es- 
sence both achieved compliance and paid a penalty to the extent of its extra, 
otherwise unrequired expenditure. The court could take that extra expen- 
diture into account as a penalty and another matter "as justice may re- 
to reduce what otherwise would be an appropriate penalty. 
Fourth, the citizen's interference with the government's agreement not 
to impose penalties is the same, whether the citizen suit and the govern- 
ment's agreement is directed at continuing violations or at wholly past 
violations. Why would the government's discretion be curtailed more if 
citizens could file suit years later in the case of wholly past violations rather 
than weeks later in the case of continuing violations? The example is of 
no use in justifying why citizens should be able to enforce against con- 
tinuing but not against wholly past violations. 
Fifth, suppose the hypothetical order and agreement were to forego 
penalties in return for the violator coming into compliance at glacial speed 
by using an outmoded, cheap, and unreliable control technology. In that 
case, the government's action may have abated pollution in the short 
term, but it provided neither general nor specific deterrence for continued 
compliance. Would it not be in the public interest for citizens to seek penal- 
432 Gwalmey, 484 U.S. at 61. 
433 It left EPA free to decide not to enforce against a particular violation. But it did not 
leave EPA free to decide, in the absence of its own enforcement in court, that no one else 
could enforce against that violation. 
434 The hypothetical is somewhat similar to the concept of "supplemental enforcement 
projects" ("SEPs"), environmental improvement projects beyond any requirement of law, 
which EPA may agree to accept in lieu of some part of the appropriate penalty. EPA does 
so, however, only in consent decrees. See EPA Supplemental Enforcement Projects Policy 
(Apr. 10, 1998), ENVT'L L. REP. I Admin. Mat. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35703. 
435 The statutes typically include "such other matters as justice may require" as  the last 
factor that courts are to consider in determining the amount of a penalty to assess. See. 
e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000). Courts recognize they have the ability in assessing 
penalties to take into account penalties already paid for the same violations. In Hercules, 
830 F. Supp. at 1538-40, defendant sought dismissal of a citizen action seeking duplicative 
penalties for the same violations. The plaintiff argued it was entitled to maintain its action 
despite the earlier state penalties but assumed the court would take them into account when 
it reached its own penalty assessment. Id. at 1538. The court agreed. Id. at 1539-40. 
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ties to assure such deterrence? How would a citizen suit for penalties undo 
the compliance achieved by the government action? Or suppose the hy- 
pothetical order did not require compliance and imposed no penalties? Be- 
- 
cause the EPA order in the Court's example required the violator to com- 
ply, the example cannot be read to justify deference to a government action 
that does not require compliance. To do so would be to misapply the ex- 
ample, as well as to disregard the wording of the bar element436 and the pol- 
icy of the statutes. 
Sixth, allowing citizen suits to seek penalties in the Court's hypo- 
thetical would not discourage violators from entering into settlements with 
EPA for the many reasons discussed above.437 Citizens do not often sue to 
enforce against violations subject to a settlement with EPA. Few of the cited 
cases involve such a suit, and none do so in the situation posited by the 
Court. In any event, if EPA wants to insulate the violator from a citizen 
suit, Congress provided a mechanism for doing so: an action in open court 
in which citizens could intervene, rather than in a consent administrative 
order negotiated in private.438 There is, of course, a large difference between 
an administrative order on consent and a consent decree. The consent 
decree must be reviewed and approved by the court as comporting with the 
statute being enforced and citizens may intervene and oppose its entry. 
The administrative order on consent is not subject to public notice, judi- 
cial approval, or citizen intervention. In short, the consent decree is sub- 
- - 
ject to transparency, the consent administrative order is not. The trans- 
parency afforded by citizen participation in enforcement was one of the 
purposes Congress had in authorizing citizen suits. 
Although the Court's tertiary argument in Gwaltney was unneces- 
sary, ill-conceived, and illogical, some courts have cited it in deciding 
almost every legal issue under the citizen suit provisions narrowly to re- 
strict citizen suit even when such interpretations ignore the 
primary interpretive tool used by the Court in Gwaltney, the plain Eng- 
lish reading of the present tense.440 These courts viewed citizen enforce- 
436 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000), barring a citizen suit if the gov- 
ernment "is diligently prosecuting a civil action . . . to require compliance" (emphasis added). 
437 See discussion supra accompanying notes 145-146. 
438 Embodying such agreements in judicial consent decrees is more transparent and 
protective of the public interest than embodying them in consent administrative orders. 
Independent judges must approve consent decrees, reviewing them for consistency with the 
statute being enforced and with the public interest. See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp 
Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 85-86 (D. Alaska 1977). Moreover, the DOJ provides public notice 
of proposed consent decrees enforcing environmental laws, soliciting public comment. It 
makes the comments available to the judge and reserves the right to withdraw its consent 
to a decree based on the public comments. DOJ, Consent Judgment in Actions to Enjoin 
Discharges of Pollutants, 28 CFR 5 50.7 (2004). 
439 Post-Gwalmey decisions unfavorable to citizen plaintiffs invariably cite, quote, and 
rely on Gwalmey. See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 
F.2d 552, 555-58 (1st Cir. 1991). 
M0 See Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-58, the most egregious example of disregarding the 
plain English of the statute. Among other things, the decision held that violators against 
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ment as undercutting the prosecutor's decisions not to enforce, to use en- 
forcement remedies other than judicial, or to settle on unfavorable terms. 
Their view that prosecutorial discretion should preclude enforcement action 
by others is quite different from the rationale the Court set forth in Chaney 
as the justification for prosecutorial discretion. There it viewed the im- 
perative as the prosecutor's need to maximize enforcement through tar- 
geted use of his scarce enforcement  resource^.^' Citizen suits, of course, do 
not intrude on that imperative at all; indeed, they extend the prosecutor's 
resources. 
The Court reinforced its negative message toward citizen suits in 
Gwaltney by a series of rulings limiting the standing of citizens to bring 
such The Court repudiated much of this repressive standing doc- 
trine443 that may help to reverse the,perception that the Court has a gener- 
ally negative view of citizen suits. The Court's positive view of citizen 
suits in Laidlaw may reduce the divide between citizen-friendly courts 
and prosecutor friendly courts, a divide that is evident throughout much 
of citizen suit jurisprudence. 
No court considering statutory preclusion issues has recognized that 
the preclusion before it was part of the theme and variations pattern of 
preclusions on both EPA and citizen enforcement in all of the environ- 
mental statutes. When that is recognized, it becomes abundantly clear 
that Congress determined how much deference i t  intended be given to the 
prosecutorial discretion of the first prosecutor to enforce and articulated 
that intention in the constants and variations in the preclusions. It con- 
structed a spectrum of preclusions on EPA enforcement, with weaker 
ones applying to statutes or programs in which Congress intended states 
to have no role in implementing. It constructed a different spectrum of 
preclusions on citizen enforcement, with the weaker ones applying to 
violations involving hazardous materials.444 The preclusions on citizen 
enforcement are usually, but not always, stronger than preclusions on EPA 
enforcement. When ,courts understand this pattern, it should be easier for 
them to apply the preclusions that Congress intended rather than fanciful 
constructs in some judges' eyes. 
whom a 9: 309(g) penalty has been assessed are not subject to actions seeking injunctions 
for compliance, despite the fact that CWA Q: 309(g) provides only that persons against 
whom Q: 309(g) administrative penalties have been assessed "shall not be subject of a civil 
penalty action." 33 U.S.C. Q: 1319(g)(6)(A) (2000). 
441 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). 
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defend- 
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); and Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
")Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). 
4 4 4 T h i ~  makes it easier for citizens to abate the most dangerous violations, those in- 
volving releases of health-threatening pollutants. 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 491 2004 
492 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 28 
IV. CONCLUSION: UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF PRECLUSIONS IN 
CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS 
Congress enacted broad authority for citizen suits to promote com- 
pliance with environmental laws and to provide for citizen participation 
in environmental protection. It believed citizen suit authority would pro- 
mote compliance by encouraging more plentiful and more effective gov- 
ernment enforcement and by providing default citizen enforcers if the 
government failed to enforce or to enforce effectively. Congress qualified 
this broad authority to limit disruption or conflict from successive ac- 
tions, and limit undue harassment of defendants. One element of the de- 
vice was the diligent prosecution bar. The purposes of the authority and 
the qualification to it are not altogether complimentary, but are the result 
of compromise. Thus different parts of the citizen suit provisions cannot 
be interpreted through the lens of a single legislative purpose. Congres- 
sional intent is better understood by recognizing that Congress compro- 
mised this amalgam of purposes and qualifications in the particular ways 
it worded and limited the provisions. While the best indicia of congres- 
sional intent is normally the words it uses in statutes, it is particularly 
true when a provision, such as the citizen suit provision, is the result of 
compromising multiple divergent goals. That conclusion is reinforced by 
the theme and variations nature of the preclusion device, a device that 
Congress repeated in the EPA and citizen suit provisions of the statutes, 
but repeated with variations in each of its elements to express different 
balances between its purposes and qualifications. The citizen suit provi- 
sions, then, are best interpreted by reference to their plain English meanings. 
Most courts have used a plain English meaning interpretation of most 
issues arising under the provisions, with straightforward and compatible 
results. A minority of courts have reached tortured and aberrant results 
by disregarding the plain meaning of the provisions and instead inter- 
preting them to defer as much as possible to the government's enforcement 
discretion. This elevates a qualification of the citizen suit provisions over 
the purpose of the provisions, a perverse result. These interpretations and 
their results are not true to, and indeed do violence to, the wording and 
history of the provisions, and should be disregarded. That violators, not 
prosecutors, are the vocal advocates of deference to prosecutorial deci- 
sions, underlines the perverse nature of the minority interpretation. 
A plain English interpretation of the typical diligent prosecution bar 
prevents citizens from filing a citizen suit complaint for a particular vio- 
lation if, and only if, ( I )  prior to the time the citizen has filed her com- 
plaint, (2) the government has commenced (3) an enforcement action speci- 
fied in the provision (4) by filing a complaint in the forum specified in 
the provision; (5) the government action is still pending and (6) is being 
diligently prosecuted; (7) and the government action addresses violations 
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of the same requirements the citizen plaintiff alleged were violated (8) in 
a manner capable of and calculated to require compliance. 
If the forum specified in the provision is a court, the court must be 
an Article I11 court or its state equivalent. An action is still pending if it 
has not been resolved by a dispositive motion, a trial on the merits, or a 
consent decree entered by the court. Diligent prosecution means the gov- 
ernment is prosecuting the action with reasonable speed, energy, resources, 
determination, and effectiveness calculated to achieve compliance. An ac- 
tion is capable of and calculated to require compliance if it seeks an in- 
junction requiring compliance or penalties in an amount sufficient to de- 
ter violation, e.g., in an amount larger than necessary to recover the eco- 
nomic benefit the violator has secured by non-compliance. 
This interpretation flows directly from the words used by Congress 
in the EPA enforcement and citizen suit provisions, including the verbal 
tenses it used in the provisions. The interpretation assures a vibrant use 
of citizen suits to secure compliance with the pollution control statutes. It 
also preserves the unfettered ability of government enforcers to prosecute 
any violator, and to do so free of whatever complications citizen suits may 
cause, as long as the prosecutor moves with reasonable dispatch to secure 
compliance, uses the enforcement tools that Congress determined were 
sufficient to do so, and seeks compliance. 
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